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Abstract
Operational practices of both power transmission and distribution grids are impacted
by the increasing connection of renewable energy resources, electric vehicles and
energy storage systems. A timely and accurate knowledge of the system state, cou-
pled with a level of automation able to protect or control the system, enables a better
operation of the electrical grids. In this respect, synchrophasor networks, might pro-
vide system operators with wide-area, synchronized, low latency, high refresh-rate
measurements from phasor measurement units (PMUs). This thesis focuses on the
design and validation of resilient synchrophasor networks in order to address some of
the challenges that are preventing the adoption in real-ﬁelds of what proposed by the
literature. First, the architectural layers of synchrophasor networks are described with
particular focus on the time dissemination techniques suitable for phasor measure-
ment units. Then, we propose a new data-pushing logic able to minimize the latency
introduced at the concentration point without increasing the data incompleteness.
The data-pushing logic is validated in three real synchrophasor networks adopting
different telecom infrastructures (i.e., 4G-LTE, optical ﬁber links and twisted pairs).
In the context of reliable operation of synchrophasor networks, we propose an algo-
rithm able to deal with intentional or unintentional bad data measurements. We also
impersonate an attacker and we show that it is possible to forge delay attacks undetec-
table by state-of-the-art bad-data detection algorithms that can lead to physical grid
damage. We use the proposed bad data algorithm as an effective way of neutralizing
these attacks.
The IEEE C37.118 Class-P Std compliant synchrophasor extraction algorithm adopted
in the real-ﬁelds is also implemented and validated in a GPS-synchronized real-time
simulator. The simulated PMUs are used to validate two applications for the real-time
protection and control of electrical networks by means of synchrophasor technology.
The ﬁrst one is a protection scheme that relies on PMU-based real-time state estima-
tion processes to detect a fault and identify the faulted line. Then, we validate in a
real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) setup, the Grid Explicit Congestion Notiﬁcation
(GECN) voltage control mechanism for distribution networks, already presented in the
literature. We show that, by leveraging on the accurate knowledge of the system state,
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GECN is able to control the state of the system in time-scales of seconds, in order to
maintain its voltage level within predeﬁned limits.
Keywords: Phasor measurement unit; WAMPAC; synchrophasor network; phasor data
concentrator; state estimation; bad data; time-synchronization; time-attack; fault
detection and location; hardware-in-the-loop; ﬁeld trials.
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Résumé
L’exploitation en temps réel des réseaux de transport et de distribution d’électricité
est inﬂuencée par la pénétration croissante des sources d’énergie renouvelable, des
véhicules électriques et des systèmes de stockage d’énergie. Une connaissance précise
de l’état du système, associée à un niveau d’automatisation capable de le protéger ou
de le contrôler, permettrait un meilleur fonctionnement de celui-ci. À cet égard, les
réseaux de synchrophaseur peuvent fournir aux opérateurs du réseau des mesures,
sur une grande portée, avec un taux de rafraichissement élevé, et à faible latence à
partir d’unités de mesure de phaseurs (PMUs). Cette thèse porte sur la conception et
la validation de réseaux de synchrophaseurs résilients aﬁn de répondre à certains des
déﬁs qui empêchent encore l’adoption dans le monde réel de tels systèmes comme
le propose la littérature. Tout d’abord, les couches architecturales des réseaux de syn-
chrophaseurs sont décrites en mettant l’accent en particulier sur les techniques de
diffusion temporelle adaptées aux unités de mesure du phaseur. Ensuite, nous pro-
posons une nouvelle logique de poussée de données capable de minimiser la latence
introduite au point de concentration sans augmenter la perte des données. La logique
de transmission de données est validée dans trois réseaux réels de synchrophaseurs
adoptant différentes infrastructures de télécommunication (c’est-à-dire 4G-LTE, des
liaisons à ﬁbres optiques et des paires torsadées).
Dans le contexte du fonctionnement ﬁable des réseaux de synchrophaseurs, nous
proposons un algorithme capable de traiter des mesures intentionnellement ou non
intentionnellement erronées. Nous représentons également un système d’attaque
et nous montrons qu’il est possible de réaliser des attaques causant des retards in-
détectables par des algorithmes de détection de données erronées réputés être à la
pointe, pouvant ainsi conduire à des dommages physiques au réseau. Nous utilisons
l’algorithme de données erronées proposé comme un moyen efﬁcace de neutraliser
ces attaques.
L’algorithme IEEE C37.118 classe-P Std compatible avec l’algorithme d’extraction de
synchrophaseur adopté dans les applications réelles est également implémenté et
validé dans un simulateur GPS synchronisé en temps réel. Les PMU simulées sont
utilisées pour valider deux applications pour la protection et le contrôle en temps réel
v
Abstract
des réseaux électriques au moyen de la technologie de synchrophaseurs. Le premier
est un système de protection qui repose sur des processus d’estimation d’état en
temps réel basés sur les PMUs pour détecter un défaut et identiﬁer la ligne en défaut.
Ensuite, nous validons en temps réel la conﬁguration HIL, le mécanisme de contrôle
de tension GECN pour les réseaux de distribution, déjà présenté dans la littérature.
Nous montrons qu’en utilisant la connaissance précise de l’état du système, GECN
est capable de contrôler l’état du système dans des échelles de temps de l’ordre de
secondes, aﬁn de maintenir son niveau de tension dans des limites prédéﬁnies.
Keywords : Unités de mesure de phaseurs ; WAMPAC; réseaux de synchrophaseurs ;
concentration des phaseurs ; estimation d’etat ; données erronées; synchronisation
temporelle ; attaque temporelle ; détection et localisation des défauts ; hardware-in-
the-loop; essais sur le terrain.
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Introduction
Motivation
Apower grid is an ever growing complex infrastructure experiencing large changes such
as integration of renewable generation, load growth, integration of electric vehicles
and energy storage, to name a few. A real-time accurate knowledge of the system state
has deemed to be crucial to better operate the grid under such changes, increase the
effectiveness of system utilization, ensure the security of supply and prevent blackouts.
Driven by these concerns, the deployment of synchrophasor technology is taking place
in transmission networks, where these measurements have been considered as the
enabler of the so-called wide area monitoring. Although the deployment of a single
phasor measurement unit does not pose any particular problems, the operation of the
so-called synchrophasor network1 still presents unique challenges.
At the same time, the concept of wide-area monitoring, protection and control, can
be scaled down and adopted in distribution networks to meet the increased reliability
requirements of these systems. An augmented level of automation, coupled with
low latency, high-refresh rate monitoring, can smooth the impact that distributed
energy resources are having on the protection and voltage management practices
of distribution systems. For these reasons, major efforts are currently under way to
implement synchronized measurement technology in distribution networks enabling
distribution network operators to change the operational practices of passive and
active distribution networks.
Within this context, this thesis aims at addressing the main challenges that are pre-
venting the adoption in the control rooms of what proposed by the literature on
synchrophasor networks. Among the highlighted issues, the time, as fundamental
component of any synchrophasor networks, represents the guideline throughout the
manuscript.
1With the term synchrophasor network, we here refer to the architecture that, starting from multiple
measurement points, is able to take protection and control actions on the network.
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Dissertation outline
This thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 presents the state-of-the-art in power system real-time situational aware-
ness with particular focus on the role played by PMUs. Insight on the status of the
current research and operational practices are given, always keeping the focus on the
challenges that have still to be addressed. Additionally, the major efforts that are cur-
rently under way to implement synchronized measurement technology in distribution
networks are presented.
In Chapter 2 the architectural layers of modern synchrophasor networks are presented
together with their key-components. Particular focus is given to the importance of the
time synchronization and time dissemination in order to meet the stringent latency
requirements of some applications. In this context, the time dissemination techniques
suitable for synchrophasor networks are introduced together with advantages and
drawbacks when adopted in power systems.
Chapter 3 presents functions and applications that we envisioned as time-critical for
a successful operation of a synchrophasor network. We propose a new data-pushing
logic for data concentrators in order to reduce time latency. Additionally, functions to
obtain a reliable estimate of the system’s state are given. The second half of the chapter
presents two state-estimation-based applications that exploit the availability of PMU
data with different time constraints: (i) an application that, in time-scales of hundreds
of milliseconds, leverages on the state estimation results to provide protection functi-
ons to the monitored network, and (ii) an application conceived to be able to control
the state of the system in time-scales of seconds, in order to maintain its voltage level
within predeﬁned limits.
Chapter 4 starts with the analysis of state-of-the-art bad data detection and identiﬁ-
cation methods for power grid situation awareness systems. Then, a novel bad data
detection method able to deal with intentional or unintentional tampering of syn-
chrophasor measurements is presented. In the second part of the chapter it is shown
that it is possible to forge attacks to the time reference of a number of synchrophasors
that are undetectable by state-of-the-art bad data detection methods and, at the same
time, lead to physical grid damage. At the end of the chapter, the proposed bad data
detection method is tested as a countermeasure to neutralize the attack.
Chapter 5 provides the experimental validation of the functions and applications
presented in the previous chapters. The two applications that cope with faults or
voltage violations are validated in a GPS synchronized real-time simulation platform.
In this respect, the chapter describes (i) the platform and (ii) the implementation
and validation of a real IEEE C37.118 Class-P Std compliant synchrophasor extraction
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algorithm used under these operating conditions. Moreover, three real ﬁeld trials are
described with their characteristics. They are used to experimentally validate the data
concentrator pushing logic and the real-time state estimation functionality proposed
in the thesis.
A summary of the main outcomes, remarks and future work concludes this dissertation.
Contributions
A list of the original contributions of the thesis can be found here below:
1. We design a phasor data concentrator (PDC) that, in addition to the data-pushing
logics suggested by the reference standard, implements a logic that minimizes
the latency introduced by the PDC without increasing the data incompleteness.
The performance of the data-pushing logic is assessed and compared in terms
of reliability, determinism and reduction of the overall latency in three real sy-
nchrophasor networks adopting different telecom infrastructures (i.e., 4G-LTE,
optical ﬁber links and twisted pairs). The experimental results show that the
proposed logic is indeed characterized by the lowest latency contribution.
2. We deﬁne and validate a protection mechanism for fault detection and faulted
line identiﬁcation that relies on PMU-based real-time state estimation processes.
We show that, in terms of latency and accuracy, the proposed process is suitable
for both transmission or distribution networks (active or passive), with solid-
earthed and unearthed neutral, for low- and high-impedance faults of any kind
(symmetric and asymmetric) occurring at different locations.
3. We deﬁne an algorithm for the pre-estimation ﬁltering of bad data in PMU-based
power system linear state estimators. The algorithm is able to assess the reliability
of the incoming measurements by leveraging on the conﬁdence in the predicted
system state. The algorithm is proven to be computationally efﬁcient and robust
against multiple bad data of different nature and magnitudes. Additionally,
the algorithm is able to distinguish between actual bad data and unexpected
operating conditions and thus suitable for being adopted in real PMU-based
state estimators.
4. We show that it is possible to forge delay attacks that are undetectable by state-of-
the-art bad-data detection algorithms. We give a closed form for an undetectable
attack that imposes two phase offset to two or more PMUs. We also propose
different methods for combining two-delays attacks to produce a larger impact.
We prove that the attacks are successful and can lead to physical grid damage.
5. Using a hardware-in-the-loop setup, we assess in real-time the performance
3
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of a voltage control mechanism (already presented in the literature) for distri-
bution networks. We model the network, the measurement devices, the data
concentration, the real-time state-estimation and the control mechanism in the
hardware and software chain. This enables us to assess the performance, in
terms of accuracy and latency, of the proposed processes.
4
1 State of the art in power systems
real-time situational awareness
The availability of synchronized measurements, provided by phasor measurement
units (PMUs), is able to offer a real-time view of the behavior of a power system. The
associated real-time knowledge of the system state has triggered the development of
speciﬁc applications to better operate the grid, increase the effectiveness of system
utilization, ensure the security of supply, and prevent blackouts. At the same time,
an integrated architecture capable of enhancing the power system performance has
unique deployment challenges. In this chapter, we present the state-of-the-art in
power system real-time situational awareness. We give insights on the status of the
current research and operational practices always keeping the focus on the challenges
that have still to be addressed. Additionally, we introduce the major efforts that are cur-
rently under way to implement synchronized measurement technology in distribution
networks.
1.1 Wide area monitoring protection and control systems
There is no common deﬁnition for a wide area monitoring, protection and control
(WAMPAC) system, as it represent a complex infrastructure consisting of different
system solutions aimed at meeting various application requirements. The building
blocks are: synchrophasor measurements, high precision time synchronization, data
communication and concentration, applications, and visualization tools. There is no
commondesign forWAMPAC systems since their architecture is function of the speciﬁc
applications’ needs. On the other hand, a feature that is common for all the WAMPAC
systems is the use of system-wide information and their capacity to communicate
selected local information to a remote concentration point in order to achieve a given
task [1].
The concept of WAMPAC in power systems is usually framed in the context of large -
interconnected - transmission systems. Research explored several aspects of WAMPAC
5
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Figure 1.1 – Distribution of papers with respect to each category. Adapted from [2].
systems and real deployments have already taken place at the transmission level as
summarized in what follows.
1.1.1 Research
In the latest years, PMUs are rapidly being deployed in electric power networks and
consequently WAMPAC systems are emerging as advanced monitoring, protection and
control infrastructures. Researchers have investigated a multitude of topics among
which the PMU structural design, PMU placement, PMU applications within the
substation and various wide-area functionalities. A classiﬁcation of the publications
on these topics on IEEE and IET journals and standards (up to 2014), includes the
following categories, as reported in [2] and depicted in Fig. 1.1:
1. PMU algorithms and PMU/wide area monitoring systems (WAMS) structural
issues;
2. State estimation consisting of or based on PMU data;
3. Model validation, calibration and extraction via PMU data;
4. Fault/event detection and location using PMU data;
5. WAMS-based dynamic/stability monitoring and prediction;
6. WAMS-based control strategies;
7. WAMS-based protection schemes.
While the early research has been devoted primarily to the PMU algorithms and PMU/-
WAMS structural issues, the latest years have been characterized by a growing interest
6
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towards the development of robust wide-area-based monitoring, protection and cont-
rol applications.
As the ﬁrst requirement for realizing wide-area systems is the time-synchronized
sampling over an entire power system, satellite based time dissemination systems have
been largely adopted as preferred solution [3, 4, 5]. In this respect, attacks on the time-
synchronization receivers have been a major concern in the literature. Indeed, the aim
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report [4] is to “identify,
analyze and provide guidance on technologies, standards and methodologies for
addressing the practical timing challenges that are currently being experienced in wide
area time synchronization”. The concept of time-synchronization in a synchrophasor
network and the related challenges are further expanded in this manuscript.
In addition to PMU algorithms and their time-synchronization, researchers are inves-
tigating all the fundamental components of WAMPAC systems. High-performance
communication systems and information and communications technology (ICT) ar-
chitectures have been explored in terms of impact on the reliability of the WAMPAC
applications, for example, in [6, 7, 8]. Classical state estimation and bad-data detection
techniques have been revised speciﬁcally to include PMU data (e.g., [9, 10, 11]). Ad-
ditionally, state estimators relying entirely on PMU measurements have also been
proposed (e.g., [12]). Research efforts are devoted to the PMU-based identiﬁcation of
grid impedancematrices [13] and Thevenin equivalents [14], necessary for themajority
of the monitoring and protection algorithms for wide area systems. Researchers have
produced a large number of fault detection and location schemes based on PMU data.
In general, these schemes leverage on the accuracy and high refresh rate of PMUs. Due
to the extent of the literature and the heterogeneity of the fault scenarios, a review on
the current practices is given in Chapter 3.2.1.
1.1.2 Operation practices
The outcomes of the research and the success of ﬁrst prototype systems led to the de-
velopment and testing in real ﬁelds of applications designed to (i) reduce the number
and impact of large failures and (ii) detect initiation of disturbances. Nevertheless, as
reported in [15], there is still a major conﬁdence gap in the industry between using syn-
chrophasor tools for ofﬂine applications and the willingness to rely on synchrophasor
tools for real-time critical applications.
Indeed, various publications reported the status of practical applications for different
utilities and countries (e.g., [16, 17, 18]). The maturity of elementary applications (i.e.,
monitoring, model validation) is proven [16, 17, 18, 19]. In contrast, more advanced
functions (e.g., control, protections) are still in an early phase. In particular, wide-area
control and protection applications are mainly under development and in general not
7
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Figure 1.2 – Planned introduction of wide area technology. Adapted from [18].
Figure 1.3 – Type of WAMPAC systems in operation. Adapted from [18].
yet mature enough to be considered as consolidated industry products, as described in
[18]. A wider deployment of such advanced functions is expected to happen in the near
future. In this respect, a survey was distributed to electrical utilities worldwide in order
to understand the intentions of network operators to adopt wide area technologies
and the current type of WAMPAC system in operations. Fig. 1.2 and 1.3 summarize the
outcome of the survey.
In Fig. 1.4 it is illustrated the value that synchronized measurements can bring to the
industry in terms of wide area applications. The feasibility of the targeted applications
is also shown as function of the deployment challenge (number of PMUs needed,
communication and application requirements).
The feasibility of these functions depends on the further advancements in several
engineering ﬁelds. In what follows we provide an overview on the challenges that are
preventing to operate a power system as an unique intelligent wide area system.
8
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Figure 1.4 – Synchronized measurements and industry needs for power transmission
systems. Adapted from [20].
1.1.3 Ongoing challenges
The discrepancy between what presented in the literature and what currently in use
in real-power systems is due to the following challenges imposed by the real-ﬁeld
deployment:
• Time synchronization: Several concerns have been expressed on the dissemina-
tion of an accurate time-reference for power system equipment. Issues might
arise, for example, from time discontinuities (e.g., leap seconds) or the jamming
and spooﬁng of time-signals [4]. Meanwhile, we are assisting to an increasing
proliferation of devices requiring precise time synchronization in power system.
This is leading to the exploration of alternative time dissemination methods and
towards attempts to increase the robustness of existing technologies [5].
• Latency of the control signals: As highlighted in [2], one of the most critical
barriers against the implementation of many theoretically-proven control and
protection algorithms is the signal latency. This practical challenge has been only
marginally discussed in the literature. In the real ﬁeld, a delayed control signal
can degrade or even deteriorate the performance of control/protection systems
and thus researchers and real-ﬁeld deployments have to carefully account for it.
• Cyber security: Data spooﬁng, denial of service, malicious code injection, man-
in-the-middle attack, reconnaissance attack, packet injection attack (snifﬁng).
9
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These are some of the security threats that can induce serious malfunctions
in control center applications. Although such threats are common to other
measurement devices, they have to be considered prior to a massive deployment
of PMUs.
• Data management and analysis: Current data management methods could be-
come burdensome for the large amount of data associated to the synchrophasor
technology. Large amount of data may represent the bottleneck in exploiting
wide area systems especially due to limited communication bandwidth. Additio-
nally, data analysis experts are required to create visualization tools to rapidly
extract and display meaningful information for operators in the control centers.
• Control centers: Since the advent of wide area infrastructures, it is clear the
need to furnish the control centers with new situation awareness tools. The
architecture of current control centers has to be revised as speciﬁed, for example,
in [21]. The overall system has to be scalable and ﬂexible as the number of
installed PMUs is expected to increase over time from few units to, potentially, a
device per node.
• User acceptance: Finally, it is important to guide the user through the learning
curve from the installation of a synchrophasor system to their acceptance and
use. Control room personnel need to be engaged, trained and committed to use
and trust new real-time applications and data outside of post-event analysis.
1.2 Wide area systems adaptations to the case of distribution
networks
While the deployment of PMUs at the transmission level is taking place, the possibility
of augmenting the level of automation in distribution networks is under exploration
at the research level. Studies on research and development priorities for distribution-
system PMUs have been carried on, together with the deployment of ﬁrst demonstra-
tors. In what follows we present the state-of-the-art, advantages and open challenges
of adapting the “wide-area” approach to distribution systems.
The deployment of automation systems and advanced technologies in distribution
system is driven by the following challenges:
• Reliability: As the reliability of the electricity is considered amajor concern for the
customers, and considering that 90% of customer interruptions originate from
distribution systems [22], a fast identiﬁcation and isolation of faults is crucial. On
the other hand, the current lack of monitoring and automation of distribution
systems is the result of a trade-off between cost of better infrastructures and cost
of manual inspection. Indeed, crews are often involved in the network restoration
10
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and therefore some interruptions are lengthy (i.e., in the range of tens of minutes
to several hours). Automating the distribution systems would lead to shorter
power outages (in average) and thus to increased reliability.
• Impact of distributed energy resources (DERs): As more active power sources are
being connected (i) distribution networks are no longer purely passive, and this
affects protection and voltage management practices; (ii) a disturbance on the
load can trigger protection schemes and unnecessarily trip DERs. Details about
the impact of DERs in distribution systems, with particular focus on protections
of current and future distribution networks are discussed in [23, 24].
Various authors are exploring the possibility of deploying PMUs in distribution systems
to address these issues. In particular, the adoption of PMU-based state estimators to
develop low-latency and high-refresh rate state estimators for distribution networks
is proposed in [25, 26]. The comparison of three-phase distribution system state
estimation (DSSE) algorithms is given in [27]. Several contributions focused on the
proper meter/PMU placement for DSSE. Placement algorithms have been shown
to be able to integrate heterogeneous measurements, keeping the cost at minimum
(e.g., [28]). Additional research has proposed robust meter placement with respect
to the malfunction of some measurement devices or uncertainty in the distributed
generations’ (DGs’) operative conditions (e.g., [29]).
Reference [22] analyses a number of use cases, suggested by distribution network
utilities, where PMUs can provide crucial help (e.g., system reconﬁguration to manage
power restoration, operation of islanded distribution systems). The ﬁndings of report
[22] are that “PMUs offer important and irreplaceable advantages over present appro-
aches in the emerging distribution-system issues related to reliability, integration of
distributed energy resources, and the changing electrical characteristics of load”.
Currently, real deployments of PMUs at the distribution level have taken place mainly
on university campuses (e.g, Illinois Institute of Technologies [30], UCBerkeley campus
[31], École Polytecnique Fédérale de Lausanne [32] or within research projects (e.g.,
[33]). As it will be highlighted in the manuscript, in the case of [32] and [33], DSSE is
performed. Additionally, PMUs have been used for monitoring purposes during the
islanding maneuver of an active distribution network (ADN), signiﬁcantly facilitating
the operator maneuvers [34].
1.2.1 Advantages
The aspects that might facilitate the adoption of PMUs and, in a more general way, of
distribution systems oriented towards a “wide area approach”, are summarized in what
follows:
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• Costs vs. beneﬁts: On one side, PMU prices and installation costs have dropped
markedly since 2010 [15] and the implementation cost is likely to be less than
the total cost of multiple, stand-alone measurement systems. On the other side,
beneﬁt analysis are showing the crucial role that PMUs might have for the future
automation of distribution networks [22]. Indeed, several applications can take
advantage of the same sensing and communication infrastructure. As for the
case of transmission networks, also at the distribution level, the incremental cost
of adding applications is minimal in comparison to the beneﬁts received [18].
• Sensing: Currently, distribution networks are characterized by a limited penetra-
tion of sensing devices. This leaves room for designing architectures able to meet
the applications’ requirements. Additionally, the use of electronic sensors (e.g.,
clamp-on ﬂexible Rogowski coils) enables the deployment of sensing devices
rapidly and without affecting the ﬁnal customers.
• Limited area: The area covered by a distribution network is reduced if compared
to a transmission one. This calls for a limited number of devices needed to fully
monitor the system, with subsequent lower bandwidth requirements for the
communication layer. Additionally, a reduced number of cells is sufﬁcient when
adopting mobile telecommunication technology over a geographically small area,
thus reducing the overall latency.
1.2.2 Ongoing challenges
The real-time monitoring, control and protection of distribution systems needs to
cope with additional issues, if compared with transmission systems:
• Phase angle displacement: The deployment of PMU devices in distribution sys-
tems calls for higher accuracy in the metering systems, because of the limited
phase angle displacement. The development and validation of a PMU tailored
for distribution systems was the topic of the dissertation [35]. An example of
phase displacement between voltage phasors at the beginning and end of a 20 kV
overhead line is given in Fig. 1.5.
• Time synchronization: As for the transmission systems, the time synchronization
of PMUs is a major challenge. The satellite-based time dissemination represents
an additional issue for distribution feeders in urban context, due to the limited
clear-sky view. Wired based time dissemination may be a valuable alternative.
The topic of time synchronization and dissemination is further expanded in
Chapter 2.
• Communication: The current panorama of the status of communication net-
works and associated bandwidth is largely non-homogeneous. There are exam-
ples of utilities with ﬁber connecting each substation to the control room. In
12
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Figure 1.5 – Inﬂuence of the line load and line length on the phase difference between
voltage phasors measured at the beginning and end of a overhead line, modeled as
π-line. Adapted from [35, Chapter 2].
few cases, the ﬁber extends all the way to the customer [22]. Other utilities have
engaged in partnerships with smart-grid demonstration projects and are building
communication networks for automation and reliability. However, even if increa-
sing, ﬁber optic is not currently a common choice, because of its cost. In these
cases, wireless technology, Ethernet communication or other wired technologies
have to be chosen on a per-substation basis.
• Network parameters: Many algorithms (e.g., DSSE) require the knowledge of
topology and line parameters. Such information is not always available to the
network operator nor fully reliable. Additionally, a direct estimation of the line
parameters based on PMU measurements for distribution networks is difﬁcult
due to the limited phase angle displacement. The knowledge of the admittance
matrix is a constraint for the development of some automation solutions for
distribution systems.
• Proofs of concept: More research, demonstration projects and information sharing
is needed. The development of common testing and calibration platforms as
well as standards for PMUs in distribution systems is advised.
Within this context, the manuscript highlights:
• The architectural design of a wide area system adapted for distribution networks;
• The deﬁnition of time critical functions with particular reference to situational
awareness and fault location/protection tools;
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• The resiliency of the above functions with respect to bad data and intentional
cyber attacks;
• The experimental validation via real-time digital simulations and real-scale se-
tups.
14
2 Modern synchrophasor networks
and their time synchronization
The synchrophasor network has to be able to securely and timely convey measure-
ments, obtained by geographically distributed devices, to a concentration point that
eventually performs the following functions: (i) monitor the state of the network under
analysis; (ii)modify the state of the network bymeans of speciﬁc control and protection
algorithms.
A synchrophasor network is a complex infrastructure and several aspects are crucial
for a correct operation of such a system. All the components have to be designed and
deployed in order to minimize the possibility of non-secure operation (e.g., data loss,
unintentional bad data, malicious attack, etc.) that could compromise the accuracy of
the data consumers (e.g., state estimator) and thus lead to non-optimal decisions.
The aims of this chapter are twofold:
• Present the components of a synchrophasor network, the associated time disse-
mination techniques and their performance;
• Introduce the speciﬁc technical nomenclature used in the rest of the dissertation.
2.1 Architectural layers and components
A synchrophasor network can be seen as a combination of layers with dedicated
functionalities as shown in Fig. 2.1. The grid and actuation layer consists of the actual
monitored network together with the actuation devices to be used in case of control
/ protection. In the sensing layer, voltage and current synchrophasors are measured.
Accuracy in the synchrophasor phase estimation and possibility of time-stamping of
the measurements are guaranteed by the time dissemination layer. A telecom network
capable of exchanging data frames between the PMUs and the concentration point
(or between intermediate concentration points) constitutes the data communication
15
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Figure 2.1 – Example of synchrophasor network architecture’s layers.
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layer. Finally, the data process-and-operation layer deals with the data decapsulation,
time alignment, monitoring, control and protection applications1 closing then the
loop with the grid and actuation layer.
2.1.1 Sensing
The metering infrastructure is mainly composed of two elements: the sensor and the
PMU. We refer to sensor as the transducer that scales down the power system voltage or
current waveforms to levels appropriate for the PMU analog front-end. The instrument
transformers can be classiﬁed as follows:
• Conventional current and voltage (potential) transformers
• Low-power (electronic) current and voltage transformers
The choice of a proper sensor is function of many factors (e.g., type of substation
insulation, installation constraints, price, accuracy). Additionally, in the synchrophasor
network deployment phase, one can often encounter existing sensors for which a
replacement is not economically justiﬁed. To have an example of the accuracy of
such devices, let us consider the case of common standard magnetic core current
and voltage transformers (CTs and VTs) of class 0.5%. According to the standards
[36] and [37], this sensor introduces, at full scale, a maximum ratio error of 0.5%
and a maximum phase error of 6 mrad for VTs and 9 mrad for CTs. This level of
uncertainty, in most of the cases, exceeds the one of the connected PMU and thus
deteriorates the expected accuracy in the estimation of the magnitude and phase. In
this dissertation, we consider the sensors as devices of known characteristics in order
to model their contribution to the measurement noise2 and keeping in mind that,
being the ﬁrst elements in the measurement chain, their accuracy can inﬂuence the
WAMPAC operations.
The second element composing the metering infrastructure is the PMU. According to
the IEEE Std. C37.118.1-2011 [38], a PMU is a device that provides an estimate of the
synchrophasors, frequency and rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) of the acquired
voltage and/or current waveforms, based on a common coordinated universal time
(UTC) reference. The latency introduced by the PMU in order to provide synchropha-
sors, frequency and ROCOF estimations, is called PMU measurement reporting latency.
It is deﬁned in [38] as the time difference between the absolute time an event occurs in
the power system and the absolute time the same event is reported by the PMU. This
delay is mainly inﬂuenced by (i) the length of the acquisition window adopted by the
1We here focus on centralized control and protection applications. Local schemes do not operate on
an architecture like the one presented in this chapter.
2The importance of the noise covariance matrix in state estimation is discussed in Section 3.1.2.
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Figure 2.2 – Block scheme of a generic PMU. Adapted from [35].
speciﬁc algorithm and (ii) the time needed to estimate the synchrophasors. Therefore,
in general, the PMU reporting latency can be reduced by shortening the acquisition
window length of voltage and current signals and/or by adopting more performing
hardware (for a given synchrophasor estimation algorithm).
UTC Synchronization of the PMUs
In the literature, several methods are proposed to estimate synchrophasors and the
associated quantities (e.g., [35]). In this section, instead, we focus on the importance
of the time reference for the PMU. Indeed, a common UTC time reference enables
the comparison of phasor measurements obtained in different locations of the grid.
In other words, the concept of synchronized phasor (i.e., synchrophasor) allows the
deﬁnition of a common phase relationship between phasors from remote sites. Obvi-
ously, each PMU needs to be equipped with a time-synchronization module capable
of receiving and decoding the UTC time (see Fig. 2.2). The UTC time is used to (i) time-
stamp the estimated synchrophasor and (ii) discipline the sampling process of the
input waveforms. In particular, the time-sync unit generates an internal clock locked
to the external UTC time reference. This internal clock, also called “time-base”, may be
used by the signal conditioning and A/D conversion unit to discipline the sampling
process (i.e., coherent sampling) of the input waveforms. The synchrophasors are then
transferred to the encapsulation and streaming processes.
Assume to use a PMU algorithm that estimates the synchrophasor on a set of M
samples {x(n−M), . . . , x(n− 1)} acquired on a window of length T . Assume also that,
as common in practice, the synchrophasor’s time-stamp ts(n) is placed in the middle
18
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Figure 2.3 – UTC synchronized (b) vs. free running (c) sampling of a waveform. In (c)
the delayΔt between the rising edge of the subPPS and the time the ﬁrst sample of the
window is acquired t (n−M) is highlighted.
of the acquisition window3.
A coherent sampling is more advisable because, by directly associating a time-stamp
to each sample, the synchronization is automatically achieved. In this case, each
sample corresponds to a time-stamp {t(n−M), . . . , t(n− 1)} and the synchrophasor’s
time-stamp can be easily computed as:
ts(n) = t(n− 1) + Ts − T/2 (2.1)
where Ts is the PMU sampling time (see Fig. 2.3b).
Although common in practice, it is not mandatory nor always feasible to lock the
waveform sampling to the common UTC time reference. In this second case, a square
waveform, hereafter called subPPS, is internally synthesized. It is aligned to the UTC-
PPS (Pulse-Per-Second), shifted back of T/2 and characterized by a frequency equal to
the PMU reporting rate as in Fig. 2.3a. The rising edge of the subPPS waveform triggers
the sampling process. If the clock is free-running the sampling drifts over time and
thus the ﬁrst sample of the window is not aligned to the subPPS (see Fig. 2.3c). Two
countermeasures have to be taken in order to correct such drift:
3The synchrophasor’s time-stamp can also be placed in a different position, as speciﬁed in [38].
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1. Compensate the time-stamp value ts and the estimated phase by accounting
the time difference between the subPPS rising edge and the ﬁrst sample of the
window. This contribution could have a large impact on the estimated phase
angle. For example, if we assume a sampling frequency Fs = 50 kHz on a 50 Hz
system, the uncertainty due to the position of the ﬁrst sample with respect to the
subPPS rising edge could account for up to 2πmrad in the phase estimation error.
Such uncertainty can be removed by freezing the UTC time stamp of the ﬁrst
sample of each acquisition window and calculating its time delay with respect to
the rising edge of the subPPS waveform.
Δt = t(n−M)− tsubPPS (2.2)
where t(n−M) and tsubPPS are the absolute time of the ﬁrst sample of the window
and the absolute time of the rising edge of the subPPS square waveform.
2. Measure and compensate for the actual window length (not exactly T as the
sampling clock drifts). Indeed, the free running sampling clock is usually obtai-
ned with a quartz crystal oscillator that does not exactly run at the frequency
speciﬁed by the data-sheet. The actual frequency is function of the manufactu-
ring process, the surrounding temperature and other variable conditions. This
small difference, if accumulated over time, largely affects the estimation of the
synchrophasors. As an example, let consider the maximum drift declared by
a typical quartz oscillator to be ± 50 ppm. For a 50 kHz sampling clock on a
M = 3000 sample window (60 ms), this correspond to a misestimation of the
length of the window of 3 μs. Because PMUs are equipped with accurate time
reference units, the sampling clock drift can be measured in real-time over a long
observation window (i.e. in the order of seconds) and compensated [39]:
εclock(n) =
t(n)− t(n−M)
M · ts − 1 (2.3)
where t(n) and t(n−M) are the absolute times corresponding to the samples at
the end and the beginning of the observation window respectively and ts is the
nominal sampling time.
It is intuitive to understand that even by carefully compensating for such drift, the
adopted time source and dissemination technology, affect the sampling process. In par-
ticular the alignment of the subPPS to the UTC-second rollover and thus the accuracy
of the sampling time might be negatively impacted. This uncertainty can have non-
negligible effects on the overall measurement accuracy, in particular on the estimation
of the phase. For this reason, in Section 2.2 details about the accuracy, stability and
time dissemination techniques available for synchrophasor networks are presented.
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Table 2.1 – Comparison of bandwidth requirements for C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5.
Adapted from [18].
Reporting rate (Hz) IEEE C37.118.2 IEC 61850-90-5
50 66400 bps 102800 bps
2.1.2 Data communication
The data communication for synchrophasor networks is an intermediate layer that
has to allow a secure and robust connection in order to achieve a low latency exchange
of messages between the PMUs and the data process-and-operation layer. The sy-
nchrophasor system communications includes data, commands and conﬁguration
information. Additionally, the communication layer might be used to disseminate the
time (see Section 2.2.1).
Ideally, a trafﬁc study should be conducted to evaluate communications requirements:
the volume and path of data, the acceptable time delay and jitter, the error rate, the
reliability of the paths and various other characteristics. From the collected informa-
tion, an appropriate communication scheme can be selected (e.g., wired or wireless,
public or private). Such studies are rarely performed on distribution systems because
of cost and due to the still limited number of PMU-based applications available at the
moment.
One of the most important parameters to consider when designing the communica-
tion infrastructure is the end-to-end (ETE) time delay also known as communication
network latency. It is deﬁned as the time difference between the instant the PMU trans-
mits a data frame and the instant the same data frame reaches the network interface
of the data process-and-operation layer (typically the concentration point). Together
with the PMU measurement reporting latency, it deﬁnes the so-called synchrophasor
data latency. Depending on the adopted ICT (e.g., 3G-4G networks), this contribution
might introduce relatively high delays and non-deterministic latency variations.
The communication network protocols for synchrophasors data are essentially two.
The IEEE Std C37.118.2-2011 [40] and the IEC/TR 61850-90-5 [41]. The IEEE Std
C37.118.2-2011 is largely the most adopted communication standard in existing syn-
chrophasor networks as reported in [3], due to the reduced message size if compared
to IEC/TR 61850-90-5. In this respect, Table 2.1 compares the bandwidth requirements
of IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC/TR 61850-90-5 when transmitting 8 synchrophasors (phase
values and positive sequence), frequency, rate of change of frequency (ROCOF), 2
Analogs and a Digital word, with a reporting rate of 50 Hz.
Table 2.2 provides the average End-to-End (ETE) time delay of a IEEE C37.118.2 and
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Table 2.2 – Average ETE time delay of IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 under diffe-
rent links for modiﬁed IEEE 30 bus system. Adapted from [42].
Type of link Average ETE time delay (ms)
IEEE C37.118.2 IEC 61850-90-5
No With No With
backgr. backgr. backgr. backgr.
trafﬁc trafﬁc trafﬁc trafﬁc
51.84 Mbps
PMU to PDC 8.6 13.0 15.2 22.2
PDC to Central PDC 14.0 32.0 39.0 46.0
155.52 Mbps
PMU to PDC 2.1 3.0 6.3 8.3
PDC to Central PDC 6.0 8.0 12.0 15.0
622.08 Mbps
PMU to PDC 2.0 2.2 4.5 5.1
PDC to Central PDC 4.2 4.5 8.5 9.2
IEC 61850-90-5 based PMU communication under different links for a modiﬁed IEEE
30 bus system (see [42] for details). It is assumed that the test system is spread over an
area of 1000 km by 1000 km and thus the communication delays play an important role.
It is worth mentioning that each study available in the literature (e.g., [42, 43]) is based
on assumptions about the measurements, the protocols, the data format, routing
algorithm, data rate and communication infrastructure. In this context, the values
provided in Table 2.2 give an insight on the order of magnitude of the expected delays.
The ETE time delays for each speciﬁc synchrophasor network have to be obtained on a
case to case basis.
Concerning the reliable and timely data exchange, the classic approaches to reliable
communication through coding and retransmission (TCP/IP) are not compatible with
the hard delay-constraints of some applications. For this reason, although supported
by the standards, real-time applications typically use UDP. Additionally, TCP does
not support IP multicast. Research is now focusing on increasing reliability through
replication over multiple fail-independent paths [44].
In order to achieve cyber security of the ICT, there are a number of standards that
help security practices, as summarized in [45]. In few words, they aim at improving (i)
availability of the measurements by increasing the redundancy to prevent denial of
service attacks, (ii) integrity and authenticity by means of digital signatures or various
authentication codes and (iii) conﬁdentiality, by preventing inadvertent disclosure of
information.
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Information-centric networking for power systems
Traditionally the information network infrastructure for power grids is based on a
one-to-one client-server communication that, in some particular cases, could be one-
to-many [46]. The client is the data producer (e.g., PMU) and the server is the data
consumer (e.g. concentration point). Both end-points need to be aware of each other
and this lead to complexity that could limit the normal operations of a synchrophasor
network. In particular, by using a client-server communication:
• Each device needs to be conﬁgured with communication parameters (e.g., IP
addresses, port number). Additionally, each server needs to be conﬁgured to
accept trafﬁc only from trusted clients.
• In case of unavailability of a server (e.g., maintenance), all its clients need to be
re-conﬁgured in order to establish a communication with backup servers.
• Adding a new client forces to reconﬁgure the access control of the server in order
to include the new device among the trusted clients.
• Anomalies (e.g., faults) in the power grid may trigger a change in the grid topology
in order to restore the normal operation. In this case, a PMU device needs to
direct its data ﬂow to a different PDC and thus an individual re-conﬁguration of
each PMU device is needed.
• When different data receivers request different rates of the same data ﬂow, the
down-sampling is normally performed on the server side. This lead to waste in
network resources.
• Exposing the IP addresses, in order to establish a client-server communication,
makes the network vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
Driven by these concerns, recent research projects have focused on the possibility
of adopting information-centric networking (ICN) architectures that are by design
more secure, resilient, scalable, and ﬂexible than conventional information systems.
The ICN has to support massive integration of renewables and a heterogeneous set
of co-existing smart grid applications providing multiple beneﬁts for utilities [47].
The ICN establishes a communication built on the information/data. Indeed, the
information consumers (subscribers) are mainly interested in the information itself
(i.e., what the message is) rather than the explicit location (i.e., where the message goes
or comes from). Such an approach decouples in time and space the communicating
devices as data producers and consumers are not aware to where and when the data
will be consumed/produced by their counterparts. The ICN is based on the well
known mechanism of publish/subscribe shown in Fig. 2.4. The core components
are: (i) Publisher or data producer (e.g., PMU), (ii) Subscriber or data consumer (e.g.,
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Figure 2.4 – Publish-subscribe mechanism. Adapted from [33].
data concentration, applications), (iii) Broker for storage and data forwarding and (iv)
Broker discovery service to assign brokers to publishers and subscribers. The sequence
of operation, according to the numbering in Fig. 2.4, is the following:
1. Publisher (subscriber) ask the broker discovery service what broker to use to
publish (subscribe to) data of a certain topic;
2. Publisher (subscriber) requests to join the broker;
3. Publisher publish to broker;
4. Broker stores and forwards data to subscriber(s) with the pace required by the
subscriber, if any.
An example of ICN based middleware platform with a topic-based publish-subscribe
engine, was developed in the context of the EU FP7 project Cyber-secure DAta and
control cloud for power grids (C-DAX) [33]. The project aimed at providing a cyber-
secure distributed information infrastructure to the energy distribution networks.
Validation in the ﬁeld, showed the suitability of the platform for data communication
in ADNs even when characterized by large penetration of PMU devices [48, 49]. The
C-DAX architecture is shown in Fig. 2.5.
Fundamentally, C-DAX consists of a control and a data plane, with the former being
responsible for handling topic-based communication sessions while the latter being
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Figure 2.5 – The C-DAX architecture. Publishing steps include: (1) client join, (2) data
plane conﬁguration, and (3) topic data transmission. Adapted from [49].
dedicated to the forwarding of the PMU streaming data.
In the data plane, designated nodes (DNs) provide access for PMUs, as legitimate
data publishers, to the C-DAX platform. They act as ﬁrst point of contact and are
responsible for forwarding topic data to and from the plane. A second entity in the data
plane is the data broker (DB) that stores and forwards topic data to DNs. It acts acts as
a rendezvous point connecting the publishers and the subscribers of a speciﬁc topic.
Multiplicity of DBs under a common topic is allowed for scalability and resilience.
Additionally, DBs can (i) conﬁgure PMUs, (ii) cache data for further usage, (iii) adapt
the data rate towards subscribers with heterogeneous data rate requirements.
In the control plane, the topic resolver (RS) entity maps topic names to DBs so that
join requests can be sent to appropriate DBs. Additionally, it answers topic-mapping
requests of DNs. There may be several RSes for resiliency reasons. Security-related
functionalities (e.g., DNs local authentication of publishers / subscribers) are enabled
by the presence of a security server in the control plane that deals with functionalities
like authentication, authorization, and key distribution.
To summarize, the ICN-based architecture beneﬁts the synchrophasor network data
communication layer by addressing the intrinsic issues in a client-server based com-
munication, in particular:
• It simpliﬁes the establishment and re-conﬁguration of communication ﬂows,
limiting the error-prone manual settings and additionally taking care of setting
up new devices interested in the published data.
• Facilitates trafﬁc management decisions, selecting one or more DBs based on
the underlying transmission capabilities, application requirements, network
conditions, topology characteristics, and so on.
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• Enables network management of smart grid data, including caching and proces-
sing such as rate adaptation, aggregation, ﬁltering, and so on.
• Enhances resilience of information delivery to protect the grid against anoma-
lies/power failures and subsequently minimize power distribution disruption.
• Enhances security by avoiding the exposure of critical components’ network
locations.
2.1.3 Data process-and-operation
Data concentration
In a synchrophasor network, the data concentration is typically performed by the
so-called phasor data concentrator (PDC). The PDC collects data from several PMUs
or PDCs at a lower hierarchical-level, gathers them by time-stamp and feeds out a
single measurement set to further applications or to higher-level PDCs [46]. A design
characteristic of any PDC is its ability to provide synchrophasor data fast enough
to meet the destination’s needs. For instance, low data latency is crucial for fast
control applications because delayed data may be useless. Slower application (e.g.,
visualization) can tolerate higher data latency. Finally, applications like data logging
can tolerate the highest latencies due to their intrinsic non-real-time nature. Extensive
details about data concentrations together with a novel data-pushing logic for low-
latency PDCs are given in Chapter 3.1.1.
Data elaboration
The data elaboration consists of all the applications relaying, totally or partially, on
synchrophasor measurements. A non-comprehensive list of possible applications
includes tuning of system parameters (e.g., protection relays), estimation of the nodal
equivalent (e.g., loads) parameters, line/transformer congestion management, fault
detection and fault location [1].
Table 2.3 summarizes some of the possible PMU wide area monitoring control and
protection applications, providing an estimate for the reporting rate and latency re-
quirements as reported in the literature. The values are obtained by means of (i)
simulations focusing on the view point of the application [43] (i.e., what is needed by
the application to successfully operate), (ii) surveys aimed at collecting the expectation
of the network operators about WAMPAC applications [50] and (iii) literature’s review
[42, 51]. Due to the heterogeneity of the sources, the values provided in Table 2.3
are intended to provide an overview only on the latency requirements for WAMPAC
applications.
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Table 2.3 – Estimated latency for different PMU wide area monitoring, control and
protection applications.
Application Reporting rate [Hz] Latency Reference
Out of step protection > 10 50 ms [42, 51]
Adaptive relaying > 10 50 ms [42, 51]
Synchrocheck > 4 100 ms [42]
PMU-only state estimation > 10 100 ms [51]
Oscillation detection > 10 200 ms - 1 s [43, 50, 51]
Frequency instability >1 250 ms - 5 s [50]
Conventional state estimation < 1 1 s - 5 s [42, 43]
Voltage instability > 1 1 s - 30 s [43, 50]
Situational awareness >1 5 s [42]
Line temperature monitoring < 1 1 s - 10 min [50]
Depending on the chosen application, the latency requirements can vary between tens
of milliseconds for the so-called hard real-time applications, (e.g., fault management)
to few tens of seconds, i.e., soft real-time applications (e.g., voltage control [52]) up to
minutes for applications like line temperature monitoring4. Extensive details about
data elaboration functions and applications are given in Chapter 3. A real-time state
estimation functionality is presented. Additionally, two state-estimation-based appli-
cations characterized by different time constraints (i.e., hard and soft real-time) are
described.
2.2 Time synchronization
Synchrophasor measurements have the peculiarity of being UTC time-stamped and
thus synchronization to an UTC time-reference is needed. As previously shown, a
common UTC time-reference among different devices allows a meaningful estimation
and comparison of the phase of the main fundamental frequency component of the
acquired signals. Other components of the synchrophasor network may also exploit
the possibility of an UTC synchronization. For instance, an UTC synchronized PDC
enables the operator to (i) obtain the UTC arrival time of the incoming synchrophasors
thus detecting bottlenecks in the communication layer, if any; (ii) detect and discard
measurements with an erroneous time-stamp (e.g., measurement coming from the
future). In what follows, we elaborate on time-referencing technologies and we provide
an overview on possible time dissemination techniques for synchrophasor networks.
4The terms hard and soft real-time are used in this manuscript to indicate the type of latency constraint
that the speciﬁc application has to meet.
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Figure 2.6 – Stability and accuracy concepts.
2.2.1 Time-reference and its dissemination
A time-reference is an oscillator with a known initial time t0 [53]. Its task is to produce
a periodic oscillating signal that, ideally, should not be affected by aging, temperature,
shocks, or other external conditions. The quality of an oscillator is often expressed
by using the terms accuracy and stability (see Fig. 2.6). Accuracy is the degree of
conformity of a measured or calculated value to its deﬁnition [53]. In other words,
accuracy indicates the closeness of agreement between a measured value and the true
value of the measurand. For example, the accuracy of an oscillator embedded in a
PMU can be deﬁned by the difference between a measured on-time pulse and an ideal
on-time pulse that coincides exactly to UTC. Accuracy deﬁnes how well an oscillator
has been set on time or on frequency. On the other hand, stability indicates how well
an oscillator can produce the same time or frequency offset over a given time window.
To be noted that stability does not indicate whether the time or frequency is “right” or
“wrong” but only whether it changed over the observation interval.
Referring once again to the oscillator embedded in a PMU, it is worth to note that
whereas the accuracy can be compensated by initial calibrator of the oscillator and
regular adjustments of its unavoidable drift, the stability identiﬁes the reproducibility
of the PMU estimates and thus it is inherently related to the PMU’s quality. As a
consequence, stability can be considered to be the most important parameter to be
used when selecting a PMU time-reference oscillator.
Although each PMU embeds an oscillator, the synchronization of the components of
a synchrophasor network is usually achieved by using external time-sources for the
following reasons:
• An oscillator does not intrinsically have the absolute time information, this needs
to come from an external UTC-synchronized source;
• An embedded oscillator, independently of its quality, needs an adjustment of its
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Figure 2.7 – Unidirectional time transfer. τab is the time delay.
drift due to its ﬁnite stability. This is typically done with external and more stable
time-references;
• A single external unit can synchronize multiple instruments without the need of
replicating the time source.
As seen, synchrophasor network components require clocks or oscillators at different
locations to be set to the same time. Time dissemination technologies can use signals
broadcast through many different media, including coaxial cables, optical ﬁber, radio
signal, telephone lines and the internet. The synchronization is achieved by sharing
a on-time pulse and a time code. In general, the information sent from a transmitter
reaches a receiver after a time τab called path delay. There are two ways to compensate
for such a delay: (i) the transmitter estimates τab and sends the time out early by this
amount or (ii) τab is computed and applied on the receiver side. The correction factor
can be computed if the position of the transmitter and the receiver, together with the
medium type are known. When the transmitter is moving (a satellite, for example) it
must broadcast its position in addition to broadcasting the time.
As reported in [45], the criteria to select the proper time dissemination technology are
the following:
• Accuracy: degree of conformance between measured synchronization signal and
its true value.
• Availability: capability of the synchronization system to provide usable timing
services within the speciﬁed coverage area.
• Continuity: probability that the synchronization system will be available for the
duration of a phase operation, presuming that the system was available at the
beginning of that phase of operation.
• Reliability: probability that a synchronization system will perform its function
within deﬁned performance limits for a speciﬁed period of time under given
operating conditions.
• Integrity: ability of the synchronization system to detect the timing signals’
degradation and provide timely warnings to users.
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• Coverage: geographical area in which the application-speciﬁc synchronization
system requirements for accuracy, availability, continuity, reliability, integrity
and coverage parameters are satisﬁed at the same time.
How to disseminate the time information is the focus of the next subsection. Satellite-
and terrestrial-based technologies are presented together with advantages and disad-
vantages when employed in synchrophasor networks. Among all the time dissemina-
tion techniques available nowadays, only the ones that meet the accuracy required by
synchrophasor networks are presented.
2.2.2 Satellite-based time dissemination
In power systems, it is common practice to adopt the time derived from a global
navigation satellite system (GNSS) as UTC time reference. The best known among
the GNSSs is the Global Positioning System (GPS), an U.S. Department of Defense
satellite-based radio navigation system. Other GNSSs are the Russian GLONASS, the
Chinese BeiDou and the European Galileo5.
The satellites are typically located in the so-called medium earth orbit and have an
approximate period of 12 hours. They are equipped with atomic clocks to derive the
time information from a ground-based UTC referenced primary clock. The dissemina-
tion is done using carrier signals over dedicated frequency channels. The mechanism
through which the GPS, and in general all the GNSSs, are able to disseminate the
time is largely discussed in the literature and thus will not be treated in details in this
section. What is only marginally given in the literature, instead, is a list of advantages
and disadvantages that such a technology presents when adopted in power systems,
in particular for synchrophasor networks.
Advantages: A cheap GPS receiver (few dollars) can infer the UTC time with an un-
certainty of 100 ns (3σ) and a position uncertainty of <10 m [53]. The success of the
GPS for time and frequency transfer is due to its reliability and exceptional results with
minimal effort. A GNSS receiver synchronizes its on-time pulse to the received signals
and it is then able to produce time-of-day and date information. In terms of hardware
to be installed in the substation, the GNSS requires an antenna and the proper cabling
to reach the GNSS receiver.
Disadvantages: Relying on wireless information transfer, the received GNSS signal is
characterized by weak power level, therefore GNSSs are vulnerable to radio-frequency
interference (RFI). Disruption mechanisms that could limit the GNSSs performance
can be classiﬁed as unintentional or intentional interference.
5BeiDou and Galileo are not fully operational at the time of writing.
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• Unintentional interference: examples are RFI caused by electronic equipment
radiating in the GNSS band (above 1 GHz) or restricted line of sight to satellites
in all the cases where there is not a clear view of the sky (e.g., in urban areas or
near foliage).
• Intentional interference: in this case, the GNSS signals are deliberately jammed
by radio interference. The levels of interference needed to jam a typical GNSS
receiver are quite low, thus jamming equipment can be small.
• The GPS included the so-called selective availability that allowed the U.S. de-
partment of defense to intentionally add time varying errors to the signal, thus
inserting a non-controllable delay in the accuracy of the synchronized device.
This possibility lead to the development of an alternative common European
system (i.e., Galileo Navigation Satellite System).
In what follows, we present some of the reliability issues characteristics of GNSSs that
could undermine their usage in synchrophasor networks.
Spooﬁng of GNSS
Spooﬁng of a GNSS consists in broadcasting false signals with the aim that the victim
receiver will misinterpret them as authentic. The victim might deduce a false position
ﬁx, a false clock offset, or both. At the time of writing, spooﬁng has been used to send
a hovering drone in an unplanned dive and to steer a yacht off course (in controlled
experiments). Other claims of GNSS spooﬁng have been reported, although none
of them directly affected power system equipment yet. According to the literature
(e.g., [54]), off-the-shelf receivers have only rudimentary defense against spooﬁng and
this defense mechanism is easily deceived. A possible sequence of attack is shown in
Fig. 2.8. The spoofer exploits the knowledge of the true GNSS signal and its location
relative to the victim. It aligns its spoofed signal with the true signal (1). The attack
starts at low power and ramps its power until it captures the receiver’s tracking loops
(2-3). Afterwards, it smoothly drags the victim off to a false position/timing ﬁx (4-5).
For power systems and especially for synchrophasor networks, several publications
have dealt with the issue of GNSS spooﬁng (e.g., [55, 56, 57]). Chapter 4.2 focuses
on the detectability of timing attacks on linear state-estimators. It shows that it is
possible to forge delay attacks that are undetectable by using classic bad-data detection
techniques and, at the same time, have large impact on the state estimation results.
Leap second
Although the terrestrial time is based upon the earth’s rate of rotation, the latter slowly
changes over time. A one-second adjustment (i.e., leap second) to the UTC time is
31
Chapter 2. Modern synchrophasor networks and their time synchronization
Figure 2.8 – Spooﬁng attack sequence viewed from a victim receiver channel. Spoofer:
black dash-dotted curve; sum of spoofer and truth: blue solid curve; receiver tracking
points: red dots. Adapted from [54].
Table 2.4 – Leap second insertion occurred on December 31st 2016.
Date Time Comment
2016 December 31 23h 59m 59s
2016 December 31 23h 59m 60s extra leap second
2017 January 1 00h 00m 00s
thus needed to ensure that precise scientiﬁc time remains in synch with observed
astrological time [58]. The UTC time is usually adjusted on June 30 or December 31
and the leap seconds events are announced about 6 months before the event occurs.
Incorrect GPS or PMU handling of leap seconds, poor interoperability between clocks
and PMUs have caused several issues in the past leap second events, as reported in [58].
• Duplicated or missed measurements;
• Erroneous interpretation of PMU data;
• PMU or clock failures from second to hours;
• PMU measurements dropped at the concentration point.
If PMU data are used for missing-critical operations, such failures could cause pro-
blems as simple as lessened system visibility or as signiﬁcant as undesirable actions
such as triggering system protection schemes or wide area control schemes that could
compromise grid reliability [58].
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Figure 2.9 – Example of voltage angle misestimation due to incorrect handling of leap
second for different PMUs. Adapted from [58].
GPS glitch
On January 26th 2016, some GPS receivers suddenly began to output erroneous time
signals at different time. The disruption lasted for approximately 12 hours and was
later acknowledged to be due to an erroneous time correction parameter upload to
GPS satellites. The receivers have been affected by an abrupt 13 μs time jump in their
PPS time synchronization output, as it can be seen in Fig. 2.10. Indeed, a certain
number of GPS satellites, while declaring themselves “healthy”, broadcast a wrong
UTC correction parameter. A 13 μs time error corresponds to approximately 4 mrad
misestimation of the phase angle for a 50 Hz system. The error affected a large number
of PMU devices and these multiple coherent erroneous measurements are difﬁcult
to detect and eliminate with state-of-the-art bad data methods (see Chapter 4.1 for
details), therefore synchrophasor network applications are negatively impacted from
such events.
Countermeasures
Possible countermeasures proposed in the literature to cope with the aforementioned
issues when using GNSS as time synchronization are constituted of, but not limited to:
• Redundancy of the timing signal and local oscillators to increase reliability and
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Figure 2.10 – Time difference between Metsähovi H maser and four different GPS
receivers, for the duration of the disruption. Adapted from [59].
accuracy [45, 54];
• Protection of the GNSS receiver from RFI, to reduce the possibility of intentional
or unintentional interference [45, 54];
• Adoption of International Atomic Time (TAI) time (i.e., a time scale continuously
and monotonically incremented, never discontinued) instead of UTC for power
systems as proposed by the Swiss National Committee;
• Deﬁnition of timing event performance tests and of a single correct method for
handling the leap second [58].
2.2.3 Terrestrial-based time dissemination
The above mentioned reliability issues of GNSS led to the IEEE recommendation to
pursue an alternative method of synchronization using terrestrial system as stated
in [4, 45]. Few of the available terrestrial-based time dissemination technologies gua-
rantee the accuracy level required by synchrophasor networks. Recently, Packet-Based
Time-Synchronization Protocols (PBTSPs) like the precision time protocol version 2
(PTPv2) [60] raised the interest of some PMU developers due to the increased accuracy
with respect to its predecessors. Still, the higher cost of such a time dissemination
infrastructure (the network needs to be deployed if not in place) does not yet attract
many PMU developers. The PTPv3 (also known as White rabbit [61]) is expected to
largely increase the synchronization accuracy (i.e., in the order of sub-nanoseconds)
and thus make terrestrial-based time dissemination appealing also for synchrophasor
networks.
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PPS
A simple way to synchronize two clocks is to use a train of positive pulses at a rate of
one pulse per second (1 PPS). The rising edge of the pulses coincides with the seconds
change in the clock and provides a very precise time reference (better than 100 ns).
Because the PPS signal does not provide any indication of the date or time of day, it
has been largely replaced by the IRIG-B.
IRIG-B
According to a 2014 survey on synchrophasor system networks [3], the IRIG-B [62] is
the second most spread technology to synchronize synchrophasor networks after GPS.
The unmodulated IRIG-B code can deliver accuracy limited only by the slew rate of the
digital signal, usually better than 1 μs and, with care, even 100 ns. The IRIG-B includes
control bits that enable its support for real-time applications thanks to the inclusion
of leap second, daylight savings or summer time status, year of the century and time
quality. These assignments extend IRIG-B to a complete time message as needed by
the PMUs. The IRIG-B suffers from a limitation: the time dissemination is performed
either with twisted pair wires or coaxial cables. This means that data exchange and
time synchronization are over two different infrastructures. This limitation is overcome
by the precision time protocol.
Precision time protocol
IEEE Std 1588-2008 [60] allows sub-microsecond time accuracy for devices connected
via a network such as Ethernet. IEEE Std C37.238-2011 [63] speciﬁes a subset of IEEE
1588 functionality to be supported for power system protection, control, automation
and data communication applications using an Ethernet communication architecture.
The IEEE Std 1588 speciﬁes a way to evaluate the link delay between two nodes (master
and slave) through the exchange of time-tagged messages, see Fig. 2.11. The master
node sends a Sync message to the slave and stamps it with a time-stamp t1 as it leaves
its networking interface. The message is received at time t2 in the slave’s time base.
The process is then reversed, with a message Delay_Req sent from the slave at time t3
and received in the master at time t4. The Follow_Up and Delay_Response messages
are used to transport the timestamps recorded at the master clock to the slave clock,
so that the slave has the information needed to adjust its time. Indeed, assuming the
one-way delay through the network is exactly half of the two-way delay, the offset of
the slave’s clock with respect to the master is:
δ =
(t2 + t3 − t1 − t4)
2
(2.4)
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Figure 2.11 – Simpliﬁed PTP message exchange diagram.
Following the same principles, the grandmaster clock at the top of the time distribution
chain, synchronizes the clocks in the entire system to UTC. Each device in the time
distribution chain (including Ethernet switches) is required to support IEEE C37.238-
2011 to achieve 1 μs time accuracy. Ethernet switches supporting IEEE C37.238-2011
should perform measurements and corrections for cable delay and queuing time.
IEEE C37.238 offers the use of the same communication infrastructure (Ethernet) for
PMU/PDC data and time distribution, and reduced use of GPS connectivity whenever
possible.
Advantages: The adoption of the IEEE Std 1588-2008 in power system enables:
• The automatic time compensation for the dynamic changes of path (dynamic
delays);
• The automatic choice of the grandmaster clock thanks to the Best Master clock
algorithm. Additionally, the protocol selects the backup clocks in case of failure
of the grandmaster;
• The usage of existing network cabling;
• Additionally, all protocol adaptations relevant for the electric power industry are
taken care of in the so-called Power Proﬁle IEEE C37.238-2011 [63].
Disadvantages:
• Special network switches (i.e., transparent clocks) are needed to achieve the
sub-microsecond accuracy;
• Need to compensate for the time delay between the GPS antenna and the master
clock (if grandmaster is not integrated in the antenna).
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• Time-stamping by means of dedicated hardware. A software-only time-stamping
allows an overall accuracy in the range of 20 to 100 μs.
White Rabbit
The White Rabbit (WR) project was initiated at CERN in 2008. The idea is to deliver
the following functionality while using (or improving) existing standards. As reported
in [64], the functionality are:
• Sub-nanosecond accuracy in synchronization and stability better than 50 ps;
• Coverage over distances of 10 km (proven nowadays to be able to cover more
than 100 km);
• Ability to serve more than 1000 nodes;
• Guaranteed upper bound in the overall latency;
• Open hardware, ﬁrmware and software [61].
To achieve sub-ns accuracy, in addition to an improved version of the PTPv2 protocol,
the WR operates the so-called Layer-1 syntonization. Indeed, typical PTP implementa-
tions use free-running oscillators in each node. This means that the time base of each
node drifts during the time interval between two calculations of δ in Equation (2.4).
The Layer-1 syntonization ensures equal clock frequencies in all nodes, therefore elimi-
nating this drift. Because all the system clocks oscillate at the same rate, it is possible to
compensate for the phase shift between two clock signals. This is achieved by means
of a phase-shifting circuit in the slave that creates a phase-compensated clock signal
despite the delay introduced by the ﬁber link.
Disadvantages:
• Requires optic links and dedicated switches;
• Not standardized (although in the process of standardization).
In terms of performance, WR has been proven to be able to reach synchronization
accuracy in the order of 200 ps with standard deviation of approximately 6 ps for 15 km
links (e.g., [64]). A large number of applications is currently taking advantage of the
WR performance. Recent literature has considered WR as the future synchronization
method for PMU-based power systems (e.g., [65, 66]).
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Table 2.5 – Summary of the accuracy of time dissemination technologies for synchrop-
hasor networks.
Technology Typical accuracy
GNSS 100 ns
1PPS 100 ns
IRIG-B (unmodulated) ∼ 1 μs
PTPv2 (HW) < 1 μs
White Rabbit < 0.5 ns
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3 Time critical functions and appli-
cations
This chapter presents functions and applications that we envisioned as time critical for
a successful operation of a synchrophasor network. The chapter starts by describing
two functions that enable the network operator to (i) collect meaningful data from its
geographically distributed measurement devices and (ii) obtain a reliable estimate of
the state of its network. Since several applications can exploit the availability of PMU
data, the second half of the chapter presents two state-estimation-based applications
with different time constraints. First, a hard real-time application is described. It
leverages on the state estimation results to provide protection functions to the mo-
nitored network, in time-scales of hundreds of milliseconds. As a second example, a
soft real-time application is described. It is conceived to be able to control the state
of the system in time-scales of seconds in order to maintain its voltage level within
predeﬁned limits.
Original contributions of this chapter:
• Deﬁnition of a data-pushing logic for synchrophasor data concentration;
• Deﬁnition of a protection mechanism relying on PMU-based state estimation
processes.
3.1 Situation awareness functions
3.1.1 Phasor data concentrator
The content of this section is based on [67]. The Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) is
deﬁned by the IEEE Std C37.244-2013 [46] as a key component of the synchropha-
sor network collecting data from several PMUs or PDCs at a lower hierarchical-level,
gathering them by time-stamp and feeding out a single measurement set to further
applications or to higher-level PDCs. Depending on the requirements of the appli-
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cation being served by the PDC and the layout of the synchrophasor network, the
PDC provides additional features like (but not limited to) data quality checking, data
conversion to different formats, etc.
The most relevant functionalities of a PDC, identiﬁed by the IEEE Std C37.244-2013
[46], are data aggregation and data pushing. Data aggregation enables to concentrate
data coming from multiple PMUs into a single, usually time-aligned1, dataset. This
functionality mitigates the latency variations introduced by the components of the
synchrophasor network as data frames coming from different PMUs and characterized
by the same time-stamp, never reach the PDC simultaneously. The data pushing,
forwards the dataset to subsequent applications. It is triggered by the so-called PDC
wait time that represents the amount of time the PDC has to wait for data frames with
a given time-stamp. Reference [46] deﬁnes two logics for setting the PDC wait time:
an absolute time logic, where the data pushing is performed once a speciﬁc UTC time
is reached, and a relative time logic, in which the PDC waits for a speciﬁed relative
time triggered by an event, which may be the arrival of the ﬁrst data with a speciﬁc
time-stamp.
Acting as a bridge between measurements and applications, the PDC has to be properly
designed in order to reliably operate without introducing unnecessary delays or data
loss. Nevertheless, few contributions have dealt with the design, implementation and
testing of PDC architectures to meet the requirements dictated by the applications
in term of speed and reliability. Reference [68] and [69] highlight the inconsistencies
that might arise from an inaccurate PDC implementation and how they could affect
wide area operations. In reference [70] and [71] the functional and communication
requirements of a generic PDC are shown together with proposed test methodologies
to validate the PDC core features. A possible design for a PDC that integrates synchrop-
hasor data logging and a graphical user interface is given in [72]. Other works focus
on maximizing the throughput of synchrophasors in order to use the PDC for speciﬁc
applications (e.g., wide-area damping control [73, 74, 75]). How different settings for
the relative wait time affect the incompleteness and timeliness of the outgoing dataset
in a WAMS, is shown in [76].
However, the above-listed literature does not explore the possibility of having different
data pushing logics than the ones deﬁned in [46]. Moreover, the results available in the
literature that aim at assessing the PDC’s performance are all obtained in simulated
environments. On the contrary, the performance of the method here proposed is
assessed in real ﬁeld installations, as shown in Chapter 5.
1The time-alignment is not mandatory, but it is usually present to leverage the PMU time-stamped
measurements.
40
3.1. Situation awareness functions
Figure 3.1 – The PDC reporting latency decomposed in its individual contributions.
The synchrophasor time-stamp ts, the data frame arrival time ta and the time-aligned
dataset push time tp are highlighted.
PDC Reporting Latency Analysis
The PDC reporting latency is deﬁned as the difference in time between the moment a
set of synchrophasors characterized by a speciﬁc time-stamp is pushed towards the
subsequent application and the time-stamp itself. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this
parameter can vary between milliseconds to tens of seconds (hard real-time, soft real-
time, respectively) depending on the targeted applications (e.g., protection, voltage
regulation, etc.)
The PDC reporting latency is a result of several contributions shown in Fig. 3.1.
• The PMU measurement reporting latency is deﬁned in [38] as the time delay
between the instant a speciﬁc event occurs in the power system and the instant
the same event is reported by the PMU.
• The communication network latency corresponds to the time difference between
the instant a data frame leaves the PMU and the moment it reaches the PDC.
Based on the type of communication technology adopted (i.e., wired, wireless)
this layer may introduce high delays and non-deterministic latency variation in
the overall PDC reporting latency.
• The PDC latency is deﬁned as the time difference between the instant a dataset
with a certain time-stamp is pushed to the desired applications and the instant
the ﬁrst message with the same time-stamp reaches the PDC. The PDC latency
itself is the sum of two contributions:
– PDC wait time: accounts for the time between the moment the ﬁrst syn-
chrophasor with a certain time-stamp reaches the PDC and the instant the
last measurement arrives or the timeout expires;
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Figure 3.2 – Architecture of the proposed PDC collecting data frames from N PMUs
and pushing time-aligned datasets to P applications. Adapted from [67].
– PDC processing time: accounts for the time needed by the PDC to produce
an aggregated dataset from the single measurements and push it to the
application.
To be noted that the former contribution outweighs by far the latter.
References [45] and [46] do not explicitly state the maximum or minimum values
for the latency contribution deﬁned above. Their value should be coherent with the
requirements set by the targeted application.
What follows focuses mainly on the aspects affecting the PDC latency. A data-pushing
logic that allows to reduce the contribution of the PDC to the total latency of the
synchrophasor network is given. Indeed, additional work can focus on the reduction
of the contributions of PMU and communication layer, but these are not a direct
subject of this work. See [77] for details on how to reduce the PMU contribution to the
synchrophasor latency. Reference [78] suggests a proper engineering of the real-time
trafﬁc in order to reduce the communication network latency.
Proposed PDC Architecture
The time-alignment functionality is not mandatory, but it is usually present to leverage
the PMU time-stamped measurements. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine
applications able to sequentially process measurements characterized by a speciﬁc
time-stamp (e.g., sequential discrete kalman ﬁlter). In this case, one could envision an
architecture where the PDC is not present, and the application itself, the applications
The architecture of the proposed PDC is shown in Fig. 3.2. It is developed to meet the
requirements dictated by [46] and it implements a large number of the optional and
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Table 3.1 – List of functionalities implemented in the proposed PDC.
Functionality
Data aggregation
Data pushing (3 logics)
Selective data forwarding
Data communication - TCP/IP or UDP (multicast)
Data validation
IEEE Std C37.118.2-2011 support
Data format and coordinate conversion
Data latency calculation
Reporting rate down-conversion
Conﬁguration management
Data logging
mandatory functionalities there described. A list of the functionalities implemented is
given in Table 3.1. However, in what follows, we focus only on the functionalities that
affect the PDC latency and the completeness of the pushed dataset.
For each PMU, the PDC opens a TCP/IP or UDP socket. It continuously listen to
incoming PMU frames. When a new packet is received, the data validation process
discards invalid frames. The frames are then categorized in conﬁguration frames or
dataframes and they are treated differently according to their type. Conﬁguration
frames are needed to parse the dataframes and are typically streamed once per minute
or upon request. Once a conﬁguration frame is received from a speciﬁc PMU, the
subsequent dataframes coming from that PMU are parsed. The PDC time alignes the
data and pushes the aggregated dataset to the subsequent applications. Time-aligned
data aggregation and pushing operations are based on a circular ﬁxed-size data buffer,
shown in Fig. 3.3. The buffer can be seen as a 2D array, withN columns representing
the N PMUs and M rows, indicating the buffer-depth. Each row corresponds to a
stored time-stamp. The buffer depth and the PMU reporting rate allow to compute the
so-called buffer history length Th.
Th = M/Fr = M · Tr (3.1)
where Fr = 1/Tr is the PMU reporting rate and Tr the PMU reporting interval. A
pointer p indicates the next line to be pushed to the applications and it is always in
the smallest time-stamp tmin. The time-stamps are monotonically increasing within
the circular buffer starting from the pointed line, therefore the largest time-stamp
tmax = tmin + Th lies always in the previous line position (modulo the buffer depthM ).
New data overwrite the old one thus avoiding to rotate the buffer’s elements when data
are released. This structure is suitable for data buffering purpose because it allocates a
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Figure 3.3 – Layout of the circular buffer used to aggregate and time-align the inco-
ming data ﬂows generated by N PMUs. It can store up to M time-aligned datasets
characterized by time-stamps in the range tmin < ts < tmax. A pointer p points to the
next line to be pushed to the supplied applications.
ﬁxed amount of memory when created and it does not lead to memory leaks.
Data Aggregation logic
The data aggregation is performed with time-alignment. Before inserting the data
frame in a speciﬁc buffer position, the buffer is updated depending on the received
time-stamp ts. If ts < tmin, the data frame is discarded. If tmin ≤ ts ≤ tmax the buffer
time-stamps are not updated. If ts > tmax, the oldest lines are fed to the applications
and then replaced by the new ones. In this case, a set of ((ts − tmax) /Tr) ∈ N empty
lines, characterized by newer time-stamps up to ts, overwrites the older ones2. This
data aggregation logic is completely independent of the adopted data-pushing logic.
Absolute and Relative Time Data-Pushing logics
The implementation of the absolute and relative time data-pushing logics in the deve-
loped PDC is described in what follows. For the sake of comprehension, let us consider
the aggregation and data-pushing processes of data frames characterized by time-
stamp ts coming fromN PMUs as shown in Fig. 3.4. Let us deﬁne with ta,i and ta,j the
arrival time at the PDC of the ﬁrst and last data frames characterized by the time-stamp
ts and sent by the i-th and j-th PMUs, respectively.
2If a data-frame characterized by a time-stamp greater than the actual UTC time is received (i.e., a
time-stamp coming from the future), the data frame is discarded. This plausibility check is possible only
by synchronizing the PDC to an absolute time reference.
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Figure 3.4 – Comparison between the various data pushing logics in the case of a PDC
gathering dataframes fromN PMUs characterized by time-stamp ts. The arrival times
of the ﬁrst and the last data frame characterized by the time-stamp ts are indicated by
ta,i and ta,j , respectively.
If an absolute time data-pushing logic is adopted, the wait time is linked to the data
frame time-stamp ts and it elapses at
tp = ts + Tabs, (3.2)
where tp is the PDC push time and Tabs is the absolute PDC wait time. To be noted
that in order to push the dataframes at time tp, the PDC must be synchronized to an
absolute time reference. This logic implies that the dataset supplied to the application
is characterized by high determinism.
In case a relative time data pushing logic is adopted, the wait time counter is triggered
by the reception of the ﬁrst data frame characterized by a time-stamp ts and elapses at
time
tp = ta,i + Trel, (3.3)
being Trel the relative PDC wait time. In this case, it is not mandatory to synchronize
the PDC with the absolute time, since it has only to count up to Trel from the trigger
event. Additionally, it is evident that for this data-pushing logic, the variations in the
arrival time of the dataframes, largely affect the determinism of the dataset supplied to
the subsequent applications.
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Irrespectively of the data-pushing logics, at time tp the aggregated dataset is pushed
to the supplied applications and the pointer p is incremented. The pushed dataset is
replaced by an empty one characterized by a time-stamp equal to tmax + Tr. Yet, for
both the data-pushing logics, the pushing at time tp is operated even if the dataset
is characterized by missing information. In this case, the missing data is ﬂagged
according to what speciﬁed in [46]. It is the task of the subsequent applications
to cope with possible incomplete datasets by using techniques able to replace the
missing information (e.g. [79, 80]). A delayed packet that reaches the PDC when
its corresponding dataset has already been pushed, is discarded and it is no longer
available for further applications.
From what speciﬁed above, it is evident that the PDC wait time plays an important role
in the PDC design. Its value must be selected as trade-off between the completeness of
the dataset provided to the applications and the latency requirement of the application
itself. For a soft real-time application, the wait time can be set to a large value with
the consequent increase of the overall latency of the system. Conversely, for a hard
real-time application the wait time has to be minimized as a function of the number of
missing information accepted by the subsequent applications.
A proper value of Tabs can be set according to the measured synchrophasor data
latency in order to push time-aligned datasets that are mostly complete. In this case,
the minimum buffer depth for the absolute time data-pushing logic is
M =
⌈
Tabs − Tmin
Tr
⌉
+ 1 (3.4)
where · represents the ceiling function and Tmin the minimum possible PMU repor-
ting latency.
In case of relative time data-pushing logic, Trel has to be set according to the measured
time needed to receive all data frames of a speciﬁc dataset. The resulting buffer length
is computed as3
M =
⌈
Trel
Tr
⌉
+ 1. (3.5)
Push-when-complete logic
For a deterministic and well designed synchrophasor network, with a PDC wait time
properly deﬁned, most of the datasets are completed before the timeout elapses. In
this speciﬁc cases, and according to the logics presented so far, the dataset would wait
for the timeout to elapse before being pushed, even if the dataset is already completed.
3Note that the+1 in (3.4) e (3.5) is needed to handle dataframes arriving at the PDC at the same instant
when the corresponding dataset is being pushed.
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In this respect, a data pushing logic that pushes the dataset as soon as it is complete,
regardless of the wait time, contributes in actively reducing the PDC latency without
affecting the completeness of the dataset. The majority of the datasets are pushed
according to this logic, unless data frames are lost or delayed. In such a case, the
absolute or relative time logics would overtake and push uncompleted datasets only
once the PDC wait time has elapsed.
As mentioned, the push-when-complete logic has the main advantage of minimizing
the PDC reporting latency, which is practically reduced to the synchrophasor data
latency of the latest received data frame plus the negligible PDC processing time. This
allows to increase the time budget allocated for the other functionalities. On the other
hand, the drawback of such an approach is that the data pushing time tp is linked
with the data frames arrival time and thus it jitters. Hence, the supplied applications
should be designed in order to properly cope with non-deterministic datasets arrival. A
solution for this issue is to embed dedicated FIFO (First-In-First-Out) data structures in
the supplied applications, in order to eliminate the non-deterministic synchrophasor
data latency (see Fig. 3.2).
The validation of the performance of the proposed PDC with the associated data-
pushing logics is given in Chapter 5.
As a side note, it is worth mentioning that, although the time-alignment of synchrop-
hasors is performed in the large majority of the cases, one could imagine to feed the
time-stamped measurements directly to the applications. In this scenario, the PDC is
only used as a data concentration and decapsulation point and it does not perform any
time-alignment nor implements any particular data pushing logic. This avoids that
the PDC waits for a delayed data that does not bring a critical information for the sub-
sequent application. It is then the task of the application itself to implement a proper
sequential data-processing logic that, having a global view on the data that is currently
available and the missing ones, decides to provide or not its outputs. Following this
strategy, whenever a redundant or non critical measurement is missing, the output
of the application is still provided without the need for the PDC wait time variable to
elapse, leading to a reduction of the overall latency. The validation of such alternative
approach is not described in this manuscript and will be the focus of future research.
3.1.2 Real-time state estimation
As an example of situation awareness function, we present the real-time state estima-
tion, where with system state we indicate the voltage phasors at all the network buses.
The knowledge of the system state allows to infer the system operating conditions
thus enabling the usage of several fundamental functions, such as security assessment,
voltage control and stability analysis. Until the mid 1970s, the system state was obtai-
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ned by using the raw voltage measurements of magnitude and power injections by
means of a load ﬂow. The drawback of this modus operandi was that the loss of even
only one measurement made the calculation impossible and, additionally, error in the
measurements highly impacted the load ﬂow solution.
These limitations were overcome when the load ﬂow theory was combined with a
statistical processing of the collected information to obtain the likelihood system state.
The associated state estimation (SE) process consists in an optimization problem able
to process the measurements together with the network model in order to determine
the likelihood state of the system. The beneﬁts of such a technique are several. First of
all, the measurements are not restricted to voltage magnitudes and powers but all the
type of measurements are allowed (e.g., voltage and current magnitudes, nodal power
injections and ﬂows, synchrophasors) and their consistency is evaluated by using
the network model. Moreover, a sufﬁcient measurement redundancy allows to cope
with measurement losses, detect and identify measurements and parameters errors
and ﬁlter out the measurement noise. The importance of the foregoing properties
is perceived differently according to the ﬁnal goal of the user of the state estimation
results. For example, the aim of the system operator is to have a trustful output from
the SE and thus its main interest is to have a reliable identiﬁcation of inconsistent or
erroneous measurements. On the other hand, automatic regulation functions and
protections need also to exploit the capacity of the SE to ﬁlter out the measurement
noise in order to take accurate and proper control actions.
Traditionally, SE was performed by using measurements coming from remote terminal
units (RTUs)4. As a result, the SE was characterized by a refresh-rate that could be
in the range of minutes [81]. The advent of PMUs in transmission and afterwards
in distribution systems, is leading to better accuracy performance and a signiﬁcant
increase in the SEs refresh-rates that now are in the sub-second range.
Since the works of Schweppe on power system SE in the early ’70s [82, 83, 81], the rese-
arch mainly focused on the so-called static estimators, largely based on the weighted
least squares (WLS) [84, 85, 86]. A static estimator uses a single set of measurements
belonging to the current time-step and the network topology to obtain the most li-
kely estimate of the system state. Subsequent research led to the formulation and
development of the so-called recursive estimators, such as the Kalman ﬁlter (KF).
These estimators, in addition to the measurement set at the current time-step and
the network model, also predict the system state by modeling its time evolution. This
prediction component comes at the price of introducing an additional source of un-
certainty that, if not properly quantiﬁed, might worsen the accuracy of the estimated
state. For this reason, the ability of recursive estimators to better ﬁlter out the measu-
4An RTU is a device, installed at the substation level, that is used to send (usually non-synchronized)
measurements to the network operation and control center. The measurement set generally consists of
voltage and current magnitudes as well as active and reactive powers.
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rement noise could not be exploited in the past due to the low refresh rate between
two consecutive SE outputs and thus due the high uncertainty in the state prediction.
Thanks to the adoption of PMUs characterized by a high reporting rates, the usage of
recursive estimators has been reconsidered.
In what follows, the measurement and process models used by static and recursive
estimators, are described because they are functional with respect to the applications
described in the rest of the chapter. For the same reasons, this section also provides
the analytic formulation of two linear estimators: the so-called linear weighted least
squares estimator (LWLS) and the discrete Kalman ﬁlter (DKF).
Measurement model
The link between the system state variables and the measurements, together with
the measurement noise is expressed by the measurement model. In power systems,
the measurement model is represented by the network model that is composed of (i)
the network topology and (ii) the electrical parameters of the various components of
the power system (e.g., line, transformers). Depending on the type of measurement
chosen, the measurement model can be either linear or nonlinear. When using me-
asurements coming from RTUs or hybrid set of RTUs and PMUs, the measurement
model is nonlinear. On the other hand, when the SE uses only measurements coming
from PMUs composed of voltage and/or current phasors, the SE can be formulated in
a linear way. The latter is the formulation described in the rest of the section and used
throughout the whole manuscript.
In general, the state variables are represented by the phase-to-ground nodal voltages.
Nevertheless, there are cases in the literature where the state variables are represented
by the nodal current injections, by the current ﬂows, or a mix of them (provided that
they are independent state variables). If we deﬁne with S the set of network buses,
the number of network buses is equal to s =| S |, where the operator | | denotes the
cardinality of a set. The state of a three-phase (3-ph) network with s buses is denoted
by x ∈  n , where n = 3 · 2s is the number of states that compose the set of states
variablesN . Also, if we deﬁne with B the set of network branches or lines, the number
of branches is equal to b =| B |. An exact linear measurement model is obtained
by expressing measurements and states in rectangular coordinates. Hence, the state
vector is:
x = [Va,b,c1,re , . . . ,V
a,b,c
i,re , . . . ,V
a,b,c
s,re ,V
a,b,c
1,im, . . . ,V
a,b,c
i,im , . . . ,V
a,b,c
s,im]
T (3.6)
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where
Va,b,ci,re = [V
a
i,re, V
b
i,re, V
c
i,re]
Va,b,ci,im = [V
a
i,im, V
b
i,im, V
c
i,im] (3.7)
are respectively the real and imaginary parts of the voltage phasor at bus i in the three
phases. To be mentioned that PMU measurements eliminate the need of choosing a
reference bus5. Unlike the conventional SE formulation, when using PMUs, the phase
angle or the imaginary part of the voltage is estimated at every bus.
In order to provide an example of linear measurement model, and without loss of
generality, let us assume that the SE is fed with measurement coming only from PMUs.
Suppose that the measurements consist of nodal voltage phasors, current injection
phasors and current ﬂow phasors. Identify withD1 (d1 =| D1 |) the set of buses where
PMUs measure nodal voltage phasors, with D2 (d2 =| D2 |) the set of buses where
current injection phasors are measured and with D3 (d3 =| D3 |) the set of branches
where current ﬂow phasors are measured. Hence, the set of measurements M is
composed of:
• 3d1 phase-to-ground voltage phasors;
• 3d2 injected current phasors;
• 3d3 branch current phasors;
and its cardinality is equal tom = 2 · (3d1 + 3d2 + 3d3). Therefore, the measurement
array z ∈  m is equal to:
z =
[
zV , zIinj , zIﬂow
]T
(3.8)
where
zV =
[
Va,b,c1,re , . . . ,V
a,b,c
d1,re
,Va,b,c1,im, . . . ,V
a,b,c
d1,im
]
zIinj =
[
Ia,b,cinj,1,re, . . . , I
a,b,c
inj,d2,re
, Ia,b,cinj,1,im, . . . , I
a,b,c
inj,d2,im
]
zIﬂow =
[
Ia,b,cﬂow,1,re, . . . , I
a,b,c
ﬂow,d3,re
, Ia,b,cﬂow,1,im, . . . , I
a,b,c
ﬂow,d3,im
]
. (3.9)
The measurements and the system state variables are linked by the following equation:
z = Hx+ e (3.10)
5A reference bus, is a bus where the phase angle or the imaginary part of the voltage it is assumed to
have a known value (usually equal to zero) and therefore it is not included in the state vector.
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where H is a m × n matrix that represents the link between the measurements and
state variables and e is the measurement noise. Note that, when using a linear SE,H
does not introduce approximation in the measurement model since it is exact. The
measurement noise e is assumed to be white and Gaussian, with a distribution:
p(e) ∼ N (0,R) (3.11)
whereR is the measurement noise covariance matrix. The normality of PMU errors
is based on experimental evidences of error distributions of actual PMUs (e.g., [87]).
The diagonal entries ofR represent the variances of the measurements, which corre-
spond to the cumulative accuracies of the metering systems6. The off-diagonal entries
account for eventual correlation between the measurements that occurs if mutual
inﬂuence among meters is present. However, as discussed in [26] we here recall why
the presence of off-diagonal terms is unlikely to occur:
• Measurements provided by different meters can be reasonably considered inde-
pendent [88], and it is assumed to use no 3-ph multifunction meters [89];
• The sensors are typically installed separately in each of the three phases and the
cross-talk interferences are assumed to be negligible;
• The voltage and current magnitudes measured by the same PMU can be usually
considered uncorrelated [88];
• As demonstrated in [88], neglecting PMU correlations (both in magnitude and
phase) in the estimator model does not lead to a signiﬁcant decrease of the SE
accuracy.
For the case of power networks, matrixH of (3.10) is derived from the network topology
and the electrical parameters of the various network components. The derivation of
the linear matrixH, when using rectangular coordinates, is available in several works
in the literature (e.g., [26, 90]) and therefore it is not provided here.
Process model
As mentioned in the introduction, recursive state estimators use a process model in
addition to the measurement model. The process model is used to describe the time
evolution of the system state as a function of (i) the previous system states, (ii) the
controllable inputs, (iii) the process noise.
6With metering system, we here refer to sensors as the transducers (e.g., voltage or current instrument
transformers) that scale down the input voltage and current signals in order to interface the meters
(represented in this case by PMUs) with the electrical network.
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The considered linear discrete-time process model can be formulated as in [91]:
xt = Axt−1 +But +wt (3.12)
where:
• t is the time-step index;
• x ∈  n represents the system state;
• u ∈  uc represents a set Uc (uc =| Uc |) of known controllable variables;
• w ∈  n represents the process noise;
• A is an n×nmatrix that links the system state x at time-step t− 1with the one at
the time-step t, for the case of null controllable variables and null process noise;
• B is a n× uc matrix that links the system state with the controllable variables u,
for the case of null process noise.
In general, matrices A and B might change at each time-step. Several works in the
literature focused on the estimation the state transition matrix A to increase the
prediction model (e.g., using Holt’s exponential smoothing [92], regression analysis
[93]). Nonetheless, for sake of simplicity, in what follows we leverage on the high frame
rate of the PMUs (e.g., 50 fps in a 50 Hz system) and thus we assume that, between two
consecutive time-steps, the system state exhibits small variations. For this reason, we
adopt a unity state transition matrix as in its original formulation in [94]. Additionally,
power systems are not typically controllable thus B is set equal to the null matrix 0.
For these reasons, from (3.12) by imposingA = I andB = 0 a suitable process model
for the case of power system SE with PMUs is obtained. It is called Autoregressive
Integrated Moving Average - ARIMA (0,1,0) and it is given by:
xt = xt−1 +wt (3.13)
The process noisewt is assumed to be a Gaussian white sequence:
p(wt) ∼ N (0,Qt) (3.14)
whereQt is the process noise covariance matrix.
The application of the process model (3.13) to power system SE using KF was proposed
in the 1970 by Debs and Larson [94]. The main advantage of such a formulation is
that only Q has to be assessed. An heuristic method for the assessment of Q in the
context of power system SE is proposed in [95]. It uses a sliding time windows of the
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lastK estimated states to directly infer the distribution of the process noise covariance
matrix. In particular, being at time t, the forecast ofQt+1 is performed using the lastK
estimated states (from t to t−K). TheK process noisesw(j) with j = (1, . . . ,K) are
computed as
w(j) = x(j) − xt−K (3.15)
Finally, the process noise covariance matrixQt+1 is obtained by computing the vari-
ance of every row ofw. This heuristic method is used in this thesis to assess theQ of
the chosen recursive state estimator (i.e., Kalman Filter). For additional details, refer
to [95].
Observation. In most cases, including power system SE, it is reasonable to assume that
the process and measurement noises are uncorrelated, that is:
 [weT ] = 0 (3.16)
Weighted Least Squares
Theweighted least squares (WLS) estimator is usedwhenmeasurements are characteri-
zed by different accuracy. Indeed, the WLS method is able to weight the measurements
according to their accuracy. It relies on the following assumptions:
1. The measurement noises are Gaussian-distributed with null mean value;
2. The measurement noises are uncorrelated, therefore the measurement noise
covariance matrixR is diagonal;
3. The measurement matrixH that links the measurements with the states is full
rank, so that the network is observable.
The objective of the WLS-SE is to compute the most likely system state, given a set
of measured quantities. The measurement noises are assumed to have known Gaus-
sian probability distributions with zero mean and variances reported in the diagonal
elements ofR. The measurement residual vector r is deﬁned as:
r = z− h(x) (3.17)
where we consider the measurement function h(x) truly linear, as in (3.10). The
objective of the WLS optimization problem is to minimize the weighted sum of the
squares of the measurement residuals as explained, for example, in [86]:
J(x) = rTR−1r (3.18)
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The assumption #2, enables us to write Equation (3.18) as:
J(x) =
m∑
i=1
r2i
Rii
(3.19)
It can be seen that the reciprocal of the measurement noise variances represent the
weights assigned to each measurement, so that a higher measurement accuracy corre-
sponds to a higher weight.
In the case of Linear Weighted Least Squares (LWLS), the exact linear measurement
model of (3.10) is used. The measurement residual vector at a given time instant t is
given by:
rt = zt −Hxt (3.20)
where matrixH, a part from containing no approximations, it is also constant in time
for a given network model.
The minimum of the function J in correspondence of the estimated state x̂ can be
computed analytically as:
∂J(xt)
∂(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
x̂
=
∂(rTt R
−1
t rt)
∂(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
x̂
= 0 (3.21)
that yields:
HTR−1t (zt −Hx̂t) = 0. (3.22)
Solving for x̂t yields:
x̂t = G
−1
t H
TR−1t zt (3.23)
whereG is the so-called Gain Matrix that is deﬁned as:
Gt = H
TR−1t H (3.24)
The covariance matrix of x̂t is:
cov(x̂t) = G
−1
t (3.25)
To be noted that, whileH is constant in time for a given network model,Rmay change
at each time-step because:
• The measurement errors are calculated with respect to the measured values.
• The measurement errors are given in polar coordinates while the state is ex-
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pressed in rectangular coordinates. The projection from polar to rectangular
coordinates needs to be performed at each time-step. The derivation of the ana-
lytical relationship that allows to express the phasor uncertainties in rectangular
coordinates as a function of the measurements is given in [90]. To be noted that
the measurement errors transformed in rectangular coordinates are Gaussian-
distributed only if the standard deviation of the magnitude and phase errors are
small [90]. Hence, we assume that the sensors used throughout the manuscript
satisfy this constraint.
Kalman Filter
The Kalman Filter (KF) was presented in 1960 as a recursive solution to the discrete data
linear ﬁltering problem. Since then it has been further improved and used in different
ﬁelds including power systems SE. The KF relies on the following assumptions:
1. The process and measurement noises are Gaussian white sequences;
2. The process and measurement noises are uncorrelated, as indicated by (3.16);
3. The measurement matrixH that links the measurements with the states is full
rank, so that the network is observable.
Among the several KFs that have been deployed, the Discrete Kalman Filter (DKF) is
used when it is possible a linear formulation of the SE, as in our case. In what follows,
the DKF is described as it is one of the estimators used in this thesis.
As mentioned above, the estimator has to face and manage two main sources of
error formally included in (i) the measurement noise covariance matrix R and (ii)
the process noise covariance matrix Q. The former takes into account the noise e
added by the measurement devices. The larger the coefﬁcients ofR, the lower the ﬁlter
trusts the measurements model (3.10). The Q matrix, instead, comprehends every
approximation introduced in the process model, therefore it gives an indication of how
much the ﬁlter trusts the process model (3.13).
As known (e.g., [91]), DKF consists of two different parts, the so-called time-update
(prediction) and the measurement-update (estimation). The prediction equations
obtain an a-priori estimate x˜t of the true state xt, using the observations available up
to and including time-step t− 1. The estimation equations incorporate the new mea-
surements obtained at time-step t into the a-priori estimate and obtain an improved
a-posteriori estimate x̂t of the true state xt.
The derivation of the formulation for the DKF-SE is not the focus of the chapter and
thus it is not provided. The prediction and estimation equations for the optimal
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Kalman Gain are reported in the following for reference:
1. Time-update (prediction):
x˜t = x̂t−1 (3.26)
P˜t = P̂t−1 +Qt−1. (3.27)
2. Measurement-update (estimation):
Kt = P˜tH
T (HP˜tH
T +Rt)
−1 (3.28)
x̂t = x˜t +Kt(zt −Hx˜t) (3.29)
P̂t = (I−KtH)P˜t. (3.30)
where:
• P˜t is a s× smatrix that represents the a-priori estimate error covariance;
• P̂t−1 and P̂t represent the a-posteriori estimate error covariance matrices at
time-step t− 1 and t, respectively;
• Kt is a s×mmatrix that minimizes the a-posteriori estimate error covariance. It
is the so-called “Kalman gain”.
3.2 Time critical power system applications
As introduced in Chapter 2, the so-called data process-and-operation layer, is often
composed of applications that, taking advantage of the PMU measurements, are able
to achieve several speciﬁc tasks. A non-comprehensive list of possible applications
includes tuning of system parameters (e.g., protection relays), estimation of the nodal
equivalent (e.g., loads) parameters, congestion management, fault detection and fault
location [1]. It is clear that these applications, although based on the same architecture,
are characterized by very different time-scales. In what follows, we present two appli-
cations that, with different time-scales, aim at protecting and controlling the power
system.
3.2.1 Fault detection and faulted-line identiﬁcation
The content of this section is based on [96] and it is a shared contribution with L. Zanni
that is the other main author of the work.
56
3.2. Time critical power system applications
Introduction
The fundamental problem in power system protection is to deﬁne the quantities that
allows to differentiate between normal and abnormal (faulty) operating conditions.
This is complicated by the fact that, for a relay device, a normal operating condition can
also be the one where a disturbance exists, but it is outside of the zone of protection
[97]. Regardless of the chosen method, the fault detection and subsequent protection
of a power system is not a trivial task. The network operator always needs to deal with:
1. Deﬁnition of zones of protection: the region of a power system for which a given
relay or protective system is responsible.
2. Selectivity of protections: the setting of time-delays and coordination between
relays belonging to the same or different zone of protection.
3. Increasing number of protection devices installed: each type of relays covers
for a subset of possible faults. This leads to increased complexity in terms of
installation and maintenance.
In the recent years, studies have shown that the network operator can highly bene-
ﬁt from PMUs and the associated synchrophasors in order to improve its existing
protection schemes [98].
Traditionally the fault detection (with the associated relaying schemes) and fault lo-
cation functionalities have been considered as separate processes since the latter
usually requires computational efforts that do not ﬁt the time latencies needed by the
protections.
While the protection of the system from faults has to be achieved within time-scales of
tens of / hundred milliseconds, the identiﬁcation of the faulted component (i.e., fault
location) is usually performed ofﬂine. Fault location methods can relay on impedance-
based techniques [99], exploit the characteristics of fault-generated traveling waves
(e.g., [100, 101, 102]) or use synchrophasor measurements (e.g., [103, 104]).
In distribution systems, the protection of the feeders is typically achieved by means of
breakers often installed only at the root of each feeder. In a very basic scheme, the fault
location is then performed by repairing crews, leading to outages that might last hours.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the increasing integration of DGs, is leading to changes
in monitoring and automation of existing distribution systems. An accurate and fast
fault location is the next step to accelerate the service restoration. In this respect, the
literature has proposed a number of methods for fault location in distribution networks
based on impedance measurements [105], traveling waves [106] and synchrophasors
[107].
57
Chapter 3. Time critical functions and applications
This section discusses the possibility of merging the relaying and fault location functi-
onalities in any power system network by using PMU-based real-time SE. Indeed,
beside their capability of bad data ﬁltering, real-time state estimators are characterized
by high rejection of measurement noise [86] and low time latency [32]. The former
property improves the assessment of the fault position, whilst the latter supports the
stringent time requirements of protections. In the literature, the papers that aim at
localizing faults by means of PMU-based state estimation is limited to [108] and [109].
In [108] the fault is detected by using bad data identiﬁcation techniques. An augmen-
ted state vector, that includes the voltage and the fault position, is used to estimate the
fault location. Reference [109], follows a similar approach by using estimated and/or
actual voltage and current measurements at the extremities of the faulted line to infer,
by means of a WLS, the fault position.
The method proposed in this section relies on the outcomes of a LWLS synchrophasor-
based SE to identify, in real-time, the line affected by the fault, the fault type and
the current drained by the fault. For this reason, differently from existing methods,
the proposed method does not change regardless to the type of network, the type of
fault, the fault impedance or the presence of DG. This ﬂexibility theoretically enables
the network operator to adopt the proposed approach as a single protection and
fault-location scheme for any power system.
Proposed method
The proposed faulted-line identiﬁcation7 method represents one of the possible appli-
cations based on synchrophasor networks data and therefore:
• There is no need to implement any coordination between relays, but time-
deterministic communication is required with the data process-and-operation
layer (i.e., PDC and applications).
• It is based on PMUs that implicitly enable the operator to perform voltage and
synchronization checks before operating a reclosing maneuver.
• A part from the sensors, the method does not share other components with
the existing protection relays and thus it might be used as a backup remote
protection for the deployment and testing phase.
The proposed fault detection and faulted line identiﬁcation methodology strongly
relies on the state estimation theory and in particular on the WLS formulation given in
Section 3.1.2. It relies on the following assumptions:
7Henceforth in this manuscript, the term faulted-line identiﬁcation is used interchangeably with the
term fault location
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1. Knowledge of the network admittance matrix (i.e., H is exact). This implies
the knowledge of (i) network topology and (ii) line parameters. For (i), it has
to be noted that the standard [40] allows PMUs to record and stream digital
values with the synchrophasor data. The digital values may correspond to the
status of the breaker connected to the lines departing from a PMU-monitored
substation. The status of all the breakers in the observed system allows to obtain
the incidence matrix and thus the network topology. Indeed, the possibility
of streaming the breaker’s status together with the synchrophasor is a further
advantage of the PMUs for protection. It allows to reconstruct and time-tag
the topology changes with the same latency as the measurement set. If, due to
installation constrains, not all the PMUs can measure the status of the breakers in
the substation, the literature provides several methods to estimate the topology
or detect topology errors, with or without using PMU measurements (e.g., [110,
111, 112]. Concerning (ii), distribution and transmission networks are usually
composed of overhead lines and cables that have a standard conﬁguration with
known electrical parameters. Therefore, we suppose that these characteristics are
known. By knowing the incidence matrix and the line parameters, the admittance
matrixY can be obtained.
2. Knowledge of the noise covariance matrixR. This assumption holds in power
systems because the characteristics of the measurement devices (e.g., sensor’s
class) are usually known. See Section 3.1.2 for details about the measurement
model.
3. PMUs are installed in every bus. In the current literature, it is evident the growing
interest in deploying PMUs and associated applications. Recent publications
have dealt with PMUs installation in every bus, even at the distribution level [30,
32].
4. Bad data are not present in the dataset. The targeted application sets stringent
time requirements. For this reasons, it is assumed that bad data are removed
from the measurement set by using the pre-estimation ﬁltering of bad data as
described in Chapter 4.1.
Fault modeling: A generic fault on a line is an event that can be modeled by adding
an additional three-phase bus (hereafter called virtual bus) on the line affected by
the fault. The virtual bus absorbs the fault current and it increments by one the total
number of three-phase buses in the monitored network.
Let us consider a s-buses and b-lines network equipped with PMUs at every bus,
measuring injected currents. We can imagine to feed b parallel SEs with the same
dataset. Each one of the b-SEs has a slightly different topology from the others. The
difference is due to the presence of the virtual bus on a speciﬁc line. The jth SE
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(j = 1, ..., b) considers the existence of a virtual bus in the middle of the jth line. This
leads to an augmented state vector x. The state vector thus becomes:
x = [V a,b,c1re , ..., V
a,b,c
sre , V
a,b,c
s+1re
, V a,b,c1im , ..., V
a,b,c
sim , V
a,b,c
s+1im
]T (3.31)
where V a,b,cs+1re and V
a,b,c
s+1im
represent the real and imaginary parts of the nodal voltage
phasor in the virtual bus. The measurement matrixH is modiﬁed accordingly for each
SE.
In normal operating conditions, the b-virtual buses do not absorb any current and thus
the different topology among the SEs does not play a role in the b estimated states. In
this case, the minimization of the objective function returns similar results for each of
the b-SEs:
xj  xtrue ∀j (3.32)
Assume now the existence of a generic fault (i.e., phase to ground, phase to phase or
three phase) in the line delimited by buses #h and #u. The fault consists in a current
(i.e., fault current) being drawn from an unknown position between buses #h and #u.
Assume the f th SE is the one, among the b parallel SEs, with the virtual bus placed in
the middle of the line that connects bus #h and #u. It is intuitive to understand that the
topology of the f th SE is the closest to real network one. This is true even if the fault is
not located exactly in the middle of the line, that is, in correspondence of the virtual
bus for the f th SE. In this case:
xf  xtrue
xj = xtrue ∀j = f
(3.33)
As the position of the fault is not known a priori, it is necessary to distinguish among the
b-SEs the one providing the best estimated state. The weighted measurement residuals
(WMR) are used as the metric to determine the best SE (the one characterized by the
smallest topology error):
WMRj =
m∑
i=1
|zi − ẑji |
σzi
j ∈ [1, . . . , b] (3.34)
where ẑj = Hjx̂j .
During normal operating conditions, the b-WMRs are all close to each other because
the SEs have the same dataset as input and each virtual bus is not absorbing any
current so it is seen as a zero-injection bus8. By the time a fault occurs, b − 1 SEs
converge to a solution far from the true state and their WMRs suddenly increase. The
SE that has the virtual bus placed in the faulted line has the lowest WMR, allowing
8A zero-injection bus is deﬁned as a bus where no load or generation is connected.
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an immediate identiﬁcation of the faulted line. Moreover, the state returned by the
SE characterized by the lowest WMR, is used, together with its admittance matrix,
to estimate the fault currents. The phases of the virtual bus in which the estimated
current differs from zero are the ones affected by the fault, so that also the type of fault
is identiﬁed.
The analysis of the WMRs allows also the detection of the fault. Let us call WMRmean
the mean of all the WMRs at a certain instant in time. When the difference between
the WMRmean of two consecutive time-steps has a sudden increase, a fault is detected
(one example of the time evolution of the WMRs before and during a fault is provided
in Section 5.4.2, Fig. 5.17).
A pseudo-algorithm that summarizes the proposed method is given in Algorithm 1.
For every new data set coming from the PMUs, we compute the WMRs of the parallel
SEs and also their mean WMRmean. Comparing the WMRmean of two consecutive time-
steps, we detect the presence of a fault. If a fault is detected, the index f of the SE
associated to the minimum WMR identiﬁes the faulted line. Finally, we can use the
estimated state returned by the f th SE to identify the fault type and estimate the fault
current.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-algorithm of the proposed fault detection and line identiﬁcation
method.
1: function IDENTIFY FAULT (LINE,CURRENT,TYPE)
2: for each time-step t do
3: compute WMRj ∀j
4: if mean(WMRs)
∣∣∣
t
	mean(WMRs)
∣∣∣
t−1
then
5: Fault detected← true
6: f = index of min(WMRs)
7: Faulted line← f
8: If = Y fEf
9: Fault current← Ifvirtual bus
10: Fault type← phases where Fault current = 0
11: end if
12: return Fault detected, Faulted line, Fault current, Fault type
13: end function
For sake of clarity, a ﬂowchart summarizing the proposed method has also been added
in Fig. 3.5.
In summary, the proposed method allows to:
• detect the existence of a fault;
• identify the faulted line;
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∣∣
t
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t = time-step
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Faulted line = f = index of min(WMRs)
Fault current = Ifvirtual bus; where I
f = Y fEf
Fault type = phases where Fault current = 0
No fault
End End
yes
no
Figure 3.5 – Flowchart of the proposed fault detection and line identiﬁcation method,
performed at each time-step t.
• identify the fault type (1-ph, 2-ph or 3-ph);
• estimate the fault current.
Although not presented in this manuscript, the methodology described here can also
be applied to estimate the location of the fault along the faulted line. The virtual bus
is moved in discrete steps along the faulted line and state estimation is subsequently
performed. The position of the virtual bus that minimizes the WMR corresponds to
the most likely position of the fault along the line.
The validation of the proposed fault detection and faulted-line identiﬁcation method
in a real-time simulation environment is given in Chapter 5.4.
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Figure 3.6 – Scheme of a generic centralized DMS for ADNs. Adapted from [114].
3.2.2 Voltage regulation scheme for distribution networks
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the past years have seen a large increase in the connection
of DERs that resulted in violation of operational constraints at the distribution level.
This leads to the need of developing optimal control strategies tailored for distribution
grids. It is worth noting that optimal control solutions are of interests only if they meet
the time constraints imposed by the stochasticity of DERs, in particular photovoltaic
units (PVs), largely present in these networks. The synchrophasor network architecture
presented so far, if well designed, meets these time constraints and may enable the
deployment of processes for optimal control of distribution networks (e.g., voltage
control, line congestion management).
This section starts with an overview on a centralized distribution management system
(DMS) for ADNs. Then, framed within this control architecture, the Grid Explicit
Congestion Notiﬁcation (GECN) mechanism, ﬁrstly presented in [113], is recalled
together with the formulation of the optimal voltage control problem.
Distribution management system for active distribution networks
A control architecture, aiming at operating in distribution networks, needs to take
into account the multi-phase unbalanced nature of the network, the non-negligible
R/X ratio for longitudinal line impedance as well as the inﬂuence of the transverse
capacitance9, and thus the existing control strategies have to be upgraded to meet
such constraints.
Let us consider an ADN equipped with a number of distributed controllable energy
resources, a monitoring infrastructure like the one presented so far and a centralized
DMS. A possible architecture of the DMS is shown in Fig. 3.6, and its main modules
are:
9The line shunt parameters are non-negligible especially in presence of coaxial cables. These types of
cables are often present, for instance, in urban context.
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• State estimation: This DMS module has been described in Section 3.1.2. The
real-time SE has to be able of assessing the system state with a latency of few
tens/hundreds of milliseconds with relatively high levels of accuracy and refresh
rate. Once the voltage phasors are known, it is straightforward to compute the
nodal power injections and the line power ﬂows.
• Short-term forecasts10: This DMS module incorporates algorithms able to pro-
vide short-term forecast for loads and DERs. An accurate forecast of load and
DER generation is useful when the DNOs is requested to contribute to ancillary
services, or for demand-response actions [115, 116].
• Online centralized optimization: This DMS module formulates and solves the
optimization problem in order to obtain the new operation set points. Examples
of objective functions can be the minimization of the losses, or of the voltage
deviation, the minimization of the cost of the energy supply or the management
of lines congestions. Once the new set points are obtained, the module com-
municates them to the controllable DERs with a time-scale that is set by the
controlled application [114, 117].
In what follows we give the necessary background on the Grid Explicit Congestion
Notiﬁcation (GECN) mechanism. The GECN mechanisms was discussed in the Ph.D.
dissertation [118]. We brieﬂy recall the functionalities of the centralized GECN network
controller and the design of the GECN load controller for the case of thermostatically
controlled loads (TCLs). These two components constitute the necessary background
to fully understand the validation of the GECN mechanism in a real-time simulation
environment, given in Chapter 5.5.
GECN mechanism
A control mechanisms that implements a direct control of each single resource, is not
a viable approach when the resources are numerous and diverse, as in the distribution
networks where the controlled systems are represented, for instance, by thermostati-
cally controlled loads (TCLs) or distributed storage. Such control scheme would results
in algorithms that cannot scale in the number of network buses and controllable re-
sources. Additionally, a customized architecture for the control of a speciﬁc type of
energy resource, renders the control problem difﬁcult in presence of heterogeneous
resources. The GECN mechanism was designed in order to address such issues. GECN
is a uniﬁed control mechanism that provides grid ancillary services by controlling
heterogeneous energy resources via low bit-rate broadcast-control signals [113]. It is
conceived to avoid individual point-to-point communication from the DNO to every
10This functionality is mentioned for the sake of completeness but it is not used in the manuscript. It is
mainly used for energy management purposes.
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controllable resource and uses state estimation as feedback channel. The control
architecture is essentially composed of two parts:
• The ﬁrst part is a centralized network controller that, based on the system state,
computes optimal power active and reactive nodal power set-points that steer
the system to the desired voltage level. The optimal set-points are then translated
to broadcast signals, henceforth called GECN signals, that are communicated to
the buses where the controllable DERs are connected.
• The second component of the GECN architecture is the local controller that
interprets the GECN signals and acts on the DERs according to the device’s
capabilities and internal state constraints.
An interesting feature of such mechanism is the inherent ”separation of concerns"
between the centralized GECN network controller and the GECN local controllers. The
GECN network controller is agnostic with respect to the nature and the actual state of
the controlled resources. On the other hand, the local resource controller is speciﬁc
for each type of DER and simply acts on the resource it is coupled to, as a function of
its GECN input signals and the resource’s internal state without having a view of the
whole system.
GECN network controller
The control mechanism is based on the closed loop depicted in Fig. 3.711. A deviation
from the day-ahead forecast power proﬁles
(
P fi (t+ 1), Q
f
i (t+ 1)
)
is penalized and
thus the aim of the DNO is to match them as closely as possible to reduce the costs of
operation associated to the acquisition of reserve at transmission level (e.g., [119]). At
the same time, the DNO has to ensure a voltage proﬁle within acceptable operating
limits
(
E0 − δ ≤ |E¯i(t+ 1)| ≤ E0 + δ
)
, where δ denotes the voltage deviation from the
rated value E0 that the DNO tolerates.
At each time-step t, and for each bus i, the DNO observes the state of the network E¯i(t)
and the aggregated active and reactive power injection Pi(t), Qi(t). Additionally the
DNO computes the mismatch between forecast power and aggregated one, in absence
of control, asΔP fi (t) = P
f
i (t+ 1)− Pi(t) andΔQfi (t) = Qfi (t+ 1)−Qi(t).
The voltage sensitivity coefﬁcients with respect to absorbed/injected power of a bus
 [120, 113] are:
KP,i(t) :=
∂|E¯i(t)|
∂P
, KQ,i(t) :=
∂|E¯i(t)|
∂Q
, (3.35)
11Fig. 3.7 shows the closed loop for the control of the active power. In case the controllable resources
have reactive power capabilities, a similar feedback control loop is adopted.
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Figure 3.7 – Control loop for the computation of the GECN signal g(t) for the control of
active power. Adapted from [113].
This allows for a local linearization of the voltage deviationΔ|E¯(t)| = (Δ|E¯i(t)|)i:
Δ|E¯(t)| ≈ KP(t)ΔP(t) +KQ(t)ΔQ(t). (3.36)
Next, using the computed sensitivity coefﬁcients, the DNO solves the following convex
optimization problem (i.e., the online centralized optimization block shown in Fig. 3.7)
to compute optimal nodal power adjustments (ΔP∗(t),ΔQ∗(t)) for the buses with
controllable loads, in order to steer the system towards the desired operating set-point
for voltage control:
min
ΔP,ΔQ
∑
i
(
ΔPi(t)−ΔP fi (t)
)2
+
∑
i
(
ΔQi(t)−ΔQfi (t)
)2
subject to: γi ≤ cosϕi ≤ 1
Emin ≤ |E¯i(t)|+Δ|E¯i(t)| − E0 ≤ Emax
(3.37)
where γi is the constraint on the power factor of the i-th bus.
To be noted that the optimal control problem reported here has been modiﬁed compa-
red to [113]. In particular, in this case the limits on the voltage deviations are explicitly
inserted as constraints of the optimization problem. Additionally, we apply the penalty
method to transform the problem above into an unconstrained optimization problem
and we use a gradient descent iterative scheme to compute the optimal solution of
the control problem [121]. Adopting such a method allows us to have control over the
solution of the optimization problem in real-time as shown in Section 5.5.
The resulting optimal set points, (ΔP∗(t),ΔQ∗(t)) are mapped to the GECN signal g(t)
66
3.2. Time critical power system applications
as shown in Fig. 3.7. A saturation function f mapsΔP ∗i (t) to a value in [−1, 1].
f(ΔP ∗i (t)) = sign(ΔP
∗
i (t))(1− e−|ΔP
∗
i (t)|/bi) (3.38)
where bi is a parameter that affects the slope of the saturation function (i.e., the smallest
the b, the steepest the slope). A exponential parameterG, function of the mismatch
between optimal and actual set point computed at the previous time-step t−1 is then
used to weight the outcome of (3.38) as shown in Fig. 3.7:
G = esign(ΔP
∗(t−1))(ΔP ∗(t−1)−ΔP (t−1)) (3.39)
Note that, in case the controllable resources have also reactive power capabilities, it
is sufﬁcient to replaceΔP ∗i (t)withΔQ
∗
i (t) in (3.38) and (3.39) to compute the GECN
signal for the control of reactive power.
The GECN signals are broadcasted to the network buses and particularly to the load
controllers. In what follows we describe how the load response has been represented.
Load response representation
In this thesis we consider TCLs whose state is given by their temperature (e.g., air
conditioners or refrigerators). In particular, we describe the behavior of a cooling
thermostatic device. A more detailed load representation, including also storage
systems can be found in [118].
A TCL operates in binary mode X = {0, 1}, and its internal state is given by the cooling
compartment temperature, constrained in the form of a deadband Θ = [θmin, θmax].
The internal temperature of these kinds of loads can be modeled as in [122]:
θ(t+ 1) = θ(t) + (1− )
(
θ0 − ηX(t)Pr
A
)
+ ω(t) (3.40)
where θ0 is the ambient temperature,  = e−τA/mc describes the inertia of the appliance,
τ is the time-step andmc is the thermal mass, η is its coefﬁcient of performance, and
A is the thermal conductivity. The process ω(t) is a noise process-modeling of the
random external heat injections in the thermostatically controlled loads having a
distribution that follows hourly data. A typical duty-cycle function (Fig. 3.8) is:
h(X = 0, θ) =  {θ≥θmax}
h(X = 1, θ) =  {θ≥θmin}
(3.41)
As in [118], we assume at each network bus i a population of the aforementioned TCL
appliances, each one having a state evolving as in (3.40) and a duty cycle described by
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Figure 3.8 – Duty-cycle for appliances with deadband-constrained state. Adapted
from [118].
(3.41). In addition to the controllable loads, in each network bus, non-elastic demand
represented by typical 24-h load proﬁles is considered. The combination of elastic and
non-elastic loads at the bus level, represents the so-called ”aggregated power".
GECN local controller
All the elastic appliances connected to a network bus i receive at the time-step t
the GECN control signal gi(t) broadcast by the DNO. The signal represents a real
number gi(t) ∈ [−1, 1]. The control signal gi(t) is proportional to the DNO’s desire
to inhibit consumption: a positive gi inhibits consumption, a negative gi encourages
consumption, whereas gi = 0 does not impact the behavior of the appliance. The local
controller decides the action to be taken based on the internal state of the resource
and on the value of the received signal.
The normal operation of a TCL appliance is an on-off mode, with the temperature
moving in a dead-band. When on, the TCL absorbs active power, and via a ﬁxed
power factor, a proportional amount of reactive power. For this reason, the target
of the GECN local controller is to control the active power injection by switching
mode, if necessary and allowed by the internal state of the TCL. A ﬂow chart that
summarizes the design and control actions of the local resources-controller is shown
in Fig. 3.912. In particular, a TCL reacts with a probability equal to the magnitude of
the gp signal received. Therefore, a larger magnitude of the signal would result in more
appliances participating in the control action. If the TCL reacts, the controller turns
on or off the appliance with a probability that is function of the signal and on the
internal state of the fridge (i.e., internal temperature). Finally, if the appliance switches
mode due to the gp signal received, it ignores ignores all subsequent control signals
for a predetermined number of time-steps. This avoids operation in mini-cycles thus
preserving the compressor’s lifetime.
As for all the other topics presented in this chapter, the validation in a real-time
simulation environment of the GECN mechanism here recalled, coupled with its
12A more detailed description of this load controller is given in [118].
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Figure 3.9 – Statemodel representing the local controllers for TCLs. Adapted from [123].
functional blocks (e.g., PMU-based state estimation), is given in Chapter 5.
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4 Quality and reliability of PMU-
based time critical functions
This chapter starts with the analysis of state-of-the-art bad data detection and identiﬁ-
cation methods for power grid situation awareness systems. Then, a novel bad data
detection method able to deal with intentional or unintentional tampering of syn-
chrophasor measurements is presented. In the second part of the chapter it is shown
that it is possible to forge attacks to the time reference of a number of synchrophasors
that are undetectable by state-of-the-art bad data detection methods and, at the same
time, lead to physical grid damage. At the end of the chapter, the proposed bad data
detection method is tested as a countermeasure to neutralize the attack.
Original contributions of this chapter:
• Deﬁnition and validation of an algorithm for the pre-estimation ﬁltering of bad
data that leverages on the conﬁdence in the predicted system state. The algorithm
is also able to distinguish between actual bad data and unexpected dynamic
phenomena;
• Closed form formulation of an attack to the time-reference of selected PMUs
that is undetectable by state-of-the-art bad data detection methods and leads to
physical grid damage.
4.1 Bad data detection and identiﬁcation
As mentioned in Chapter 3.1.2, sufﬁcient measurement redundancy allows SE to cope
with measurement losses and to detect and identify measurements errors. These are
the so-called bad data (BD). Detection indicates the ability of recognizing the existence
of a BD in the measurement set whereas the identiﬁcation pinpoints the speciﬁc
corrupted measurement(s) in the set. BD always deteriorates the accuracy of the
estimation output, although a large measurement redundancy and the employment of
robust state estimators can mitigate this impact. In power systems, BD are not rare
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due to the large amount of collected measurements and the complexity of the sensing
and communication layers.
An example of BD are the so-called gross errors. They are measurements characterized
by a large difference from their expected value (e.g., negative magnitude values) that
can be identiﬁed with simple plausibility checks. Data conditioning algorithms can be
used to analyze the incoming measurements seeking gross errors, missing data, or to
reﬁne the raw measurements (e.g., [80]).
Other BD require more advanced methods to be detected and identiﬁed as the measu-
rement error magnitude is only a few times larger than the expected standard deviation.
These types of errors impact the accuracy of the estimated state and can be generated,
for instance, by electromagnetic interference.
Several different algorithms are available in the literature for BD detection (BDD) and
identiﬁcation as summarized in [124]. They can be mainly classiﬁed in post-estimation
and pre-estimation ﬁltering processes according to the position in the state estimation
chain where the detection of the BD takes place. As an alternative, one may rely on the
so-called least absolute value (LAV) estimator that falls in the category of the robust
state estimators. The LAV possess intrinsic bad-data rejection capability and does
not need a separate bad-data process. When used in combination with PMU only
estimators, it is possible to reduce its computation time and at the same time address
its vulnerability against leverage measurements1. Nevertheless, as the robust state
estimators are largely discussed in the literature, they are not included in this thesis.
In what follows, we provide the general background on post- and pre-estimation
method for BD identiﬁcation. Then, we present a novel BD detection and identiﬁcation
algorithm that falls into the category of the pre-estimation methods.
4.1.1 Post-estimation methods
Being executed after the static state estimator, the post-estimation methods enable the
network operator to exploit the statistical properties of the SE outputs. The analysis
is typically carried out on the measurement estimation residuals as they provide a
quantiﬁcation of the quality of the ﬁtting between measurement set and network mo-
del. Following the nomenclature given in Chapter 3.1.2, the measurement estimation
residual vector and its covariance matrix are:
r̂t = zt −Hx̂t (4.1)
cov(r̂t) = Ct = Rt −HG−1t HT (4.2)
1A measurement that, although not critical, is characterized by a small residual even in presence of a
large error.
72
4.1. Bad data detection and identiﬁcation
A well-known post-estimation BD detection method is the χ2-test. It leverages on
the assumption that each measurement residual r̂t,i is a randomly-distributed zero
mean Gaussian variable (assumption valid, for instance, in WLS and DKF SE presented
in Chapter 3.1.2). Indeed, the objective function J(x̂), being the sum ofm normally-
distributed random variables, has a χ2-distribution with (m− n) degrees of freedom.
The detection of BD in the set of measurement is triggered if J(x̂) > χ2(m−n),ζ , where ζ is
the chosen detection conﬁdence probability (e.g. 95% or 99%). A part from performing
only detection and no identiﬁcation of BD, this method also usually fails to detect BD
for errors lower than twenty standard deviations as reported in [86, 125].
Another widely-used post-estimation method that allows both detection and identiﬁ-
cation of BD is the largest normalized residual (LNR) test. It requires the calculation of
the normalized measurement estimation residual vector r̂Nt . The i
th element of r̂Nt is
computed as:
r̂Nt,i =
| r̂t,i |√
Ct,ii
. (4.3)
Each normalized residual should be distributed as∼ N (0, 1), therefore the LNR test
detects BD if at least one element of r̂Nt exceeds a certain threshold (e.g. 3 or 4). The
largest r̂Nt,i is identiﬁed as BD, removed from the data set, and the SE is performed
again. This procedure is iterated until no BD are detected. The LNR test limits its
identiﬁcation capability to a single BD or multiple non-interacting BD, that is multiple
BD appearing simultaneously whose residuals are not correlated [86, 125].
Finally, the hypothesis testing identiﬁcation (HTI) method [126, 127] is able to avoid
several successive state estimation cycles, differently from the post-estimation met-
hods presented so far. Additionally, the method is able to deal with multiple interacting
BD. The HTI is based on the selection of a set s of suspected measurements and the
computation of their estimation error eˆs. The identiﬁcation of the BD in the set is
performed according to statistical properties of each eˆs,i in order to decide whether
to accept the hypothesisH0 (i.e., the measurement is valid), orH1 (i.e., the measure-
ment is corrupted). Although the latter method seems to solve some of the issues that
characterize post-estimation methods (e.g., iteration in the state estimation solution),
it has to be taken into account that its performance is inﬂuenced by the choice of a
proper suspected measurement set. The set s should be:
• Large enough as to contain all the BD;
• Small enough to ensure accuracy in the estimate of eˆs;
• Formed by independent and non-critical measurements2.
2A critical measurement is a measurement that makes the network unobservable if removed; a critical
pair is composed of two measurements that make the network unobservable if removed simultaneously.
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The choice of the elements of s is usually performed by using the LNR test that, as spe-
ciﬁed above, does not provide optimal results when dealing with multiple interacting
BD. The difﬁculty in choosing a proper set s have limited the adoption of HTI method
in real applications in favor of simpler, although not always reliable, LNR test.
To conclude, some general remarks concerning the use of post-processing BD methods:
• All the methods here introduced cannot identify BD in critical measurements or
critical pairs, since their residuals are always equal to zero [86]. High measure-
ment redundancy is therefore advised in real-ﬁeld installations.
• A common assumption of post-estimation methods is the exact knowledge of the
network model therefore any inconsistency between measurements and network
model is associated to the existence of BD. However, network parameter errors
have an impact on the state estimation residuals similar to BD. BD processes may
misinterpret a network parameter error as a BD. An effective method to distin-
guish between BD and network parameter errors with or without synchrophasor
measurements is presented in [128] and further expanded in [129].
• Although the post-estimation methods do not always succeed in presence of
interacting BD, they are characterized by a relatively high reliability and accuracy.
These characteristics come at the expense of computational time, because, after
the identiﬁcation of BD, the state has to be re-estimated iteratively until no
more BD are detected. In this respect, one can take advantage of a predicted
system state in order to obtain a consistent set of predicted measurements to be
compared with the real ones, as usually done by the pre-estimation BD methods.
4.1.2 Pre-estimation methods
Pre-estimation methods analyze and ﬁlter the set of measurements before proceeding
with the state estimation. The high refresh rate of PMU-based SE allows to effecti-
vely use prediction models as the ARIMA(0,1,0) already deﬁned in (3.13). This raised
the interest in coupling pre-estimation methods, as well as data conditioning of raw
measurements, with recursive state estimators.
Pre-estimation methods are usually based on statistical procedures or simply logical
checks that typically involve the examination of the so-called innovation vector, deﬁ-
ned as the difference between the most recent set of measurements and a predicted
one inferred by using previous estimations [130]
νt = zt −Hx˜t. (4.4)
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The innovation vector is a Gaussian white sequence whose covariance matrix is:
St = Rt +HP˜tH
T (4.5)
An useful indication of presence of BD may come from the normalized innovation
vector νNt . The i
th element of the normalized innovation vector is computed as:
νNt,i =
| νt,i |√
St,ii
. (4.6)
Setting a threshold for some elements of the innovation vector is not a sufﬁcient
condition to detect the existence of BD. Sudden variations in the system state (e.g.,
inrushes, faults and disconnection of loads or generators) may also lead to a mismatch
between predicted and actual measurements. In some works in the literature (e.g.
[131]), the discrimination between BD or other possible anomalies is performed by
analyzing the skewness γt of the distribution obtained by the normalized innovation
vector νNt and comparing it yet with another threshold γmax (to be assessed off-line
based on previous data-series):{
Bad data if |γt| ≥ γmax
Other anomaly if |γt| < γmax
(4.7)
It is clear that more robust methods, that do not fully rely on customized thresholds,
are needed. Additionally, the methods have to be able to distinguish between BD and
variation in the system state, taking the proper countermeasures for the two cases. In
order to overcome this limitation, the method described in the next section has been
proposed by the authors in [79].
4.1.3 Apre-estimationﬁlteringprocess of baddata for linearpower system
state estimators using PMUs
The section presents a pre-estimation method that examines the measurement inno-
vations for each new received set of measurements in order to locate anomalies and
apply countermeasures. The incoming measurement from a PMU is marked as reliable
or not, according to a dynamic threshold deﬁned as a function of the conﬁdence of
the predicted state estimated by using an ARIMA(0,1,0) process model. A fast and
reliable heuristic boolean logic routine is provided to detect the presence of BD and
discriminate it from measurements recorded during fault conditions. The detection
and identiﬁcation scheme is based on the following inputs: (i) the forecast state of the
network obtained by means of a Kalman ﬁlter, (ii) the current network topology, (iii)
the accuracy of the measurement devices and (iv) their location.
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Figure 4.1 – Steps of the bad data algorithm process.
An analysis on the impact of single and multiple BD of different nature and magnitudes
is given. Furthermore, the algorithm is also tested against faults to show its robustness
and the help it provides to the state estimator during these peculiar operating conditi-
ons. The speed of the process itself is also taken into account since the BD processing
is supposed to introduce a negligible time latency.
We suppose the measurements consist of phasors of bus voltages and nodal-injected
current sent by a certain number of PMUs deployed in the network to guarantee its
observability. We adopt the linear Discrete Kalman Filter (DKF) whose formulation is
given in Section 3.1.2.
A set of measurements might differ from the expected ones for two main reasons: a
sudden change in the system operating point or BD. Generally speaking, there might
be errors in the meter-communication or in the network conﬁgurations (e.g. faulty
switch breaker status information). The algorithm propose here only considers meter-
communication errors and it is able to discriminate a BD from data recorded during a
fault, a fast dynamic in the system or other unexpected conditions. The probability of
simultaneous occurrence of a BD and a fault is assumed to be negligible.
The proposedBDmethodmight be seen as a process inserted in between the prediction
and estimation parts of the DKF. It is divided in four basic steps as shown in Fig. 4.1.
In Step #1, called detection of anomalies, the innovation vector is checked against a
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speciﬁc threshold that is analytically deﬁned in what follows. If one or more anomalies
are detected, the algorithm goes to the second step, otherwise the estimator proceeds
to the estimation part. In Step #2, fast dynamic vs. BD, the algorithm infers whether
the previously identiﬁed anomaly is due to a sudden change in the network conditions
(e.g., fault, inrush of a load, etc.) or to a set of incoming measurements affected by BD.
In case a BD is identiﬁed, the algorithm proceeds to Step #3, replacement of BD, where
the wrong measurement is substituted with its predicted value (pseudo-measurement),
obtained by using the ARIMA (0,1,0) process model combined with the outcome of the
DKF. When the anomaly is found to be due to a sudden change in the network state
or a fault in a bus, the algorithm enters in Step #4, tuning of Qt in order to help the
estimator to keep track of the quickly changing state of the network.
Step #1: detection of anomalies
Let suppose the availability, at time-step t − 1, of the a-posteriori estimated state
x̂t−1 and its associated error covariance matrix P̂t−1. A BD is now inserted between
time-step t− 1 and t so that the set of measurement zt is affected. By means of (3.26)
and (3.27), x˜t and P˜t are obtained. The innovation vector, its covariance matrix and
the normalized innovation vector can be then obtained as already shown in (4.4), (4.5)
and (4.6), respectively. Thanks to the statistical properties of νNt ∼ N (0, 1), it is now
possible to deﬁne a threshold for each element of the normalized innovation vector
that should not be exceeded during normal operating conditions. Therefore, each ith
element of νNt should satisfy the following equation:
|νNt,i| ≤  (4.8)
where |νNt,i| is the absolute value of the ith element of the innovations νt,i and  deﬁnes
the conﬁdence interval, usually taken equal to 3 or 4 for Gaussian noises. The deﬁnition
of this threshold is close to the threshold usually set for LNR tests.
It is important to note that the use of bus voltage and nodal-injected current pha-
sors establishes a linear relation between measurements zt and state xt. Therefore,
in the calculation of matrix St in equation (4.5), no approximations are introduced.
This eliminates the need of augmenting the  in order to include the approximations
introduced by the linearization process as done, for instance, in [132].
The ﬁrst step of the detection of anomalies is therefore to check each νNt,i using (4.8) and
raise a ﬂag for those elements who do not satisfy it. In this way, the νNt is associated
to a Boolean vector βt that is ﬁlled with zeros or ones according to the absence or
presence of anomalies, respectively.
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Step #2: discrimination between fast dynamic and BD
The second step discriminates whether the previously identiﬁed anomalies are in
fact BD or they are due to an unpredictable fast dynamic in the system. A reliable
logic routine is implemented to distinguish between the two possibilities. The idea is
simple: assuming that a sudden change in the system is occurring in a certain region
of the network, an unexpected variation in correlated variables has to be detected by
different PMUs, especially from those who are deployed in a region nearby the anomaly.
Obviously, it is assumed that network topology and substations where the PMUs are
installed, are known. A function takes as input the adjacency matrix3 and the PMU
locations and provides, for each PMU, the indices, in the normalized innovation vector
νNt , of the neighbor measurement devices. In this case, the term neighbor devices
indicates the PMUs that are closer to the one whose measurements are under analysis.
Each anomaly detected for bus voltage or nodal-injected current phasors in the Step #1,
is then checked against the corresponding quantity of the neighbor PMUs. If at least
one of the neighbor devices is recording the same anomaly, it is a symptom of the
presence of a fast network dynamic at time-step t, otherwise the anomaly is marked as
deﬁnitive BD. A simpliﬁed pseudo-algorithm that summarizes this process is provided
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Pseudo-algorithm for discrimination between BD and dynamics.
Input: PMU index i at time t such that βt,i = 0
1: J = set of neighbors of i
2: if (∃j ∈ J, βt,j = 0) then
3: zt,i = dynamic
4: else
5: zt,i = bad data
6: end if
When the anomaly is detected on an injected current, the comparison described in
Algorithm 2 is performed with the corresponding voltage phasors of the neighbor
PMUs. This is due to the relatively low inﬂuence that a fast dynamic has on the injected
currents whereas the voltage proﬁle is more affected by sudden changes in the power
ﬂows.
Step #3: replacement of BD
The previous step has enabled the discrimination between BD and sudden changes in
the operating point of the network. The measurements that have been identiﬁed as
wrong, are simply replaced with their prediction avoiding to impact the observability of
the system. The new set of measurements z∗t (see Fig. 4.1) is fed to the estimation part
3In power system, the adjacency matrix provides an indication of which are the neighboring buses of
each bus.
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of the DKF. The variance associated to the pseudo-measurements is indeed larger than
the one of the incoming set, because it includes the uncertainty added in the prediction
step. Therefore, the outcoming P̂t, resulting from the state estimation at time-step t,
will have larger values for those elements obtained by using the pseudo-measurements.
If the BD is not temporary, the uncertainty in the innovation terms, especially for those
buses whose state is strongly based on the pseudo-measurements, will eventually
be so large that a BD could fall again within the conﬁdence interval that deﬁnes the
acceptable measurements and, therefore, it could be fed again to the DKF. Concerning
this point, it has to be clariﬁed that the replacement of the corrupted measurement
is advisable in presence of BD on a critical measurement. In all the other cases, the
measurement can be safely discarded.
Step #4: tuning of process noise covariance matrix (Qt)
As anticipated, even when the anomalies are identiﬁed as originated by a fault, the
algorithm has to take further actions before proceeding with the estimation part. As
explained, theQt gives an indication of howmuch theDKF trusts its processmodel and
thus its previous estimations. Provided that the process model is correctly deﬁned, a
diagonalQt with elements in the range
[
10−4, 10−10
]
is usually selected (e.g., [95, 133])
meaning that high belief is given to the previous estimations to infer the next ones.
A fault in the network, instead, eliminates completely the correlation between the
previous estimation and the current state. In order to take into account the above
considerations, it is necessary that, once a fault is detected, the elements of theQt are
increased to values large enough4 to strongly rely on the measurements only until the
estimator has tracked the new faulty state. At that point, theQt+n can be decreased
again to the pre-fault values trying to re-enhance the accuracy of the estimation. An
appropriate value of n for a BD process coupled with PMUs and a DKF working at 50
fps is n ≥ 3.
After having detected a fault and increased the Qt, the BD algorithm, has also to
compute an updated version of the a-priori estimated covariance P˜∗t (see Fig. 4.1)
that incorporates the changes in theQt matrix. The set of measurements can then be
forwarded to the estimation part of the DKF.
4.1.4 Performance evaluation
The performances of the pre-estimation ﬁltering of BD are tested on a fully unbalanced
distribution network based on a modiﬁed version of the IEEE 13-bus test feeder [135]
shown in Fig. 4.2. The choice of a distribution system rather than a transmission
network is driven by the increasing interest the PMUs are raising when installed in the
4Note that the assessment of the most suited value ofQt during sudden changes is addressed in [134].
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Figure 4.2 – The simulated IEEE 13-bus distribution test feeder.
challenging active distribution networks context (e.g.,[136]). From the point of view of
the algorithm deﬁnition, there are no differences when dealing with transmission or
distribution networks. Differently from what it is deﬁned in [135], here the network
rated voltage is assumed to be 15 kV, the lines are unbalanced and correspond to
the #602 line conductor conﬁguration of [135]. With reference to Fig. 4.2, bus #1
represents the connection to the sub-transmission network. This point is modeled
as an ideal generator imposing the nominal voltage and frequency in series with its
internal short-circuit impedance (Ssc = 300 MVA, balancedRsc/Xsc = 0.1).
The network is implemented inside a phasor-domain simulator to reproduce different
test conditions and save the corresponding true phasors of voltage and currents (see
Chapter 5.1 for details about the real-time simulation platform). The sets of measure-
ments are saved every 20 ms, so that it is possible to simulate incoming synchrophasors
streamed at 50 fps from a certain number of PMUs deployed in the ﬁeld. A Gaussian
noise with zeromean is added to themeasurements in order to simulate the use of class
0.1 CT and VT as described in [36] and [37]. The noise added by the PMUs is neglected
since it is a few orders of magnitude smaller than the one added by the sensors [39]. For
this reason the PMU’s accuracy is not inserted in the model of the system. As for the
measurements, also the true state of the network is saved every 20 ms in order to allow
an ofﬂine accuracy assessment of the SE performances when pseudo-measurements
are inserted in the DKF process. The power proﬁles of loads and DGs are unbalanced
and they come from measurements taken in a real distribution network located in the
South-East region of Switzerland. Data refers to residential and commercial buildings
for the loads and PVs and mini-hydro power plant for the DGs.
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Tests are run with the network in normal operating conditions and also when affected
by fast dynamics like the ones characterizing single or multi-phase faults. The algo-
rithm has to identify the eventual presence of single or multiple BD during the normal
operating conditions, and detect the sudden change in the network state in case of
faults without replacing the unexpected, but correct, received measurements.
Both DKF and the BD algorithm here presented are fully implemented in LabVIEW. A
library of potential BD is developed in order to simulate the meter devices behavior
when affected from several types of BD. The library includes: offset in magnitude and
phase for each phasor of every PMU, single or multiple packet losses from one or more
PMUs due to communication failures, drift in the phase estimation that might affects
PMUs after the loss of the absolute time reference, etc.
A total of 7 PMUs are assumed to be installed in bus #1, #3, #5, #8, #10, #12, #13
and every PMU estimates 6 synchrophasors (three nodal voltages phasors and three
injected/absorbed nodal current phasors). This number of PMUs guarantees the ob-
servability of the system. For simulation purposes, this number of PMUs, together with
the absence of other meters, creates a system with very low redundancy: removing only
one PMU from the set, would make the system not fully observable. We have decided
to use this critical measurement conﬁguration since no PMU data can be dropped
without losing the observability of a certain area of the network. The importance of
an effective replacement in case of a telecommunication system failure is therefore
highlighted. The matrixRt is diagonal and it is assumed to be constant. Each element
is equal to 0.1 · 10−6 that corresponds to the variance of real and imaginary part of the
current and voltage sensor measurements [36, 37]. The elements of matrixQt are set
to 10−9 during normal operating conditions, following a probabilistic assessment of
the process-noise covariance matrix described in [95].
The algorithm is tested against several scenarios of BD present in everyday life of
power systems. Some characteristic results are reported in what follows. All the plots
are shown in per unit with reference to the following base voltage and current values:
Vb = 15 kV, Ib = 666.6 A.
Gross errors
This test simulates a temporary communication failure from the PMU placed in bus #1.
At time t = 0.5 s, all the information coming from bus #1 is lost and the communication
is supposed to be re-established after 1 s. The gross BD is identiﬁed with no delay
and replaced with pseudo-measurements. Fig. 4.3 shows the replacement for real
and imaginary part of the voltage phasors of phase c. A similar behavior is recorded
for all the missing synchrophasors. As it can be seen, the replacement with pseudo-
measurements, increases the conﬁdence interval for which an incoming measurement
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Figure 4.3 – Replacement of synchrophasors due to temporary communication failure.
The grey area represents the 3σ conﬁdence interval.
is deﬁned as acceptable or not. This is due to the growing uncertainty associated to
the pseudo-measurements when they are constantly replacing the missing ones.
Fig. 4.4 shows the absolute value of the error in the estimation of the real and imaginary
components of the state for the bus affected by the speciﬁc BD and its neighbors. The
error is plotted as a function of the bus position and the simulation time. The packets
are missing between the two red dotted lines. As it can be noticed, the replacement
does not worsen the accuracy in the estimated state for all the surrounding buses
since the errors of the estimated state after the BD event are comparable with the ones
before the event.
In case of damage of one of the PMU’s components, the device can stream synchropha-
sors largely different from the real ones. This scenariowas also tested and the algorithm
performs well even in this case without affecting the quality of the estimations for the
neighbor buses.
Small deviations
The algorithm is able to identify and detect BD even when the deviation from the true
value is small. Fig. 4.5 shows a temporary offset of 0.004 p.u. in the voltage magnitude
of phase b streamed by the PMU in bus # 10. The BD is properly detected and replaced.
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Figure 4.4 – Missing packets: Absolute value of the estimation error for real and imagi-
nary part in bus #1 and its neighbor buses.
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Figure 4.5 – Phasors replacement due to an offset in the voltage magnitude value.
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Figure 4.6 – Detection of a phase drift in bus #10 due to loss of time synchronization.
Phase Drift
This is a BD speciﬁc for PMUs that could appear when the device loses its time syn-
chronization due to unintentional or intentional interference. The BD causes a phase
drift in all the synchrophasors estimated by the PMU. In this speciﬁc case, the PMU
deployed in bus #10 is supposed to be affected by a deviation in the estimated phases
of 1.5 mrad/sec. The drift begins at time t = 2 s and it continues until t = 18 s when
the PMU is re-synchronized with a valid absolute time source. As shown in Fig. 4.6, for
the ﬁrst two seconds, the BD does not detect the anomaly since the obtained residuals
are within the bounds deﬁned by (4.8). As soon as this condition is not satisﬁed, i.e.
at t = 4 s, the BD is correctly identiﬁed. Due to the slow deviation, the identiﬁcation
is not immediate and this results in a temporary worsening in the accuracy of the
estimated state, especially for bus #10 and #11 as shown in Fig. 4.7. The replacement of
the wrong measurements brings the accuracy back to its usual values even if the PMU
is still not time-synchronized.
Multiple BD
The presence of multiple BD coming from a single or several PMUs is also simulated.
The algorithm correctly identiﬁes and replaces them as long as they are not highly
correlated. In fact, the simultaneous presence of BD on the same phasor quantities in
two or more PMUs belonging to the same region, might deceive the algorithm of the
existence of a fast dynamic in the region itself. It should be noted that such concurrent
events are not likely to happen, if not intentionally.
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Figure 4.7 – Phase drift: Absolute value of the estimation error for real and imaginary
part in bus #10 and its neighbor buses.
Tracking of faults
Tests with single and multi-phase faults on different buses are performed to check
whether the BD algorithm takes the proper countermeasures described in Section 4.1.3.
The case illustrated in Fig. 4.8 consists in a 3-ph fault on bus #7 with a fault impedance
of 1 Ω. The fault begins at time t = 1 s and it is assumed to be cleared after 500ms. As
it can be seen, the fault is correctly distinguished from a BD since it is not classiﬁed
as such. The process noise covariance matrix Qt=1s is increased to an appropriate
value for n = 3 iterations and then it is set back to the original value of 10−9. The
same happens atQt=1.5s. Thanks to this expedient, the SE keeps following the state,
with only a slight worsening in the accuracy performance immediately after the begin
and the end of the 3-ph fault. This test is repeated for different faults types and fault
impedances with the same positive results.
Timing assessment
Fig. 4.9 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the time added by the BD
process here described (red line) and also the CDF of the whole process (prediction,
BD assessment and estimation). The test was run on a Intel core i7, 8GB of RAM.
This result is only indicative and shows that BD detection obviously adds a latency
to the SE. It can be seen that the latency is approximately one third of the total time
that is taken to perform the complete estimation. The speciﬁc ﬁgure refers to the test
where complete sets of incoming measurements are lost, and therefore replaced with
pseudo-measurements, for one second. Obviously, the latency for both SE and BD
algorithm is proportional to the number of measurements to be processed. In addition,
the latency of the BD layer is also slightly dependent on the number of BD which are
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Figure 4.8 – Absolute value of the estimation error for real and imaginary part in every
bus, during a 3-ph fault at bus #7.
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Figure 4.9 – CDF of the time latencies for the BD algorithm and the whole SE process.
not likely to occur simultaneously.
Conclusion
A pre-estimation ﬁltering process of bad for PMU-based linear state estimators has
been discussed and validated. The proposed algorithm is coupled with a DKF state
estimator that uses only PMU measurements. The detection of potential anomalies
relies on a set of dynamic thresholds inferred by predicted measurements using an
ARIMA (0,1,0) process combined with the outcome of the adopted DKF state estimator.
If a potential bad data is detected, it is compared with adjacent PMU data in order
to verify whether it is a real bad data or a non-predictable fast dynamic appearing
in the network (for instance, a fault). Additionally, we provided a way to replace the
bad data with pseudo-measurements obtained by a prediction process fed by the
state estimation itself. The variance associated to these pseudo-measurements is
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computed using the a-priori error covariance of the DKF. The algorithm is validated
against single and multiple bad data of different nature and magnitudes, namely: gross
errors, small synchrophasors-magnitude deviations and synchrophasors phase-drifts.
Furthermore, the algorithmhas been tested against faults to show its robustness during
these unexpected operating conditions. The performance assessment of the proposed
algorithm allows to conclude that it appears robust and compatible with the real-time
nature of the considered state estimation process enabling the use of this functionality
also to observe fast network dynamics.
As a ﬁnal remark, we would like to point out that the algorithm here presented does
not rely on any statistical property of the residuals. For this reason, the algorithm
is agnostic to the existence of critical measurements, differently from the methods
presented in Section 4.1.1.
4.2 Undetectable timing attack on linear state-estimation by
using rank-1 approximation
The content of this section is based on what published in [137]. As discussed in Chap-
ter 2, smart-grid applications based on synchrophasor measurements strongly rely on
the usage of a proper time synchronization technology and are vulnerable to timing
attacks. A fundamental question is whether timing attacks could remain undetected
by bad-data detection (BDD) algorithms used in conjunction with state-of-the-art
situation-awareness state estimators. In this section, we analyze the detectability of
timing attacks on linear state-estimation. We show that it is possible to forge delay
attacks that are undetectable. We give a closed form for an undetectable attack; it im-
poses two phase offsets to two or more synchrophasor-based measurement units that
can be translated to synchrophasors’ time delays. We also propose different methods
for combining two-delays attacks to produce a larger impact. We simulate the attacks
on a benchmark power-transmission grid, we show that they are successful and can
lead to physical grid damage. To prove undetectability, we use classic BDD techniques
such as the largest normalized residual (LNR) and the χ2-test, described in Section 4.1.
Recent works show that both GPS and packet-based time-synchronization protocols
(PBTSPs) can be attacked (e.g., [56, 138]). As civilian GPS satellite signals are not
authenticated, they can be spoofed by superimposing a fake signal with a higher signal-
to-noise ratio, which would enable an attacker to manipulate a GPS clock [56]. In
the case of PBTSPs, an attacker could inject a malicious offset in the time signal by
delaying messages, which is feasible because in any PBTSP it is impossible to measure
asymmetries in the propagation delay [139]; for this reason, any notion of asymmetry
needs to be provided to the protocol (e.g., PTPv2 assumes that propagation delays are
symmetric). As the attack involves only delaying messages, such an attack would work
even if synchronization messages are encrypted and/or authenticated.
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In what follows, we analyze the effect of tampering with the common time reference
of PMUs used for linear state estimation of a transmission network, applying the
well-known WLS. We show that by manipulating the time reference only, it is possible
to perform an attack that does not change the measurement residuals, and thus it
bypasses the BDD methods used in state-of-the-art state estimators. We show that a
successful attack requires tampering with at least two different angles, and we provide
a method to compute attacks that maximize damage while remaining undetectable.
We illustrate the ﬁndings with respect to a PMU-based linear state-estimator applied to
the 39-bus IEEE-benchmark power system. We demonstrate that in given transmission
lines, the attack can produce a large mis-estimation of the power ﬂows while passing
the χ2 and LNR tests.
Our work assumes that the only manipulation concerns the time reference used by
PMUs. As shown for example in [140], such attacks may be possible without compro-
mising any cryptographic security system. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
work that addresses how to perform an undetectable attack on linear state-estimators
by maliciously manipulating only the time reference of a set of PMUs.
4.2.1 System Model
State Model
We consider a one-phase direct-sequence equivalent of a three phase transmission
network with Nb buses, and we let N be the set of all buses (with N = Nb elements).
The system state is x ∈ CN . We assume nodal injected-current phasors and/or nodal
voltage-phasors measurements coming from PMUs only. We count separately me-
asurements for voltages and for currents. At a bus where both voltage and current
are measured, we count two measurement points; at a bus where only voltage (resp.
current) is measured, there is a single measurement point. We denote by MV ⊆ N
the set of measurement points for voltage, and by MI ⊆ N the set of measurement
points for nodal currents. Let M = MV ∪MI be the set of all measurement points,
andM = |M|. The measurement vector is z ∈ CM .
Let Y be the (N ×N) single-phase complex admittance-matrix, andH be theM ×N
complex measurement matrix. We have
Hm,m = 1, m ∈ MV
Hm,n = 0, m ∈ MV ,m = n
Hm,n = Ym,n, m ∈ MI , n ∈ N .
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The measurement model is recalled in equation
z = Hx+ e, (4.9)
where x ∈ CN is the system state, e ∈ CM is the complex measurement-error with a
distribution discussed in Section 4.2.5. Deﬁne the veriﬁcation matrix F as
F  H(H†H)−1H† − I (4.10)
We denote withH† the conjugate transpose ofH . Note that Fz = 0 if and only if there
exists some state x with z = Hx. If Fz = 0, there is a unique complex vector x that
solves z = Hx and it is given by x = (H†H)−1H†z. In general (i.e., when Fz = 0),
x = (H†H)−1H†z is the least-square estimator of the state. Note that we assume
that the state estimation uses the WLS in rectangular coordinates instead of complex
numbers. The reason for using complex numbers becomes apparent in the next
sections, where we ﬁnd closed form expressions that could not be found otherwise.
Attack Model
The goal of the attacker is to create a mis-estimation of the state of the grid while
maintaining the residuals of the state-estimator unaffected. As illustrated by the attack
in Fig. 4.10, this goal can be achieved using various attack vectors. We consider an
attacker that is an insider to the utility, thus he has access to the network topology
and to the admittance matrix, but he is not able to physically tamper with any PMU or
transducer (sensor). We assume the attacker is able to observe, but cannot forge the
measurement vector z, which is consistent with the security standards for synchropha-
sor data transmission, as those mandate only authentication but not encryption [141].
We thus consider that the attacker can add an offset to the time reference of some
PMUs, which will be seen as an offset in the synchrophasor estimation. An attack
against the time reference can be done with moderate effort for both PTP and GPS
synchronization schemes [142]. For the case of PTP, many overhead lines contain an
optical ﬁber with physical layer repeaters placed every few kilometers on the line poles,
and it is also common to have unmanned facilities with repeaters. For an attacker it
would be sufﬁcient to disconnect a cable and to insert a delay box to attack PTP [140].
In the case of GPS, spooﬁng GPS transmitters can be built from low-cost components
and can be coordinated easily [56, 143].
As a result of the attack, the PMU shifts the time window for which the synchrophasor
is computed. Therefore, besides the incorrect estimation of the phase, the attack
affects the estimation of the phasor’s amplitude, the frequency of its main tone and
the ROCOF estimation. As we are considering a transmission network, it follows that
the estimation of the phase angle is the one that is most affected by the attack, thus
this is the only error we consider in this manuscript.
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Mis-estimation of the System State (Voltage Phasors)
by altering Voltage/Current Measurements
Compromise
PMU
Alter Time
Reference
of PMU
Insert asymmetric delay in
the communication path for PTP
Spoof GPS signals
with computed oﬀset
Tamper with
PMU’s transducers
MITM Attack to
forge
PMU data
Choose attack locations
to introduce undetectable attack
Learn Topology
of the grid
Learn PMU
locations
Figure 4.10 – Attack-tree for attacking the time reference of a PMU measurement
infrastructure.
4.2.2 Undetectable Time-Synchronization Attacks
In what follows we present a theory of undetectable attacks, which forms the basis for
the practical methods presented in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4.
Absolutely Undetectable Attack
Let p be the number of time references manipulated by the attacker, αi the ith phase
angle difference between the attacked and the original synchrophasor measurement
and Ai the set of measurement points to which the angle difference αi is imposed,
i = 1:p.
For allm ∈ M, deﬁneΔzm = z′m − zm where zm is the value of themth measurement
that would be obtained if there would be no attack and z′m is the value obtained when
the timing attack is present. We have:
Δzm = zm(ui − 1), ifm ∈ Ai
Δzm = 0, ifm ∈ M \
⋃
i
Ai
with ui = cosαi + j sinαi = ejαi , i = 1:p.
By the deﬁnition of F , an attack that produces a changeΔz = (Δzm)m=1:M to the true
observation vector z is absolutely undetectable if and only if
FΔz = 0. (4.11)
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LetΨ be the attack-measurement indicator matrix, deﬁned by
Ψm,i = 1 ifm ∈ Ai andΨm,i = 0 otherwise, (4.12)
withm = 1:M and i = 1:p. ThenΔz can be re-written as
Δz = (u1 − 1) diag(z)Ψ:,1 + ...+ (up − 1) diag(z)Ψ:,p (4.13)
where Ψ:,i denotes the i-th column of matrix Ψ and diag(z) is the M ×M diagonal
matrix with diag(z)m,m = zm. By (4.11), the attack α is absolutely undetectable if and
only if
p∑
i=1
(ui − 1)F diag(z)Ψ:,i = 0. (4.14)
We can make (4.14) more tractable by introducing the attack-angle matrix W , which is
a p× p hermitian-complex matrix deﬁned as
W  ΨT diag(z)†F †F diag(z)Ψ (4.15)
or in other words
Wi,j =
∑
l,m,n∈M
Ψl,iΨm,jF¯n,lFn,mz¯lzm (4.16)
with i, j = 1:p. We use F¯n,l to denote the conjugate of Fn,l. Note that the dimension of
the matrixW is p× p, where p is the number of different delays imposed by the attack;
it is particularly interesting to useW when p is small.
Theorem 1. The attack α = (α1, . . . , αp) is absolutely undetectable if and only if
W (u−1) = 0 (4.17)
with u = (u1, ..., up)T ,1 = (1, ..., 1)T .
Proof. First recall that the attack is absolutely undetectable if and only if equation
(4.14) holds. Second, we prove that for any complex vector y ∈ Cp :
Wy = 0 ⇔ F diag(z)Ψy = 0. (4.18)
The ⇐ side of the implication directly follows from the deﬁnition of W . Conversely,
assume thatWy = 0 for some y ∈ Cp. Then
ΨT diag(z)†F †F diag(z)Ψy = 0
⇒ y†ΨT diag(z)†F †F diag(z)Ψy = 0
⇒ ‖F diag(z)Ψy‖2 = 0
⇒ F diag(z)Ψy = 0
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In the above, ‖·‖ denotes the 2 norm, deﬁned for y ∈ Cp by ‖y‖ =
√∑p
i=1|y|2i .
Timing attack with a single delay (p = 1)
Consider that the attacker can only induce a single delay, i.e., p = 1 and α = (α1). Then
the matrixW is a single complex numberW = (W1,1), and Theorem 1 becomes
W1,1(u1 − 1) = 0 (4.19)
withW1,1 =
∑
l,m∈A1,n∈M F¯n,lFn,mz¯lzm. It is very unlikely thatW1,1 = 0, thus undetec-
tability requires u1 = 1 (i.e. α1 = 0), namely there is no attack. Thus this case is of no
interest.
Timing attack with two delays (p = 2)
Consider now that the attacker can induce two delays (e.g., with two GPS coverage
zones or two different communication paths in a PTP network), i.e., p = 2 and α =
(α1, α2). Observe that for p = 2 the matrixW is 2× 2, and Theorem 1 becomes
W1,1(u1 − 1) +W1,2(u2 − 1) = 0
W2,1(u1 − 1) +W2,2(u2 − 1) = 0.
Before we formulate our theorem, we propose the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let a, b ∈ C. If a+ b = 0 then the solutions of the system of equations{
a(u− 1) + b(v − 1) = 0
|u| = |v| = 1
with unknowns u, v ∈ C are
u = v = 1 and u =
a¯(a+ b)
a(a¯+ b¯)
, v =
b¯(a+ b)
b(a¯+ b¯)
.
If a+ b = 0, there are inﬁnitely many solutions, given by u = v, |u| = 1.
Proof. We can interpret the system of equations as follows. Denote with S1 the unit
circle in the complex plane, i.e., S1 = {u ∈ C, |u| = 1}. When u ∈ S1, z = a(u − 1) is
a point in the circle of center −a and radius |a|; similarly, z = −b(v − 1) is a generic
point in the circle of center b and radius |b|. Solutions to the equations are given by the
intersection of these two circles, if they intersect. Now they intersect because u = v = 1
is a solution. Therefore, there is exactly one other solution, except in the special case
where the two circles are tangent or when the two circles are identical.
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Theorem 2. For p = 2, if rank(W ) = 1 there is one non-trivial absolutely undetectable
attack vector α = (α1, α2), given by
α1 = 2arg(W1,1 +W1,2)(mod 2π)
α2 = −2 arg(W1,2) + 2 arg(W1,1 +W1,2)(mod 2π) (4.20)
Proof. With rank(W ) = 1, the system of equations derived from Theorem 1 is equiva-
lent to
W1,1(u1 − 1) +W1,2(u2 − 1) = 0 (4.21)
where the unknowns are u1, u2 ∈ Cwith the constraints |u1| = |u2| = 1. This system of
equations can be precisely solved by applying Lemma 1 to (4.21) and obtain a single
non-trivial attack, given by
u1 =
W1,1 +W1,2
W1,1 + W¯1,2
u2 =
W¯1,2(W1,1 +W1,2)
W1,2(W1,1 + W¯1,2)
from where we derive the attack vector α, using the fact thatW1,1=W¯1,1 becauseW is
hermitian.
For the case rank(W ) = 2, there is only one solution u1 = u2 = 1, i.e., there are no
absolutely undetectable attacks.
As we show next, Theorem 2 forms the basis for practical attacks because, even when
W is full rank, it can often be well approximated by a rank-1 matrix.
4.2.3 Practically undetectable attack with two delays
In this section we describe a strategy for performing a practically undetectable attack
when W is full rank and p = 2. We assume that each attacking-angle affects a single
PMU, i.e., we attack two PMUs in total. In [144] it is shown that attacking at least two
PMUs is enough to perform an undetectable attack.
Attack based on Rank-1 matrix approximation
Recall that theW matrix is hermitian, thus we can diagonalizeW asW = UΛU †, with
UU † = U †U = I and Λ is a diagonal matrix with real, nonnegative and descending-
ordered eigenvalues. Let us construct Λ˜ = diag (Λ1,1, 0), with Λ2,2 = 0 and we deﬁne
W˜ = U Λ˜U †, i.e., we replace the smallest eigenvalue by 0. The approximate attack is
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one that satisﬁes
W˜ (u−1) = 0, (4.22)
and the attack vector α is then given by (4.20) with W˜ in lieu ofW .
The IoS criterion
The effectiveness of using W˜ instead ofW depends on the value of Λ2,2 and whether or
not zeroing this value is a good approximation. To investigate this, we use the index of
separation (IoS) of the matrixW , which is classically deﬁned as
IoS =
λmax∑
i λi
=
Λ1,1
Λ1,1 + Λ2,2
. (4.23)
We obtain the two eigenvalues ofW as roots of the characteristic polynomial:
Λ1,1 =
1
2
(
trace (W ) +
√
trace (W )2 − 4 det(W )
)
Λ2,2 = trace (W )− Λ1,1
and using Λ1,1 and Λ2,2 in (4.23) we get
IoS =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− 4 det(W )
trace (W )2
. (4.24)
Note that for an attack with two delays (p = 2), IoS(W ) ∈ [0.5, 1] and IoS(W ) = 1 =⇒
rank(W ) = 1.
An attacker should therefore look for attack locations such that IoS(W ) ≈ 1. In general,
for a given choice of locations, IoS(W ) depends on the measurement vector z; however,
it is possible to avoid this dependency by computing the minimum index of separation
(IoS∗), deﬁned as the minimum value of IoS(W ) taken over all values of z ∈ CM . If
IoS∗ ≈ 1 for a given choice of locations, then the delay attack given by (4.20) with W˜ in
lieu ofW is undetectable, regardless of the value of the measurements. The following
theorem provides a closed-form expression for IoS∗.
Theorem 3. For an attack with two delays (p = 2), and one attacked measurement
point per delay (A1 = {z1} andA2 = {z2}), the minimum index of separation (IoS∗) is
equal to
IoS∗ =
1
2
+
|f12|
2 (f11f22)
1
2
(4.25)
with
fi,j =
∑
l,m
∑
n
Ψl,iΨm,jF¯n,lFn,m (4.26)
whereΨ is deﬁned as in (4.12). Note that IoS∗ depends only on the measurement matrix
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H and the location of the attacked PMUs.
Proof. We want to ﬁnd the minimum of (4.24). First we need to compute the elements
Wi,j ofW to ﬁnd det(W ) and trace (W ) as a function of attacked measurements z1 and
z2. We use (4.16) with p = 2 and one attacked measurement per delay
W1,1 =
∑
l,m,n
Ψl,1Ψm,1F¯n,lFn,mz¯lzm = |z1|2f11
W1,2 =
∑
l,m,n
Ψl,1Ψm,2F¯n,lFn,mz¯lzm = z¯1z2f12
W2,1 =
∑
l,m,n
Ψl,2Ψm,1F¯n,lFn,mz¯lzm = z¯2z1f21
W2,2 =
∑
l,m,n
Ψl,2Ψm,2F¯n,lFn,mz¯lzm = |z2|2f22.
(4.27)
The trace and determinant ofW are given by
trace (W ) = |z1|2f11 + |z2|2f22
det(W ) = |z1|2f11|z2|2f22 − |z1|2|z2|2f21f12
= |z1|2|z2|2
(
f11f22 − |f12|2
)
.
(4.28)
Note that f21f12 = |f21|2 = |f12|2. Using (4.24) and (4.28) we can express the problem
as
min
z1,z2
1
2
√
1− 4 |z1|
2|z2|2 (f11f22 − |f12|2)
(|z1|2f11 + |z2|2f22)2 . (4.29)
Note that the objective function can be simpliﬁed if we substitute s = |z2|
2
|z1|2 in (4.29),
which brings
min
s
1
2
√
1− 4s (f11f22 − |f12|
2)
(f11 + sf22)2
.
By analyzing the sign of the derivative with respect to swe ﬁnd a minimum when s =
f11
f22
, and substituting this in (4.24) we obtain the value of IoS∗ given in the theorem.
Theorem 3 can be used to ﬁnd pairs of PMUs that can be attacked undetectably by
ﬁnding that the corresponding IoS∗ ≈ 1. This is computationally simpler than the
algorithms in [144] or [145].
For locations where Theorem 3 does not provide IoS∗ ≈ 1, depending on the operating
conditions of the grid, the following result shows than an attacker could still ﬁnd
alternative attack locations to produce an undetectable attack.
Theorem 4. For an attack with two delays (p = 2) , one attackedmeasurement per delay
(A1 = {z1} andA2 = {z2}), and rank(W ) = 2, there is still a possibility of performing
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a practically undetectable attack if the ratio between the magnitude of the attacked
measurements is either very small or very large.
Proof. By analyzing (4.24), it follows that IoS(W ) ≈ 1 if and only if IoS(W ) ≈ 1 ⇔
trace (W )2 >> det(W ). By using (4.28) we can express the inequality as(|z1|2f11 + |z2|2f22)2 >> |z1|2|z2|2 (f11f22 − |f21|2)( |z1|
|z2|f11 +
|z2|
|z1|f22
)2
>>
(
f11f22 − |f21|2
)
.
(4.30)
Deﬁne d = |z2||z1| , d ≥ 0, d ∈ R; substituting d in (4.30)(
1
d
f11 + df22
)2
>>
(
f11f22 − |f21|2
)
(4.31)
If we take the left-handside of (4.31) and plot it as a function of d, we can observe that
it has a quadratic behavior with minimum in d∗ = (f11/f22)
1
2 and expands to+∞, both
when d → 0 and when d → +∞, i.e., if the ratio between the magnitude of the attacked
measurements is either very small or very large.
In summary, an attacker can compute IoS∗ for arbitrary pairs of locations; this requires
only the knowledge of H . If he ﬁnds location pairs with IoS∗ ≈ 1, he has obtained
candidate locations where an undetectable attack is possible; he can then test the
effect of such attacks. If, in contrast, there is no location with IoS∗ ≈ 1, the attacker can
rely on Theorem 4 to assess the candidate measurements to be attacked, and pick two
measurements with smallest or largest magnitude ratio and still perform a practically
undetectable attack.
4.2.4 Practically undetectable attack with more than two delays
In this section we consider the problem of computing attacks with more than two
delays, i.e., ﬁnding a solution to the problem in Theorem 1 for p > 2. In what follows,
we show how to combine attacks against two delays (p = 2) to obtain an attack with
p > 2 delays.
Combining Attacks on Disjoint Pairs of PMUs
As a ﬁrst step, we consider that there is a set of disjoint PMU pairs (p = 2) that can
be attacked using the algorithm proposed in Theorem 2, i.e., pairs of PMUs for which
the IoS is close to 1. In what follows we show that even though an attack modiﬁes the
apparent measurements (and the apparent system state), when the attacked pairs of
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PMUs are disjoint, the attacks can be computed independently in parallel.
Theorem 5. Consider a collection ofK attacks, and letA(k)i be the set of measurements
affected by the ith angle of the kth attack. Let zm be themth measurement value when no
attack is performed and letW (k) be the matrix given by (4.15) when it is only attack k
that is performed. Then
(i) the matrixW (k) depends only on the values zm form ∈ ∪iA(k)i .
Assume furthermore that the setsA(k)i are disjoint, i.e. any measurement point appears
in someA(k)i for at most one k and at most one i. Then
(ii) if each attack k is absolutely undetectable if performed on its own, then so is any
combination of the attacks, performed sequentially or simultaneously.
Proof. By (4.16),
W
(k)
i,j =
∑
,m∈M
z¯zm {∈A(k)i }
 {m∈A(k)j }
g,m
=
∑
∈A(k)i
∑
m∈A(k)j
z¯zmg,m
with g,m =
∑
n F¯n,Fn,m. Note that g,m depends only on the veriﬁcation matrix F and
is thus independent of the measurements and of the attack. Statement (i) follows.
Now assume that the attacked sets of measurements A(k) = ∪iA(k)i are disjoint. The
matrixW (k) for attack k depends only on the values of zm form ∈ A(k). An attack k′ = k
affects only the measurement sites inA(k′) andA(k′) ∩ A(k) = ∅ therefore form ∈ A(k),
the values of zm remain the same before or after attack k′. ThereforeW (k) also remains
the same before and after attack k′ is performed.
The above result implies that for a set of disjoint PMU pairs with IoS ≈ 1 a practically
undetectable attack can be performed by attacking each pair of PMUs simultaneously
with the angles given by (4.20).
Combining Attacks on Overlapping Pairs
Let us now consider attacks on overlapping pairs of PMUs. Unfortunately, we cannot
apply the previous result because theW matrix of an attack now may depend on the
apparent measurement values due to another, overlapping attack. However, as we
show next, it is possible to combine attacks sequentially, provided that the effect of the
previous attack in the sequence is accounted for.
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Theorem 6. Consider a sequence of k = 1:K attacks, computed one after the other. The
pairs of PMUs attacked may be overlapping. Let z(0)m = zm be the true value of measure-
mentm, and z(k)m the apparent value after the kth attack. Let attack k be constructed so
as to be absolutely undetectable assuming that the measurements are z(k−1)m . Then the
combination of theK attacks is absolutely undetectable.
Proof. Note that, by assumption, the kth attack, resulting in z(k), is undetectable, i.e.,
by (4.11) it satisﬁes
F
(
z(k) − z(k−1)
)
= 0
where F is the veriﬁcation matrix, which is independent of the measurements. Sum-
ming all these equations for k = 1:K gives:
F
(
z(K) − z(0)
)
= 0
which shows that the combination is undetectable.
The theorem implies that if a sequence of attacks on pairs of PMUs is practically
undetectable, then so is their combination. One may think that it is difﬁcult to predict,
in the general case, whether a sequence of attacks is practically undetectable, since
the undetectability condition (IoS(k) ≈ 1) depends on the matrix W (k) which itself
depends on the result of the previous attack. As we show next, this is not the case, as
the IoS of a pair of PMUs does not change due to an attack against a subset of those
PMUs.
Theorem 7. Consider a pair of PMUs, with matrixW given by (4.16) derived using the
original measurements z. Assume that an attack is performed that affects a subset of
this pair of PMUs, producing an apparent measurement z′. LetW ′ be the matrix given
by (4.16) computed using the apparent measurements z′. Then IoS(W ) = IoS(W ′).
Proof. Observe that by (4.23) and (4.28), IoS(W ) depends only on the modulus of the
complex measurements zm. Since an attack modiﬁes only the angle of the measure-
ments, the modulus are unchanged, and so is IoS(W ).
The practical implication of the above results is that an attacker can identify an arbitrary
set of pairs of PMUs with IoS ≈ 1 based on the true measurement values, or a set of
pairs of PMUs with IoS∗ ≈ 1. The attacker can then take an arbitrary sequence of these
PMU pairs, computes the angles of the kth attack using (4.20) and with matrix W (k)
updated to account for the effect of the preceding k − 1 attacks in the sequence, and
in this way the attacker obtains an undetectable attack. In the example studied in
Section 4.2.5 we consider a case where 10 pairs of PMUs have IoS∗ ≈ 1, and we found
that, in general, every sequence of attacks gives a different set of attack angles.
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A special case of interest is if we repeatedly attack a particular pair of PMUs (that has
IoS ≈ 1). The effect of doing so is that the second attack restores the original measu-
rement, i.e., it undoes the ﬁrst attack. To see why, let z be the original measurement
value, z(1) the apparent measurement after the ﬁrst attack and z(2) the apparent mea-
surement after the second attack (computed using the updated matrixW (1)). We have
z(2) = z(1) by construction of the second attack. By Theorems 6 and 7, the sequential
combination is an undetectable attack on z, which has produced an apparent mea-
surement z(2). Nonetheless, by Theorem 1 there is only one non trivial undetectable
attack, therefore z(2) = z.
A Greedy Heuristic
In the previous subsections we have shown how to ﬁnd a potentially very large number
of undetectable attacks. In this section we propose a greedy heuristic for computing
an attack that aims at optimizing a certain attacker objective.
We assume that the attacker has an objective that it wants to maximize; for example
he might want to underestimate the apparent-power ﬂow of a transmission line (with
the potential consequence of burning it). The attacker has access to the admittance
matrix Y , the PMU measurement type and locations and the measurement vector
z. The attacker’s goal is to mount an undetectable delay attack that induces a forged
measurement vector z′ that maximizes the attacker’s objective, say J(z′).
A greedy algorithm for achieving this objective is as follows.
1. Establish a list L of pairs of PMUs that have IoS ≈ 1 given the measurement
vector z. Alternatively, the list L can be computed using IoS∗ ≈ 1, in which case
it is independent of the measurement z.
2. Let z(0) = z and k = 0;.
3. k = k + 1. Find the pair jk ∈ L that maximizes J(z(k)) where z(k) is the for-
ged measurement obtained after applying the attack to the pair jk and to the
measurement z(k−1).
4. If k < Kmax and J(z(k))− J(z(k−1)) > ε go to 3) else exit and output j1, j2, ....
In other words, the algorithm ﬁnds at every step, among all the possible attacks, the
one that gives the largest damage. It then updates the measurement vector z based on
the attack, and continues until no new attack can increase the damage in the line or a
maximum number of iterations is reached. The attack to be mounted is then given by
the sequence of pairs of PMUs j1, j2, .... By the theorems in the previous section, this
combined attack is practically undetectable. In Section 4.2.5 we provide numerical
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results for testing undetectability of the resulting attack. Additionally, we compare the
apparent-power ﬂow mis-estimation obtained by this method versus an undetectable
attack on a single pair of PMUs.
4.2.5 Performance evaluation
In this section we illustrate how the previously presented attack method can be applied
to the IEEE 39-bus system, a benchmark for power transmission grids [146]. We show
in particular how the computation of IoS∗ can be used to easily ﬁnd attack locations.
We also demonstrate that the attacks are non detectable by BDD methods based on
residuals.
The performance evaluation was entirely done in MATLAB 2015b-64 bit, on a PC with
Intel® core i7-5500U, 2.40GHz and 8 GB of RAM. The procedure consisted in:
1. Every 20 ms, a load ﬂow is computed in order to determine the true state of the
network;
2. The synthetic measurements forwarded to the state estimator are obtained by
perturbing the true quantities inferred from the previous step with randomly-
generated Gaussian noise characterized by the cumulated standard deviation of
the PMUs and their sensors;
3. Computation of the attack vector according to the presented algorithm;
4. WLS estimation;
5. WLS estimation with attacked measurements;
6. Comparison of the detectability for step 5 with respect to step 4;
7. Comparison of estimated apparent power ﬂows for steps 4 and 5.
The computational cost of the attack is compatible with the delays involved in a typical
PMU-measurement ﬂow. For instance, with the adopted software and hardware, an
attacker needs an average of 0.4ms with a max of 1.3ms over a 300 s attack window to
compute the attack vector when p = 2.
Analysis of Residuals
We here describe how residuals are analyzed in order to detect the existence of the
attack. WLS cannot be expressed easily using complex matrix operations as we use in
Section 4.2.1, because the measurement errors cannot be assumed to have circular
symmetry, as we discuss later. This is why in what follows we have to introduce a
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slightly different formalism than in Section 4.2.1 in order to project from complex to
rectangular coordinates.
The error covariance matrixR is deﬁned as
R = E
(
ee†
)
(4.32)
where e is the measurement error vector from (4.9), assumed to be Gaussian. Note that
if PMU errors in polar coordinates are relatively small, their projection in rectangular
coordinates result into a Gaussian distribution [147]. R is a complex hermitian matrix,
namelyR† = R. In order to work with rectangular coordinates, we need to move from
R ∈ CM×M to a matrixR′ ∈ R2M×2M . Let e = a+ jb ∈ CM and deﬁne e′ =
(
a b
)T ∈
R
2M . Then, using the same expression as in (4.32) it follows that
R′ = E
(
e′e′T
)
=
(
Raa Rab
Rba Rbb
)
Note thatRaa, Rbb ∈ RM×M are diagonal matrices. As the hypothesis of independent
measurement errors was justiﬁed in Section 3.1.2, thenRab = Rba = 0. R′ is therefore
diagonal and can be expressed as
R′ =
(
Raa 0
0 Rbb
)
= diag
(
σ2e′1
, . . . , σ2e′2M
)
(4.33)
where σe′m (m = 1, . . . , 2M ) is the standard deviation of the m
th measured quantity.
(Note that if we would haveRbb = Raa, then ewould have circular symmetry and we
could do least square estimation in complex numbers, but such an assumption cannot
usually be made.)
At this point, we can perform the WLS in rectangular coordinates as described in
Section 3.1.2. The WLS residuals are analyzed by using the χ2 and LNR tests described
in Section 4.1.1.
Recall that the undetectable attack is structured such that the distribution of the
residuals, and their values after the attack, remain unchanged when compared with
the values obtained without the attack. Hence, all the detection methods based on the
normality of the residuals are expected to fail in identifying the attack. This is shown
numerically in Section 4.2.5.
Electrical model
The validation of the attacks is performed on the IEEE 39-bus system shown in Fig. 4.11.
We assume Bus #31 as the connection point to the external grid with a short-circuit
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Figure 4.11 – Benchmark IEEE 39-bus transmission system and PMU locations.
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power of Ssc = 50 GVA. The ratio between the real and imaginary parts of the short-
circuit impedance isRsc/Xsc = 0, as usually assumed for transmission networks. We
assume the network has 13 PMUs that measure voltage and injected-current phasors
and 8 PMUs that measure injected-current phasors only, for a total of 21 PMUs instal-
led. Network observability (i.e., matrix H of full rank) is the only criterion followed
when selecting measurement type (i.e., nodal voltage and injected-current phasors vs.
injected-current phasors only) and PMU locations. These PMU locations, their mea-
surement type, together with the presence of 12 zero-injection buses5, are sufﬁcient
conditions to guarantee the observability of the system state. Note that other combi-
nations of PMU locations and measurement type would affect the veriﬁcation matrix
F and all the quantities computed from it such as the attack-angle matrixW and the
minimum index of separation IoS* deﬁned in equations (4.15) and (4.25), respectively.
In summary, this would mean different attack-locations as the ones showed in this
analysis.
PMU measurements are generated by adding a white Gaussian noise to the amplitude
and phase of the ideal phasors obtained by running a load ﬂow. The standard deviation
of the measurements is compatible with class 0.1 current and voltage sensors as
described in [36, 37].
The load proﬁles are obtained from real measurements taken at 50 frames-per-second
by real PMUs installed in the 125-kV sub-transmission network of Lausanne, Swit-
zerland (more details about the ﬁeld-trial in Section 5.2.1.). For this reason, the load
proﬁles present time-domain behavior typical of transmission networks. This sub-
transmission network is constituted by ﬁve 3-ph loads. In order to obtain values for the
19 1-ph equivalent loads available in the IEEE 39-bus system, some of the load proﬁles
have been replicated. It is worth mentioning that the load proﬁles are then adapted
to match the values provided in [146]. Moreover, as we do not use the transformer
tap changers, the power at three selected buses (#7, #8 and #12) is adapted so that, in
all the buses, the voltage stays within the± 5% range of the rated voltage. In order to
verify the effectiveness of the attack during non-steady-state conditions of the grid, we
use a time window in which a sudden reactive power drop takes place at Bus #4 (see
Fig. 4.12).
Results for undetectability of the attacking methods
We applied Theorem 3 to all possible combinations of attack locations, with p = 2,
one measurement per delay, and taking PMUs that measure only injected currents.
Table 4.1 shows the results for the IoS∗ at each location pair. Any pair that has an IoS∗
= 1, allows an undetectable attack regardless of the measurement values.
5A zero-injection bus is deﬁned as a bus where no load or generation is connected therefore this
information can be exploited as a so-called virtual measurement.
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Figure 4.12 – Reactive power drop in Bus #4.
Table 4.1 – IoS* for all the two-delays attack combinations for buses with current
measurements only in Fig. 4.11.
Bus1 Bus2 IoS∗ Bus1 Bus2 IoS∗
4 15 0.8437 21 24 1.0000
4 21 0.6613 21 26 0.8395
4 23 0.6613 21 35 1.0000
4 24 0.6613 21 36 1.0000
4 26 0.5282 23 24 1.0000
4 35 0.6613 23 26 0.8395
4 36 0.6613 23 35 1.0000
15 21 0.9516 23 36 1.0000
15 23 0.9516 24 26 0.8395
15 24 0.9516 24 35 1.0000
15 26 0.7669 24 36 1.0000
15 35 0.9516 26 35 0.8395
15 36 0.9516 26 36 0.8395
21 23 1.0000 35 36 1.0000
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Figure 4.13 – Comparison of p-values for the χ2-test applied to two attack locations.
To demonstrate the undetectability of an attack at a pair of PMUs where IoS∗ = 1, we
perform the χ2-test for BD in the non-attacked and attacked scenarios with a detection
conﬁdence of 99%, and we conﬁrm the results by performing the LNR test in the same
scenarios. For both tests we adopted the approach described in [86] and recalled in
Section 4.1.1. We attack the pair of Buses [#21, #36] as a representative of an attack
where IoS∗ = 1; we use the pair [#4, #26], as it has the lowest IoS∗, as a basis for
comparison.
Fig. 4.13 shows the p-values of the χ2-test. At the top of Fig. 4.13 we observe that the
p-values of the χ2-test for the pair of Buses [#21, #36] are not modiﬁed by the attack,
making the attack undetectable. In the bottom of Fig. 4.13, we show result for the pair
[#4, #26], and the p-values for non-attacked and attacked scenarios are largely different,
meaning that the χ2-test detects the attack.
In Fig. 4.14 we show the LNR-test results for the attacks shown in Fig. 4.13. For each
pair of PMUs, we plot LNR = maxm |rNm|, with rNm computed as deﬁned in equation (4.3)
and m = 1 : M . The dotted line shows the threshold corresponding to a conﬁdence
of 99.73 %, which maps to a 3σ deviation for a single measurement. It can be seen
that when attacking the undetectable location pair (top), the normalized residuals are
invariant. Conversely, if we attack the second location pair (bottom), the majority of
the LNRs are above the identiﬁcation threshold making the attack easily detectable.
Note that the reactive power drop in Fig. 4.12 has no effect on the LNR after the attack,
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Figure 4.14 – LNR test applied to two different attack locations for the no-attack and
attack scenarios.
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Figure 4.15 – Undetectability of a pair of PMUs that have large measurement-
magnitude ratio, with IoS∗ < 1.
when the attack location has an IoS∗ = 1. This behavior holds under any transient.
To numerically illustrate Theorem 4, in Fig. 4.15 we show the LNR-test results for
Buses [#26, #35], which have an IoS∗ = 0.8395, for a case when the magnitude of the
measurement in Bus #35 is 9 times larger than that in Bus #26. The ﬁgure illustrates
the LNR-test results before and after the attack, and shows that the attack remains
undetectable despite the fact that IoS∗ < 1.
To illustrate Theorem 5, we show results for p = 6, for the disjoint PMU pairs [#21,
#36], [#26, #35] and [#23, #24] for which either IoS∗ = 1 (ﬁrst and third pairs), or
Theorem 4 can be applied (second pair). The attack is performed in parallel, and
Fig. 4.16 shows the results of the LNR-test, comparing attacked and non-attacked
measurements. We can observe again that the results are statistically indistinguishable
from the non-attacked case.
Finally, we use the greedy algorithm described in Section 4.2.4 with the objective of
under-estimate the apparent power ﬂow for the line between Buses #16 and #24. The
algorithm ﬁnds the maximum underestimation with p = 10, attacking pairs [#21, #36],
[#23, #24], [#24, #35], [#23, #36], [#21, #23]. We can see the LNR-test applied to the
measurements before and after the attack in Fig. 4.17, which shows that the sequential
attack on pairs of PMUs that give an undetectable attack, is also undetectable.
Results on power-ﬂows mis-estimation
To illustrate the potential impact of time synchronization attacks, we show results
for an attack against a pair of PMUs (i.e., [#21, #36]), which leads to over- and under-
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Figure 4.16 – LNR-test applied to an attack on three disjoint pairs (p = 6), following the
method described in Theorem 5.
Figure 4.17 – LNR-test on a sequential attack with p = 10, using the greedy algorithm
strategy.
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Figure 4.18 – Comparison of the true apparent-power ﬂow in two lines and the estima-
ted apparent-power ﬂow for the no-attack and attack scenarios.
estimation of power ﬂows in the power system. The attack angles computed are
α1 = 1.14 rad for Bus #21 and α2 = 0.57 rad for Bus #36, and they increased of 0.02 rad
after the reactive power drop.
We applied the same random numbers for generating the measurement noise to the
scenarios with and without attack, ensuring that any difference in the state-estimation
results is only due to the attack.
The attack worsens the estimated voltages, hence all the inferred quantities from there
are affected (e.g., injected currents, current ﬂows, active and reactive powers, etc.),
with errors going above 500 %, as shown in the right side of Fig. 4.18. In this case, the
system operator believes that the power ﬂowing in the line between Buses #22 and #23
is much higher than it really is, therefore the system operator could decide to shed
some loads or to reconﬁgure the network when this is not necessary. On the contrary,
in the left side of Fig. 4.18, the system operator under-estimates the power ﬂowing in
the line between Buses #16 and #24 thus exposing the line to power ﬂows larger than
those it is designed for (in all the cases where the true power ﬂow is close to the line’s
ampacity limit).
Fig. 4.19 compares the under-estimation of the apparent-power ﬂow on the line bet-
ween Buses #16 and #24 obtained by different attacks. We compare (i) the attack on a
single pair of PMUs (i.e., [#21, #36]); (ii) the attack on disjoint pairs of PMUs described
in Theorem 5 and (iii) the heuristic greedy algorithm described in Section 4.2.4. Alt-
hough we see that adding extra pairs appears to increase the impact of the attack, the
assertion does not always hold (e.g., attacking twice the same pair of PMUs cancels the
attack, as mentioned before). In general, it is the attacker that, by knowing the IoS∗
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Figure 4.19 – Comparison of the under-estimated power ﬂow in a transmission line, for
different attack scenarios.
criterion, can build a strategy to best achieve its objective.
4.2.6 Countermeasures
The methodology of the attack presented here does not have any inﬂuence on the
value of the residuals, hence the BD cannot be identiﬁed and removed from the me-
asurement set by applying the classic BDD algorithms. A possible countermeasure
is discussed in [148], where the authors propose strategies to maintain integrity of
measurements, and describe a BDD technique based on a comparison between mea-
surements from PMUs and measurements from SCADA (from other remote terminal
units (RTUs)). Notwithstanding, the differences between these types of measurements
could make ineffective the use of SCADA measurements to validate the integrity of
PMU measurements. Indeed, typical SCADA measurements are available every 4 se-
conds and are not time synchronized, while PMUs can provide 50 or 60 synchrophasors
per second.
Successful countermeasures capable to identify theGPS spooﬁng need to be implemen-
ted at the device level. The recent literature has discussed potential countermeasures
using this approach. Additional features need to be added in the GPS controller em-
bedded in the PMU to detect, and eventually mitigate, the GPS spooﬁng. Reference
[149] has discussed these techniques that can be clustered as follows:
• Detect changes of power-related parameters of the GPS hardware (e.g., carrier-
to-noise density ratio, absolute received signal power, power variations, etc);
• Observe time-related parameters of the GPS receiver like the length of interval
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between phase transitions, the delay between signals transmitted on different
frequencies;
• Analyze multiple signals with the same direction of arrival using multi-antenna
receivers;
• Add secondary sources of time synchronization like, for instance, precision time
protocol (e.g., PTPv2, White Rabbit).
Note that the attacks here presented require knowledge of the measurement vector,
thus integrity or authentication mechanisms are not sufﬁcient for mitigation. Given
the impact of the attacks, and how simple and useful the IoS∗ criterion is, we strongly
suggest that conﬁdentiality of PMU measurements be mandated by the standards.
Timing attacks under clock-drift conditions
The clock of any PMU has an internal oscillator that is controlled by a clock-servo.
A clock-servo is a ﬁlter that prevents the clock from making abrupt changes in time
and has a stiffness that depends on the manufacturer. The described attacks in the
paper could cause a change in time which could produce an alarm in the clock-servo,
making the attack detectable. Taking the clock-servo described in [150] as an example,
the total attack’s time-adjustment would require to be divided in “chunks" of 5 μs/s
(corresponding to a phase shift of 1.57 mrad/s at 50 Hz) to avoid an overfeeding to
the clock-servo that could trigger an alarm. Further research in this direction could
consider proposing an optimal attack with a constraint in the derivative of the attack-
angle calculation of the form |αi(t+Δt)− αi(t)| ≤ ηatt withΔt being the refresh rate
of PMU measurements and ηatt the maximum incremental step in time to avoid a
clock-servo alarm.
Pre-estimation ﬁltering vs. undetectable timing attack
We assess the performance of the pre-estimation ﬁltering process of BD, presented in
Section 4.1.3, as a countermeasure for the undetectable timing attack. Differently from
the validation of the pre-estimation ﬁltering process of BD carried out in Section 4.1.4:
• The transmission network of Fig. 4.11 does not present several critical measu-
rements. For this reason, a non-critical measurement affected by BD may be
discarded. Nevertheless, we chose to replace any corrupted measurement for
sake of comparison with the previous results;
• In what follows, the process noise covariance matrixQ is assessed following the
heuristic method presented in [95] and brieﬂy recalled in Chapter 3.1.2;
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Figure 4.20 – Replacement of the attackedmeasurements by the pre-estimation ﬁltering
of BD process.
• The attack is inserted at time t=20 s for a duration of 2 s.
As an example, let us take the undetectable attack to Bus #21 and #36 previously
described. In Fig. 4.18 it was shown that this attack led up to 3 times underestimation
and 5 times overestimation of the power ﬂows, in two speciﬁc lines. Fig. 4.20 shows
the real and imaginary parts of the current measurements (in p.u.) during the attack to
the PMUs in the two buses. The continuous black line represents the measurement
affected by the undetectable attack (from t=20 s), the grey dashed line represents the
output of the BD process. The BD method correctly detects the BD and replaces the
corrupted measurements. For the sake of completeness, we list and brieﬂy discuss the
main reasons for the success of the BD process:
1. The angles computed to obtain an undetectable attack are large (α21 ≈ 1.14 rad
and α36 ≈ 0.57 rad), thus the attacked measurements fall largely beyond the
threshold (grey area in Fig. 4.20).
2. The change in the angles is assumed to be instantaneous. This assumption
was already discussed at page 111. On the other hand, a slow change would be
detectable by residual-based BD algorithms.
3. The pre-estimation of BD assumes to compare anomalies in injected currents
with anomalies in voltage. Due to the nature of the timing attack, PMUmeasuring
current-only are the target of the attack. BD are therefore not present in voltage
measurements and this facilitates the comparison with the neighbor PMU and
the subsequent BD identiﬁcation.
Fig. 4.21 shows the impact that the attack has on 2 speciﬁc lines. Differently from
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(a) Estimated power ﬂows. (b) Detail on the accuracy of the DKF + BD.
Figure 4.21 – Comparison of the estimated power ﬂows for two lines. The BD process
neutralizes the attack.
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Figure 4.22 – Failure in replacing the attacked measurements by the pre-estimation
ﬁltering of BD process.
Fig. 4.18, the power estimated by the DKF coupled with the BD process is also given.
As it can be noticed, the BD replacement neutralizes the impact of the attack.
As mentioned, the success of the BD process is function of the computed angle α. The
larger α, the more probable the detection of the attack is. This was tested on all the
attacks presented in Section 4.2.5. As an example of missed detection, let us consider
the attack at Bus #26 and #35. In this case, the resulting angles are α26 ≈ 3 mrad
and α35 ≈ 0.3 mrad. Such angles fall below the threshold and thus the attack is not
identiﬁed as shown in Fig. 4.22.
At the same time, such small angles do not have a visible impact on the estimated
power ﬂows. Indeed, an analysis of the the estimated powers in all the lines has shown
that such angles do not impact the accuracy of the state estimator. The DKF and LWLS
provide comparable results to the non-attacked case, as shown in Fig. 4.23. For sake of
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Figure 4.23 – Comparison of the estimated power ﬂows for the lines departing from
the attacked buses. Due to the small angles, the undetectable attack does not lead to a
misestimation of the power ﬂows.
space, only the estimated power ﬂows in the lines departing from Bus #26 and #35 are
given.
Conclusions
In this section we have shown that, by manipulating the time reference of one pair
of PMUs, it is possible to perform attacks in PMU-based linear state estimators that
are undetectable by state-of-the-art residual based BDD methods. We introduced
a criterion to ﬁnd location pairs where the attack is undetectable and provided a
closed-form expression to compute the attack angles. We also provided an additional
criterion to identify attackable locations regardless of the measurement values. We
mounted attacks with more than two delays and showed that attacks on disjoint pairs
can be superimposed such that the attack is performed in parallel. Furthermore,
we showed how combined sequentially attacks are possible and can be used with a
greedy algorithm in order to damage transmission lines. We also showed that when
performing a sequence of attacks, it is possible to know whether each attack in the
sequence will be undetectable before computing the attack. We used simulations to
verify the attacks and to demonstrate their efﬁcacy. Finally, we discussed possible
countermeasures, with particular focus on the performance of the pre-estimation
ﬁltering of bad data proposed in Section 4.1.3. We have shown that this process might
represent an effective way to identify and neutralize the PMU timing attacks.
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5 Experimental activities
This chapter illustrates the experimental validation of the functions and applications
presented in the manuscript. In this respect, the chapter starts by describing a GPS
synchronized real-time simulation platform and the implementation and validation
on this platform of a real IEEE C37.118 Class-P Std compliant synchrophasor extraction
algorithm. We then describe three ﬁeld trials where we assess and compare the perfor-
mance of the proposed PDC data-pushing logics. Finally, in the real-time simulation
platform, we validate a protection mechanisms relying on PMU-based state estimation
and by means of a HIL setup, we validate a voltage control mechanism.
Original contributions of this chapter:
• Deployment and performance validation in a GPS-synchronized real-time simu-
lator of a realistic IEEE C37.118 Class-P Std compliant synchrophasor extraction
algorithm;
• Validation of data-pushing logics for synchrophasor data concentration in three
real ﬁeld installations;
• Validation in a real-time simulator of a protection mechanism relying on PMU-
based state estimation;
• Validation of the GECN voltage control mechanism by means of a time synchro-
nized HIL setup.
5.1 The real-time simulator
It is crucial to validate the behavior and performance of newprotection schemes or new
controlmechanisms prior to their deployment in real networks. Indeed, in the real ﬁeld,
the assessment of the performance of the protection scheme or control mechanism is
practically impossible as the true state is hidden by the measurement noise and bias.
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Additionally, emergency situations such as contingencies or disturbances might result
in unpredictable protection/control actions that were not foreseen in the development
phase. These limitations can be tackled by ﬁrst validating the protection or control
mechanisms in a laboratory environment using Real-Time Simulators (RTSs) within a
Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) setup.
5.1.1 Integration of an IEEE Std. C37.118 compliant PMUs in a RTS
The content of this section is based on [151]. The connection of real PMU devices to the
RTS might presents technical and economical drawbacks typically represented by: (i)
the limited number of available analog outputs to interface large number of PMUs (e.g.,
several tens/hundreds) and (ii) the potential high cost of such a kind of devices. To
overcome these obstacles, PMUsmight be virtualized and directly embedded inside the
model running into the RTS. This enables the usage of a number of PMUs limited only
by the computational resources of the RTS with respect to the selected integration time-
step and the model complexity. Despite the evident advantages of such an approach,
its application is limited by the computational resources typically required by the RT
simulation of the majority of synchrophasor estimation algorithms.
In this respect, fewworks explored the possibility of virtualizing PMUs in RTSs [152, 153,
154, 155] and the synchrophasor estimation performance was always a compromise
between accuracy and complexity. In what follows, instead, we show the deployment
and validation into a RTS of a virtual PMU characterized by a synchrophasor estimation
algorithm that, associated to a PMU prototype, has demonstrated its compliance with
the class-P requirements deﬁned in the IEEE Std. C37.118.1-2011 [38] and with most of
the accuracy requirements deﬁned for class-M PMUs with the exception of out of band
interference tests. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that presents the
integration of a standard compliant PMU into a RTS.
The focus of the section is on (i) the time synchronization of the platform that al-
lows the RT-virtualized PMU to exchange messages to real-world applications and (ii)
the assessment of its performance. The formulation of the deployed synchrophasor
estimation algorithm, the so-called enhanced Interpolated Modulated Sliding DFT
(e-IpMSDFT), is widely documented in the literature and thus it is not reported in this
work. The algorithm has been ﬁrst formulated in [39] and further extended in [156] in
order to reduce the measurement reporting latencies and, consequently, increase the
reporting rates (see Fig. 5.1). Moreover, the same algorithm is currently deployed in
PMU prototypes installed in real electrical grids [32, 47].
116
5.1. The real-time simulator
Figure 5.1 – Block scheme of the proposed e-IpMSDFT-based virtual PMU.
The platform
The adopted platform is the Opal-RT eMEGAsim PowerGrid Real-Time Digital Simula-
tor [157]. Such a platform consists of a multi-core processor hardware able to perform
operations within an integration time-step generally of some tens of microseconds.
Simulink is used to create the models that, by means of the software platform RT-Lab
are compiled and transferred in the CPUs to run in RT. Additionally, the RTS is also
equipped with a set of Analog and Digital I/Os to allow the connection with external
devices for HIL setups.
The setup is shown in Fig. 5.2 and it consists of one industrial PC (12 cores), a Spartan3
FPGA board and a Dolphin DXE410 Expansion Chassis. The RT simulated model
runs in the industrial PC, the FPGA is used to lock the integration time-step to a
more stable clock. The DXE410 module enables the communication between the two
elements. In addition to this, in order to have access to a stable and reliable UTC-time
reference needed to simulate any PMU, the industrial PC has been equipped with a
hardware GPS-synchronization module from Spectracom (Tsync-PCIe express board
[158]). This board is used to provide (i) the UTC time-stamp for PMU data-frames (ii)
the Pulse-per-Second (PPS) to a clock adapter in order to generate a GPS synchronized
clock. The reason for having such a setup is clariﬁed in the next section where the
time-synchronization of the setup is described.
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Figure 5.2 – Setup of the eMEGAsim PowerGrid RTS.
Time-synchronization of the setup
Both real or simulated PMU, need to report to the outside world the estimated values
at regular time-intervals deﬁned by the adopted reporting rate and at reporting times
aligned with the UTC-second rollover. The PDC is also usually synchronized to a
traceable UTC-time source as shown in Fig. 5.3a. The experimental validation of PMU-
based monitoring and control schemes by using HIL setup needs to include at least: (i)
a RTS integrating the RT-models of the simulated electrical grid and PMUs; (ii) a PDC
coupled with the monitoring or control algorithms under test.
In such context, it is clear that the RTS needs to integrate a proper GPS receiver, or
equivalent UTC-time source, to bring synchronization to the simulated PMUs and, in
this respect, two main possibilities exist. The ﬁrst one refers to a sort of ideal operating
condition for the RTS that wants to integrate one or more virtual PMUs. In such a setup,
the CPU clock used to derive the RTS integration time-step is disciplined by a UTC-
stable time reference (see Fig. 5.3b). This condition allows to considerably simplify the
PMU design by directly synchronizing the PMU sampling and reporting processes to
UTC and guarantees that the RTS simulation time would not drift over time. In the
case of the adopted RTS, such synchronization can be achieved by taking advantage of
the setup described and shown in Fig. 5.2. The Spectracom board generates a pulse at
the frequency corresponding to the inverse of the integration time-step conﬁgured in
the simulated model. The pulse is constantly aligned with the PPS of the GPS source
so that it does not drift in time and it is fed to the FPGA board. In correspondence
of each pulse, a FPGA counter register is incremented. The model developed by the
authors polls on the same FPGA counter and uses its increment to determine the exact
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 5.3 – Time synchronization of possible validation setups. To be noted the
position of the GPS antenna. (a) Real ﬁeld, (b) Simulation in a GPS synchronized RTS
(both grid and PMUs), (c) Simulation in a non-synchronized RTS (simulated PMU is
GPS synchronized for packet time-stamping).
instant to proceed to the next calculation step. In other words, since the FPGA counter
increment is driven by a GPS disciplined pulse, the model integration time-step will
not drift over time.
The second possibility (see Fig. 5.3c) refers to a very common conﬁguration where
the CPU clock, and therefore the RTS integration time-step, cannot be disciplined to
any stable time reference. This condition might happen, for instance, when the setup
does not include a FPGA board. As a consequence the integration time-step can only
be directly derived from the free-running CPU clock and will therefore be affected by
a slow but relevant time-drift (for the speciﬁc setup, the drift has been measured to
be approximately 9 μs/s). On the other hand, the reporting of PMU measurements
is automatically synchronized to UTC by means of the built-in C37.118 data encap-
sulation library by Opal-RT. More speciﬁcally, every time the GPS-derived UTC time
hits a speciﬁc reporting time, the data frame is built using the e-IpMSDFT estimations
and streamed out of the RTS. As a consequence, the PDC receives a synchronous PMU
data ﬂow from the RTS but the estimated synchrophasors are obtained by means of
a CPU clock that is drifting with respect to a generic UTC time-reference. In order to
illustrate the effects of this drift, let consider, for the sake of simplicity, a simple setup
where a single-channel PMU is directly connected to a simulated 50 Hz steady-state
signal generator. Since the signal generation and the PMU sampling processes are
running at the same speed, the simulated PMU will not notice the CPU clock time
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drift and will measure consistent data with respect to the signal generation settings.
Nevertheless, the frequency and phase estimation received at the PDC will not be
consistent due to the RTS’s clock drift with respect to the UTC time reference. The
consequence is that the PDC will receive a drifting phase from the simulated PMU
with a constant 50 Hz frequency estimation. In order to cope with the drift in time
of a non-synchronized RTS, the PMU estimations of frequency and phase have been
opportunely compensated. In particular, the RTS sampling clock error is computed in
real-time inside the simulated PMU as follows:
ε(n) =
tp − tp−Z
Z · Ts − 1 (5.1)
where TS is the integration time-step and the equivalent PMU sampling time, Z is the
measurement window length (expressed as an integer number of input samples) over
which the clock error is computed (for the speciﬁc case of this simulated PMU we have
adopted a 10 secondswindow length) and tp is theUTC start time of the p-th integration
time-step. Every time the CPU clock error is computed, the frequency estimation can
be properly updated (see [39] for more details about this aspect). In addition to this,
another correction takes place into the simulated PMU when the integration time-step
is derived from the free-running CPU clock. This second correction compensates the
phase uncertainty related to the PMU sampling time Ts by measuring the time distance
between the speciﬁc reporting time and the ﬁrst sample of the time-window used to
estimate the synchrophasor. Such an uncertainty corresponds, for a sampling rate
of 10 kHz and a rated system frequency of 50 Hz, to 10 πmrad (1.8 deg), a value that
deﬁnitely needs to be compensated particularly for PMUs conceived for distribution
networks (see [39] for further details).
Once deployed in the Opal-RT eMEGAsim PowerGrid Real-Time Digital Simulator, the
simulated PMU has been experimentally validated with respect to: (i) the accuracy of
the algorithm during the static and dynamic testing conditions dictated by the IEEE
Std. C37.118.1-2011; (ii) the computational load of the developed PMU model. The va-
lidation concerns the conﬁguration shown in Fig. 5.3b since it allows a straightforward
UTC-time synchronization of the RTS and thus of the PMU model.
Accuracy assessment
Typically the validation of the performance of any synchrophasor estimation algorithm
deployed in a real hardware always includes additional sources of errors dependent on
(i) the PMU A/D converters resolution, (ii) the sampling process time-stability and (iii)
the adaptation of the developed SE algorithm to the adopted hardware platform. In the
case of the simulated PMU model these error sources are not included. In particular,
the sampling process is perfectly synchronous with respect to the simulated power
system and its jitter can be, therefore, neglected. Similarly the inﬂuence of the A/D
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Table 5.1 – Performance assessment of the e-IpMSDFT algorithm (the meaning of the
symbols is the one in [38]).
Test type Test range
Maximum Error
TVE [%] FE [Hz]
Single tone f0±5Hz 5.71e−4 6.90e−4
Multi tone 10% each harmonic up to 50th 9.24e−12 4.83e−13
Ampl. modulation Mod. frequency 0.1 to 5Hz, kx =±0.1 6.29e−1 7.96e−2
Phase modulation Mod. frequency 0.1 to 5Hz, ka =±0.1 5.69e−1 1.85e−2
Frequency ramp ±1Hz/s ramp, f0±5Hz 3.71e−2 6.95e−4
Test type Test range
Response Time [s]
TVE FE
Ampl. step Magnitude =±10%, kx =±0.1 0.031 0.051
Phase step Angle =±10◦, ka =±π/18 0.026 0.048
converters and of the speciﬁc implementation of the SE algorithm are minor since
the PMU model is directly coupled with the simulated voltage/current signals and
the SE algorithm has been implemented using ﬂoating point precision (64 bits). As a
consequence, the PMU accuracy assessment, carried out on the RTS, allows an analysis
of the performance of the e-IpMSDFT synchrophasor estimation algorithm only (thus,
eliminating all the sources of additional uncertainty). In this respect, the validation is
performed by applying static and dynamic signals to the PMU as deﬁned by the IEEE
Std [38] and verifying its compliance with the same standard. Table 5.1 provides the
performance assessment in terms of Total Vector Error (TVE), Frequency Error (FE) and
response time. For each test type, the results shown in Table I, are obtained by using
the more demanding testing conditions among those deﬁned for class-P PMUs. The
speciﬁed range refers to a PMU with a reporting rate of 50 fps, but other reporting rates
were tested as well. The errors and response times are always within the limits and
the TVE in steady state conditions is compatible with distribution system applications.
The measurement accuracy is veriﬁed to be compatible with the one presented in [39].
Computational requirements
Further tests were performed to verify the computational resources of the proposed
SE algorithm when running in RT in the eMEGAsim target. In this respect, when
selecting the integration time-step, it should be taken into consideration the fact that
the MSDFT methods assumes that, for each new sample, every DFT bin needs to be
updated in order not to compromise the next DFT estimation. This computation
must be performed before the acquisition of the next sample, over the whole set of
PMU input channels, in order to correctly estimate the corresponding synchrophasors.
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Table 5.2 – Computational requirements of the virtual PMU into the Opal-RT eMEGA-
sim RTS.
Integration time-step
Number of virtual PMUs per RTS core
1-channel 6-channel 12-channels
100 μs 16 9 5
Following these considerations, the integration time-step (i.e. the PMU’s sampling
time) must be carefully selected to avoid overruns in the RTS target. In what follows,
this parameter has been set to 100 μs.
Indeed, a virtual PMU is seldom simulated alone. Typically, a simulated electrical
grid might integrate several tens of PMUs. In this respect, several virtual PMUs were
included in the same model in order to assess the maximum number of PMU that can
be simulated by a single core of the RTS. The test results are presented in Table 5.2
and refer to an integration time-step of 100 μs and to 3 different virtual PMU models,
equipped with 1, 6 and 12 input channels respectively.
To conclude, let us recall that:
• The synchrophasor estimation algorithm implemented in the simulated PMU
is also embedded in PMU prototypes deployed in three ﬁeld trials to assess the
performance of the PDC data-pushing logic. Results are given in Section 5.3.
• The assessment of the performance of the protection scheme and control me-
chanism is provided in Section 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. The results are obtained
by using simulated PMUs and the setup here described.
5.2 The ﬁeld trials
As anticipated at the beginning of the chapter, this section presents the ﬁeld trials in
which the functions described in this manuscript have been deployed and validated.
5.2.1 Services industriels de Lausanne
The Services industriels de Lausanne (SiL), the Network Operator of the city of Lau-
sanne, has deployed a PMU-based advanced and upgradable monitoring system on its
125 kV sub-transmission network that eventually will constitute the backbone of their
future SCADA system.
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Figure 5.4 – Network topology of the monitored portion of the 125 kV power network
of Lausanne city, together with the breaker position.
Power network and sensing
The electrical network is composed of 7 electrical substations as shown in Fig. 5.4.
The lines are mainly underground cables with the exception of: (i) Line 8 and 10 (two
parallel overhead lines), and (ii) Line 1 and 9 (two parallel lines) that are split in two
sections: starting from bus #1, they are composed of 3.682 km of overhead line and
1 km of underground cable (see Table 28 in Appendix 5.5.4 for details about the line
parameters). No zero-injection buses are present. The points of connection to the
220 kV grid are buses 1 and 7. The local distribution network is fed by step-down
transformers from buses 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Additionally, a non-monitored portion of the
125 kV network departs at buses 1, 2 and 7.
The voltage and current signals fed to the PMUs are obtained from standard potential
(PTs) and current transformers (CTs). The PT and CT accuracy-classes (0.2- or 0.5-class)
are speciﬁed in Table 29 in Appendix 5.5.4. The PT and CT full-scales are 125 kV and
600 A, respectively. The ratio errors and phase displacements are derived from the
accuracy class by using the Standards [36] and [37].
Each PMU is equipped with 8 voltage and 8 current channels, therefore it can be con-
nected to maximum 2 three-phase (plus neutral) power lines. A PMU is installed at
both ends of each line and measures the nodal-voltage and current-ﬂow synchropha-
sors in each of the three phases, for a total of 15 PMUs deployed in the network. This
corresponds to a very large measurement redundancy of 5.7. The PMUs are based
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Figure 5.5 – Network topology of the SiL 125 kV sub-transmission grid showing the
PMUs and PDC locations.
on the National Instruments Grid Automation System, a programmable CompactRIO
platform with PMU capability that meets the IEEE Std. C37.118.1-2011 measurement
requirements for both classes P and M. The PMUs are conﬁgured to meet the P-class
performance requirements, implementing the synchrophasor estimation algorithm
presented in [39]. Each PMU is also equipped with an 8-channels digital-input module
to monitor in real-time the status of breakers and switches1 whose location is also
represented in Fig. 5.4.
Data communication
The PMUs stream UDP frames with a reporting rate of 50 fps. The total UDP frame size
can vary depending on the number of lines that are effectively monitored by each PMU.
The size is 134 bytes when streaming a single set of phasors (together with frequency,
ROCOF and power values) and 198 bytes when streaming 2 sets of phasors.
The telecommunication physical channel is the legacy optical ﬁber of SiL. Each substa-
tion is equipped with a switch connecting the optical ﬁber and the PMUs through an
Ethernet cable. The communication is established through a dedicated Virtual LAN.
1The presence of a line breaker at both ends of each line and the possibility of including its status in
the PMU packet, enables us to obtain in real-time the network topology.
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Data process-and-operation
The PDC is equipped with a GPS receiver that provides the absolute time with a
resolution of 1 ms due to the limited precision of the LabVIEW get time function.
The PDC is running on a workstation placed in the control room of SiL (see Fig. 5.5)
equipped with an Intel Xeon Processor at 2.4 GHz, 8 GB of RAM and running Windows
Server 2008. The PDC supplies at a constant reporting pace (i.e., 50 fps) a real-time
linear state estimator of the sub-transmission grid of Lausanne, a user interface that
displays in real-time both the measured and the estimated values and a local database.
5.2.2 EPFL campus
The power grid of the EPFL campus is a particularly challenging distribution network
where all the peculiarities of ADN are present. The lines are short (most of them below
100 m), and the load demand is largely variable in function of the hour of the day and
the weather conditions. Moreover, active power injections are present as 2 MW of
photovoltaic panels are installed together with 6 MW of combined heat and power
generation units. These conditions, and the large use of power electronics, heavily
affect the voltage and current proﬁles which makes the EPFL campus a challenging
test bed for the developed infrastructure. Indeed, the analysis carried out in [35] has
shown that PMUs deployed in distribution network need to be characterized by an
accuracy well below the 1% TVE dictated by the reference Standard [38].
Power network and sensing
The electrical network is composed of 5 electrical substations as shown in Fig. 5.6. The
lines are underground cables, the parameters are reported in Table 30 in Appendix 5.5.4.
Each substation is equipped with a class-P PMU prototype [39] based on the National
Instruments CompactRIO 9068, composed by a reconﬁgurable Artix-7 FPGA and a
dual-core ARMCortex-A9 processor and equippedwith a customized Linux-RTOS. The
chassis has been equippedwith a stationary GPS unit (NI-9467) for the synchronization
to the UTC-time and two analog input modules (NI-9215) characterized by an input
range of ± 10 V and a sampling frequency of 50 kHz. The synchrophasor extraction
algorithm is the same as the one deployed in the RTS, as shown in Section 5.1.1.
The 3-ph nodal voltages and nodal injected currents are transformed to low voltage
signals by means of Altea CVS-24, that consists of 0.1-class capacity voltage dividers
and 0.5-class Rogowski coils [159]. The connection between the sensors output and
the PMU is obtained by means of dedicated shielded-cables of equal ﬁxed length for
all the substations. The connection between the GPS antenna mounted on the rooftop
and the PMU is made using RG213 cables in order not to attenuate the GPS signal also
with more than 100 meters of cables. The cable length delay is suitably compensated
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Figure 5.6 – Network topology of the power distribution feeder of the EPFL campus,
together with the adopted PMU placement and PDC location.
on the PMU side. An example of elements composing a typical substation setup is
shown in Fig. 5.7.
Data communication
The PMUs stream UDP frames with a reporting rate of 50 fps. The total UDP frame size
can vary between 66 and 138 bytes according to the number of transformers to monitor.
To avoid packet losses, the communication network is duplicated bymeans of a parallel
redundancy protocol called IPRP. UDP packets are duplicated at the PMU side and the
duplicates are removed once they reach the PDC. The design and implementation of
the protocol are given in [44]. Expensive cable deployments are avoided by re-using
existing twisted pair cables (2 Mb/s), originally installed for telephony. The cables
are passive and are stare-wired from a central point, the "PBX room" in Fig. 5.6. For
communication from this room to the location where the PDC is installed, an optical
ﬁber at 100 Mb/s is used. The whole network is resilient to up to 8 hours of power
outage. Additionally, security mechanisms are also in place to ensure that the ICT
infrastructure is robust to insider and outsider cyber-attacks, following the security
solutions and best practices for ADNs given in [160].
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Figure 5.7 – Components installed in the equipped EPFL-campus substations: GPS
antenna (top left), Altea CVS-24 current and voltage sensors (bottom left) and rack
containing: the PMU (top shelf), the SHDSL modem (middle shelf) and the UPS
(bottom shelf).
Data process-and-operation
A GPS-synchronized PDC (2 processors quad-core, 2.7 GHz) runs in a Scientiﬁc Li-
nux 7 operating system. The same machine is also hosting a DKF estimator. Raw
measurements and state estimator outputs, as well as the historical data, are made
public through a web interface2. Every stored ﬁle contains one hour of data; it is a
self-explanatory text ﬁle that is digitally signed. Other research institutes have already
used the provided historical data for different purposes [161, 162].
5.2.3 Alliander - the BML feeder
Alliander, one of the DNOs of the Netherlands, has deployed, in the framework of the
FP7 project C-DAX [33], a PMU-based monitoring system on a medium voltage (10 kV)
distribution feeder.
Power network and sensing
The BML feeder is composed of a primary substation supplying multiple feeders
including the monitored one composed of 17 secondary substations supplying the
surroundings of the city of Huissen. The substations are connected as shown in Fig. 5.8
by means of underground cables with cross sections from 95 to 240 mm2. The line
parameters are provided in Table 31 in Appendix 5.5.4. A total of 10 class-P PMUs, based
2http://smartgrid.epﬂ.ch/
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Figure 5.8 – Network topology of the Alliander 18-bus power distribution feeder, toget-
her with the adopted PMU placement. Line lengths are in scale.
on the same platform and synchrophasor extraction algorithm adopted in the EPFL
campus, have been installed in 10 buses. The PMU location depends on installation
constraints set by the DNO, as well as on the network observability. In the primary
substation (i.e., bus #1) a PMU measures nodal-voltage and current ﬂow, in all the
secondary substations where PMUs are installed, they measure nodal voltage and
injected current synchrophasors.
Data communication
The PMUs stream two sets of phasors, together with frequency and ROCOF, for a total
UDP frame size of 116 bytes.
PMU data are streamed through a public 4G LTE network, provided by the local service
provider Vodafone, to a PDC running in the Alliander data center in Haarlem (see
Fig. 5.9).
In order to support the PMU data stream, each PMU has been connected to dedica-
ted 4G routers through the CompactRIO Ethernet switched interface. The Wide Area
Network (WAN) interface of the routers connects to the Vodafone network through a
dedicated IP address range without any speciﬁc service level implemented, so that the
PMU trafﬁc is not prioritized. The advantages of such a wireless solution are its high
availability, its cost-effectiveness and its easy deployment. Nevertheless, the main dra-
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Figure 5.9 – Network topology of the Alliander 10 kV feeder showing the PMUs and
PDC locations.
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Table 5.3 – Summary of the three presented ﬁeld trials.
Network PMU
Communication type
Vn [kVrmsLL] # nodes # lines # Class
SiL 125 7 10 15 P ﬁber
EPFL 20 5 4 5 P twisted pairs and ﬁber
Alliander - BML 10 18 17 10 P 4G
wback is that the latency depends on the real-time availability of the wireless physical
mean and on the instantaneous network load, which leads, to short-term variations of
the network latency and eventual data incompleteness or packet reordering (discussed
in Section 5.3.1).
Data process-and-operation
The PDC is equipped with a GPS receiver that provides the absolute time with a
resolution of 1 ms due to the limited precision of the LabVIEW get time function.
The PDC is integrated in a Linux RedHat server equipped with an Intel Xeon CPU at
2.00 GHz and 64 GB of RAM that supplies, at 50 fps, a real-time state estimation process
used to monitor the nodal voltage and line power ﬂow variations of the feeder.
The main characteristics of the ﬁeld trials in which the PDC data pushing logics are
validated, are summarized in Table 5.3. Additionally, by leveraging on the synchropha-
sor networks here described, real-time state estimation (RTSE) has been deployed and
experimentally validated. This enabled the network operators to monitor the state of
their electrical networks with latency in the order of tens-hundred ms and a refresh
rate of 20 ms. Details about the validation of the RTSE in the presented ﬁeld trials in
[32, 47].
5.3 Phasor data concentrator
The PDC architecture and the three data-pushing logics presented in Chapter 3.1.1
were deployed and experimentally validated in the SiL, EPFL and BML ﬁeld trials.
The data ﬂow is tracked along the whole process by measuring the data frame time-
stamps ts, their arrival times ta and the PDC push time tp3. The synchrophasor data
latency of each data frame and the PDC reporting latency of each time-aligned dataset
are computed for the various data pushing logics presented in Section 3.1.1. In parti-
3A Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) would provide more deterministic performance. However,
neither of the ﬁeld trials implemented the PDC on a RTOS.
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cular, four different data pushing logics are examined over an observation window of
24 hours:
1. absolute time logic (hereafter referred as Logic 1);
2. absolute time integrating push-when-complete logic (hereafter referred as Lo-
gic 2);
3. relative time logic (hereafter referred as Logic 3);
4. relative time integrating push-when-complete logic (hereafter referred as Lo-
gic 4).
For each ﬁeld trial, the experimental results are presented bymeans of three histograms
representing the probability density function (PDF) of the following quantities:
a) the aggregated synchrophasor data latencies from all PMUs;
b) the comparison between the PDC reporting latency in Logics 1 and 2;
c) the comparison between the PDC reporting latency in Logics 3 and 4.
Also, for each data pushing logic, the dataset incompleteness is presented by means of
a table showing the percentage of incomplete datasets pushed by the PDC during the
24 hours observation window.
In order to properly set the PDC wait time, a preliminary test is performed to measure
the characteristic synchrophasor data latencies of all the ﬁeld trials together with their
jitter over a time window of 24 hours. This quantity has then been set to guarantee the
collection of the majority of the data frames with a particular time-stamp, indepen-
dently of the adopted data pushing logic. The adoption of a constant PDC wait time
represents the most classic approach to deﬁne a proper PDC wait time. Nonetheless,
other approaches are available in the literature. For example, the PDC wait time could
be adapted along the day based on recent PMU trafﬁc delay patterns, as proposed
in [75].
5.3.1 Real ﬁeld validation
SiL ﬁeld trial
The experimental results are presented in Fig. 5.10. Both the absolute and relative PDC
wait time are set by analyzing the aggregated synchrophasor data latencies from all
PMUs measured along an interval of 24 hours, as shown in Fig. 5.10a. The histogram
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Table 5.4 – Dataset incompleteness when adopting different data pushing logics in the
SiL ﬁeld trial.
% of incomplete datasets
Missing data frames Logic 1 Logic 2 Logic 3 Logic 4
1 2.3 · 10−5 2.3 · 10−5 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 6.8 · 10−5 6.8 · 10−5 4.5 · 10−5 4.5 · 10−5
>3 1.5 · 10−3 1.5 · 10−3 5 · 10−4 5 · 10−4
Total 1.6 · 10−3 1.6 · 10−3 5.4 · 10−4 5.4 · 10−4
represents the aggregated data, because an analysis by PMU data stream showed
no signiﬁcant differences among the various PMUs. As it can be noticed, they are
characterized by a mean value of 44 ms and standard deviation of 2 ms. Nevertheless,
as more than 99.99% of the packets is received with a latency smaller than 60 ms, the
absolute PDC wait time Tabs is set to this value. Besides, the average amount of time
needed to receive all data frames with speciﬁc time-stamp is 3 ms, whereas more than
99.99% of datasets take less than 20 ms to complete. Hence, the relative PDC wait time
Trel is set to 20 ms.
The comparison between Logics 1 and 2 (Fig. 5.10b) shows the improvement intro-
duced by adopting the push-when-complete logic, that enables to reduce the PDC
reporting latency by 14 ms. Nevertheless, the latter increases the jitter of the PDC re-
porting latency that is less deterministic compared to Logic 1 as it is always inﬂuenced
by the arrival time of the last-received data frame with a speciﬁc time-stamp. The
push-when-complete logic also reduces the PDC reporting latencies when adopting a
relative time data pushing logic, with an average improvement of 15 ms (see Fig. 5.10c
comparing Logics 3 and 4). In such a case the PDC reporting latency jitter is slightly
improved by adopting Logic 4 but it is still non-deterministic as in case of Logic 1.
Based on the adopted PDC wait time setting (Tabs =60 ms, Trel =20 ms), the incom-
pleteness of the time-aligned datasets is presented in Table 5.4. As expected, when
transmitting data frames through a dedicated wired telecom infrastructure, the dataset
incompleteness is negligible and in the order of few parts per million regardless of
the adopted data pushing logic. Nevertheless, occasionally, the PMU data frames are
simultaneously delayed by a considerable amount of time and do not reach the PDC
before the expiration of the absolute PDC wait time. This causes the PDC to push
empty data-sets in case of Logics 1 and 2, yielding to a total data-set incompleteness
that is one order of magnitude higher compared to Logics 3 and 4.
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Figure 5.10 – Experimental results in the SiL ﬁeld trial showing the PDF of: (a) the com-
bined synchrophasor data latencies; (b) the PDC reporting latency when adopting an
absolute time logic (Logic 1) and when integrating it with a push-when-complete logic
(Logic 2); c) the PDC reporting latency when adopting a relative time logic (Logic 3)
and when integrating it with a push-when-complete logic (Logic 4).
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(a)
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Figure 5.11 – Experimental results in the EPFL ﬁeld trial showing the PDF of: (a)
the combined synchrophasor data latencies; (b) the PDC reporting latency when
adopting an absolute time logic (Logic 1) and when integrating it with a push-when-
complete logic (Logic 2); c) the PDC reporting latency when adopting a relative time
logic (Logic 3) and when integrating it with a push-when-complete logic (Logic 4).
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Table 5.5 – Dataset incompleteness when adopting different data pushing logics in the
EPFL ﬁeld trial.
% of incomplete datasets
Missing data frames Logic 1 Logic 2 Logic 3 Logic 4
1 2.9 · 10−2 2.9 · 10−2 2.8 · 10−2 2.8 · 10−2
2 9.2 · 10−5 9.2 · 10−5 2.3 · 10−5 2.3 · 10−5
3 6.9 · 10−5 4.6 · 10−5 2.3 · 10−5 2.3 · 10−5
>3 2.3 · 10−5 4.6 · 10−5 0 0
Total 2.9 · 10−2 2.9 · 10−2 2.8 · 10−2 2.8 · 10−2
EPFL ﬁeld trial
The experimental results are presented in Fig. 5.11. Both the absolute and relative PDC
wait time are set by analyzing the aggregated synchrophasor data latencies from all
PMUs measured along an interval of 24 hours, as shown in Fig. 5.11a. The histogram
represents the aggregated data. The aggregated data are characterized by a mean value
of 44 ms and standard deviation of 2 ms. The SiL and EPFL communication networks
are both wired, so we decided to set the absolute PDC wait time Tabs to 60 ms as for
the SiL case. Besides, the average amount of time needed to receive all data frames
with speciﬁc time-stamp is 4 ms, whereas more than 99.99% of datasets take less than
20 ms to complete. Hence, the relative PDC wait time Trel is set to 20 ms.
The comparison between Logics 1 and 2 (Fig. 5.11b) shows the improvement intro-
duced by adopting the push-when-complete logic, that enables to reduce the PDC
reporting latency by 13 ms. Nevertheless, the latter increases the jitter of the PDC re-
porting latency that is less deterministic compared to Logic 1 as it is always inﬂuenced
by the arrival time of the last-received data frame with a speciﬁc time-stamp. The
push-when-complete logic also reduces the PDC reporting latencies when adopting a
relative time data pushing logic, with an average improvement of 14 ms (see Fig. 5.11c
comparing Logics 3 and 4). In such a case the PDC reporting latency jitter is slightly
improved by adopting Logic 4 but it is still non-deterministic as in case of Logic 1.
Based on the adopted PDC wait time setting (Tabs =60 ms, Trel =20 ms), the incomple-
teness of the time-aligned datasets is presented in Table 5.5. As expected, the wired
telecom infrastructure ensures an almost negligible dataset incompleteness regardless
of the adopted data pushing logic. Nevertheless, occasionally, a single PMU data frame
does not reach the PDC before the expiration of the absolute and relative PDC wait
time. This causes the PDC to push data-sets with a single missing data frame regardless
of the adopted data pushing logic.
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Alliander - BML ﬁeld trial
Fig. 5.12 shows the experimental results for the Alliander ﬁeld trial. The absolute
and relative PDC wait times have been set according to the measured synchrophasor
data latencies shown in Fig. 5.12a. As it can be noticed, by adopting a 4G telecom
infrastructure, the measured synchrophasor data latency shows a bimodal distribution
characterized by a mean value of 70 ms that, as expected, is higher than the SiL case.
The same distribution can be observed by analyzing each PMU data stream separately.
Such a behavior could be attributed to the varying conditions of the wireless medium
(e.g., interference, noise, congestion, etc.) across the duration of the measurement.
However, as the public 4G network operator did not provide any additional detail on
the network topology and data trafﬁc, a deeper investigation is not possible. Moreover,
the measured distribution highlights a behavior that is typical of 4G LTE networks,
that is the presence of several outliers scattered through time and through PMU data
stream, characterized by a synchrophasor data latency up to 1 second (not visible in
Fig. 5.12a). For this reason, the absolute PDC wait time has been set to 100 ms, as
a trade-off between the lowest achievable PDC reporting latency and an acceptable
dataset completeness. In particular, within 100 ms, more than 99.84% of data frames
are received at the PDC, which is acceptable for the supplied applications, whereas
augmenting the threshold up to 1 second would not bring a signiﬁcant improvement.
Besides, the average amount of time needed to receive all data frames with speciﬁc
time-stamp is 22 ms, and more than 98.91% of datasets are completed within 40 ms.
Hence, the relative PDC wait time Trel is set to 40 ms.
The improvements introduced by adopting the push-when-complete logic are visible
for both absolute and relative time logics. In particular, Fig. 5.12b and 5.12c show an
average reduction of the PDC reporting latency of 18 and 19 ms respectively. This
comes at the price of a higher jitter of the PDC reporting latency that, in such a case,
is highly affected by the real-time variation of the 4G network latency. Looking at the
same ﬁgures, it is also evident how the only logic that guarantees a certain determinism
in the PDC reporting latency is Logic 1 as it is the only one that is not inﬂuenced by the
data frame arrival time.
Finally, the dataset incompleteness is presented in Table 5.6. Compared to the SiL
and EPFL cases, the 4G network performance, and particularly its latency variations,
considerably affect the dataset completeness that is strongly inﬂuenced by the choice
of the absolute and relative PDC wait time. In particular, based on the adopted PDC
wait time settings, (Tabs =100 ms, Trel =40 ms), the reported cumulative data incom-
pleteness is around 1.4% in the case of Logics 1 and 2 and around 1.2% in the case of
Logics 3 and 4.
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Figure 5.12 – Experimental results in the Alliander ﬁeld trial showing the PDF of: a)
the aggregated synchrophasor data latencies from the 10 PMUs; b) the PDC reporting
latency when adopting an absolute time logic alone (Logic 1) and when integrating the
push-when-complete logic (Logic 2); c) the PDC reporting latency when adopting a
relative time logic alone (Logic 3) and when integrating the push-when-complete logic
(Logic 4).
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Table 5.6 – Dataset incompleteness when adopting different data pushing logics in the
Alliander ﬁeld-trial.
% of incomplete datasets
Missing data frames Logic 1 Logic 2 Logic 3 Logic 4
1 1.295 1.295 1.193 1.192
2 0.027 0.027 0.018 0.018
3 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.005
>3 0.042 0.042 0.013 0.013
Total 1.372 1.372 1.229 1.229
5.3.2 Conclusions
In this section we experimentally validated the architecture of a PDC that integrates
both the absolute and relative time data pushing logics together with a third one that
enables to minimize the PDC latency without decreasing the data completeness. We
have assessed the performance of the developed PDC and related logics within the
context of three real PMU installations that adopt different communication infrastruc-
tures (i.e., optical ﬁber links, combination of twisted pairs and optical link and wireless
4G LTE public network).
The assessment of the PDC performance has quantiﬁed the inﬂuence of the adopted
telecom infrastructure and PDC data pushing logic on the achievable PDC reporting
latency. In particular the experimental validation has demonstrated that the push-
when-complete logic is characterized by the lowest PDC latency, that is only inﬂuenced
by the synchrophasor data latency: in the case of optical ﬁber links the PDC latency is
on average 3 ms, whereas in the case of a 4G network, this value increases to 12 ms.
Nevertheless, the latency reduction introduced by this logic involves a reduced deter-
minism of the outgoing PDC data ﬂow. As a consequence, in order to correctly operate,
this logic has to be properly coupled with dedicated FIFO structures to mitigate the
variations in the PDC reporting latency.
On the contrary, the only logic that, independently of the network characteristics,
is capable of guaranteeing a constant PDC reporting latency and the consequent
mitigation of the synchrophasor data latency variations is the absolute one. In such a
case, the PDC reports time-aligned datasets at a constant reporting rate (corresponding
to the PMU one) with a PDC reporting latency that is ﬁxed and coincides with the
absolute PDC wait time. In such a case, the average PDC latency is approximately
16 ms in the case of optical ﬁber links (SiL) and twisted pairs coupled with an optical
link (EPFL) and 30 ms in the case of 4G network (Alliander).
Finally, the experimental validation has highlighted the importance of properly se-
lecting the PDC wait time due to its inﬂuence on the PDC reporting latency and the
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dataset completeness. The latter, particularly in the case of non-deterministic net-
works, might be degraded up to values that do not enable to exploit any longer the
availability of synchrophasor data. More speciﬁcally, regardless of the adopted data
pushing logic, in the case of wired links the cumulative dataset incompleteness is in
the order of few parts per million, whereas in the case of 4G network is in the order of
1%.
5.4 Fault identiﬁcation and location in RTS
The PMU-based fault detection and faulted line identiﬁcation method presented in
Chapter 3.2.1 is experimentally validated by means of the RTS setup described in
Section 5.1. In order to reproduce realistic conditions into the RTS, we have adopted
the following working hypothesis:
• Noise levels derived from PMU measurements recorded in the distribution feeder
of the EPFL campus have been used;
• A real PMU synchrophasor extraction algorithm, as described in Section 5.1.1,
has been adopted.
• The method has been validated for both transmission and distribution networks,
as its performance is not dependent on (i) network voltage level and conﬁgura-
tion (e.g., transmission or distribution, radial or meshed); (ii) presence of DG;
(iii) neutral connection (i.e., solid-earthed or unearthed neutral); (iv) type of
fault (symmetric and asymmetric); and (v) its impedance (i.e., low- or high-
impedance).
5.4.1 Simulation environment
In order to assess the accuracy and time latency of the proposed method we have
modeled in the RTS both the Alliander distribution feeder described in Section 5.2.3
and a commonly used test transmission network. In what follows, details about the
modeling of the networks and the adopted measurement noise models are given.
Network description
Distribution network: The Alliander ﬁeld trial (i.e., the BML distribution feeder) des-
cribed in Section 5.2.3 has been modeled in SimPowerSystemTM. The lines are modeled
with the equivalent PI circuit, the upstream grid has a short-circuit power of 1000 MVA
and it is modeled with the short-circuit impedance Zsc (we assumed a resistance to
reactance ratioRsc/Xsc=0.1). The high to medium voltage transformer can be either
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Figure 5.13 – Network topology of the 5-bus transmission test network adopted for the
validation.
Yg-Yg or Yg-Y, according to the simulation scenario that might request earthed or
unearthed neutral networks, respectively. The loads are modeled as star connections
of impedances. In normal operating conditions they absorb approximately 1/4 of
the rated power of the real transformers to which they are connected (see Table 32 in
Appendix 5.5.4 for details about the rated powers of the transformers).
Transmission network: The network used is a modiﬁed version of the PJM 5-bus
system. Its layout is reported in Fig. 5.13. The injected/absorbed powers together
with the line parameters are provided in [163]. The network has been modeled in
SimPowerSystemTM. The lines are modeled with the equivalent uncoupled PI circuit.
The medium to high voltage transformers are Yg-Yg, a common choice in transmission
networks. The loads are modeled as star connections of impedances. In normal
operating conditions they absorb the active and reactive power provided in [163].
Loads are connected to buses 1, 4 and 5.
Adopted PMUs vs. common practice
The modeled networks have been equipped with PMUs at every bus measuring nodal
voltage and injected current phasors. The implementation of the synchrophasor
extraction algorithm in the RTS have been already shown in Section 5.1.1. The use of
simulated PMUsmakes the validation of the proposedmethodmore realistic compared
to the common practice of using synchrophasors generated from the true state. Indeed,
the adoption of a real synchrophasor estimation algorithm enables us to include in the
analysis the response time of the PMU during transients. The latter is mainly affected
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Figure 5.14 – Comparison between the current phasor magnitude estimated by the
simulated PMU in bus #1 of the BML feeder during a fault versus the idealized current
phasor magnitude.
by the window length used by the algorithm and the position of the time-stamp within
the window. A comparison of the time evolution of the current phasor magnitude
estimated by the modeled PMU in bus #1 of the BML feeder during a fault versus the
idealized current phasor magnitude is given in Fig. 5.14. It can be seen that for this
speciﬁc class-P PMU characterized by a window length of 3 periods and the time-
stamp centered in the window, the magnitude estimate takes 4 time-steps to reach the
pre-fault accuracy level. This aspect is taken into account in Section 5.4.2 to assess the
total latency of the proposed method.
Measurement noise model
In the literature, the robustness of fault detection and location algorithms is tested with
respect to the measurement noise [164]. The simulated PMU introduces only the noise
due to the synchrophasor estimation algorithm. It is then needed to superimpose a
measurement noise to the synchrophasors estimated by the simulated PMU. The noise
should also include the effect of the sensor interfacing the PMU to the network. In
order to generate a realistic noise, real-ﬁeld data have been used.
We have considered real measurements taken in the EPFL campus. Fig. 5.15 shows the
magnitude and phase of nodal voltage and injected current measurements. Note that
these measurements include the noise introduced by the combination of sensor and
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PMU. The corresponding standard deviations (stds) are:
σVmag = 1.6 · 10−3% σVph = 5.1 · 10−5[rad]
σImag = 4.0 · 10−1% σIph = 5.8 · 10−3[rad]
(5.2)
Furthermore, Fig. 5.16 shows that the Gaussian assumption of the measurement noises
is fulﬁlled. The voltage and current phases are referred to the phase of another quantity
(see Fig. 5.15b and 5.15d) because the phase is continuously changing due to the fact
that the real system frequency is not exactly 50 Hz. The std of the voltage phase is 1/
√
2
of the one of (Eph1a −Eph5a) since we assume that the two voltage noises have the same
std and are uncorrelated (the same assumption holds for the voltage magnitude noise).
On the contrary, we entirely attribute the noise of (Iph1c − Eph1c) to the current phase.
We assume the measurement noise to be the same for transmission and distribution
networks. Indeed, it is important to observe that the graphs of Fig. 5.15 include both
the measurement noise and the network dynamics, therefore the computed stds are
overestimated for transmission networks that are usually considered in quasi steady-
state.
Further assumptions have to be made for distribution networks in order to simulate
the realistic behavior of the sensing system:
1. We use current protection sensors in bus #1 of the BML feeder to measure the
current during the fault. Their accuracy is assumed to be 10 times worse than the
one deﬁned in (5.2).
2. The 1-phase low impedance fault in an unearthed neutral network leads the
voltage in the faulted phase to drop to around 0.6 % of the rated value. In this
speciﬁc case, we consider an accuracy of these voltage measurements to be 100
times worse than the one deﬁned in (5.2).
In the next section we carry out a sensitivity analysis of the proposed fault location
algorithm with respect to the measurement noise.
5.4.2 Performance Assessment
This section provides the performance assessment of the method with respect to the
considered scenarios.
The accuracy of the proposed method in identifying the line affected by the fault has
been extensively tested. The scenarios refer to different combinations of the following
factors:
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Figure 5.15 – Real voltage and current measurements taken in the EPFL campus. The
signals include the noise introduced by the combination of sensor and PMU. The noise
stds inferred from the signals are shown in (5.2).
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Figure 5.16 – Normal probability plots of the measured quantities shown in Fig. 5.15.
The normality assumption of the measurement noises is satisﬁed.
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• Transmission network or distribution network operated with earthed or uneart-
hed neutral;
• Low, high or very high impedance faults (1 Ω, 100 Ω or 1000 Ω);
• Symmetric (3-ph) or asymmetric (1-ph-to-ground and 2-ph) faults;
• Fault at 1/4 or 1/2 of the line length. Three lines are considered: L4,5, L9,10, L13,16
for the distribution network and L1,3, L3,4, L1,5 for the transmission network;
• Presence of DG and different network operating conditions.
Faulted line identiﬁcation
For a given fault scenario (e.g., 1-ph-to-ground low impedance fault, at 1/4 of a spe-
ciﬁc line, on a distribution network operated with earthed neutral, without DG), the
procedure used to assess the accuracy of the proposed fault location method is the
following:
1. The model is implemented and run. The synchrophasors estimated by the PMUs
at 50 frames-per-second are recorded.
2. M sets of measurements are obtained by perturbing the quantities inferred in
step 1 with randomly-generated Gaussian white noise characterized by the stds
given in (5.2). We set M = 10000 in order to get results that are statistically
signiﬁcant. Note that the phase noise std is in radians, while the magnitude noise
std is in percentage of the quantity X of step 1. Therefore, the magnitude and
phase of the synchrophasor measurementXmeas are calculated as follows:
Xmeasmag = Xmag +N(0, σXmag ·Xmag)
Xmeasph = Xph +N(0, σXph)
(5.3)
3. Each set of measurements computed in step 2 is given to the b parallel SEs that
return the b estimated states. The latter are compared with the set of measure-
ments in order to obtain bWMR values. The index of the SE exhibiting the lowest
WMR identiﬁes the inferred faulted line. The proposed fault location method is
successful if the inferred faulted line coincides with the real faulted line.
4. The accuracy of the fault location method is represented by the percentage of
success in correctly identifying the faulted line. It is computed as:
accuracy =
Ms
M
· 100
whereMs indicates the number of times the faulted line is correctly identiﬁed.
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The accuracy of the proposed fault location method for each scenario is given in
Tables 5.7-5.24. The tables also contain an analysis of the sensitivity of the proposed
fault location method accuracy with respect to the noise level (details about the noise
levels in Appendix 5.5.4):
• Noise level 1: the noise stds are the ones presented in Section 5.4.1, which are
obtained from real 0.1-class voltage and 0.5-class current sensors;
• Noise level 10: the noise stds related to the measurement sensors and the current
protection sensors are respectively 10 and 3 times larger than the ones presented
in Section 5.4.1. These values refer to signiﬁcantly worse sensors andwere chosen
in order to represent a worst, but still realistic, scenario.
Note that the Noise level 10 corresponds to a very high noise for transmission networks
(see Tables 33 and 33 in Appendix).
Distribution network: In what follows, the method is validated on the simulated
Alliander distribution network. Fig. 5.17a shows the WMRs of the b-SEs as a function of
time for the speciﬁc case of a 3-ph fault at a quarter of line L13,16, with fault impedance
of 100 Ω and Noise level 1. The fault occurs between 0.5 and 0.52 seconds. The quick
separation of the WMRs in the following time-steps allows the detection of the fault
according to the algorithm presented in Section 3.2.1. After three time-steps (see
Figs. 5.14 and 5.18), it is evident that the LWLS with the virtual bus in line L13,16
maintains the lowest WMR, therefore the fault location algorithm correctly identiﬁes
the fault in line L13,16. It is worth observing that the fault in line L13,16 is the most
challenging to be identiﬁed among the three considered lines. This is due to the fact
that line L13,16 and its neighbor lines (L5,13, L13,14 and L16,17) are short (218 to 510 m),
and the virtual buses positioned in these lines are close to the fault. Indeed, we can
see from Fig. 5.17a that the WMRs of the SEs using these virtual buses are quite close
to each other. As a consequence, when we apply a high level of measurement noise,
the WMRs become more noisy (see Fig. 5.17b), leading to a possible misestimation of
the faulted line. However, it is important to point out that in the time-steps where the
algorithm fails, it locates the fault in one of the lines adjacent to the faulted one.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 refer to symmetric faults, namely 3-ph. The low-impedance fault is
characterized by a fault impedance of 1 Ω and leads to fault currents in the order of
thousands of Amperes. The high-impedance fault is assumed to have a fault impedance
of 100 Ω that produces a fault current limited to tens of Amperes. Consequently, the
high-impedance faults are very difﬁcult to identify and locate. Unlike conventional
schemes, the proposed method guarantees a correct fault detection and location in
case of realistic noise level (i.e. Noise level 1). If we increase the noise level (i.e. Noise
level 10), the percentage of success decreases for the case of high impedance faults.
Indeed, high impedance faults cause less perturbation in the network state compared
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Figure 5.17 – WMRs of the b-SEs in case of a 3-ph high impedance fault at a quarter
of line L13,16 of Fig. 5.8 occurring between 0.5 and 0.52 seconds. Two noise levels are
shown: (a) Noise level 1; (b) Noise level 10. In (b), the noisy WMRs worsen the accuracy
of the fault location method. At some time-steps, it does not locate the fault on the
faulted line, but on one of the adjacent ones.
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Table 5.7 – Distribution: 3-ph fault, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L9,10
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L13,16
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.8 – Distribution: 3-ph fault, 100 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 99.27%
1/2 100% 99.85%
L9,10
1/4 100% 98.54%
1/2 100% 99.90%
L13,16
1/4 100% 84.65%
1/2 100% 99.74%
to the low impedance ones. The WMRs of the various SEs are closer to each other and
the method becomes more sensitive to the noise, as already explained above. However,
even with the high noise level and the high fault impedance, the proposed method
exhibits a quite high number of correct fault location estimates.
We can also notice that the algorithm is always less accurate in locating faults at a
quarter of a line compared to the ones in the middle of a line. Indeed, the presented
methodology assumes that each virtual bus is in the middle of a given line. However,
in the experimental validation, the position of the fault was changed along the line (i.e.
1/2 or 1/4 of the line length) but always keeping the virtual bus of the SEs in the middle
of the line. When the actual fault happens to be exactly in the virtual bus of one of the
SEs (i.e. in the middle of the line), the network topology and the admittance matrix
used by that SE match perfectly the simulated faulted network. For this reason, we
achieve higher accuracy when the fault is in the middle of the line. However, we have
shown that even for fault locations not on the virtual bus, we do achieve the correct
identiﬁcation of the faulted line.
The same considerations about symmetric faults can be extended to the other sce-
narios. We can further observe that the proposed fault location method has slightly
reduced performance in locating a low impedance fault only in case of a 1-ph fault
in an unearthed neutral network with Noise level 10. The reason is that the voltage
drops signiﬁcantly in the faulted phase. As already mentioned in Section 5.4.1, for this
speciﬁc case we have used stds of the voltage magnitude and phase measurements in
the faulted phase which are 100 times larger than the ones deﬁned in Section 5.4.1.
Transmission network: The method is further validated on the transmission test bed.
Tables 5.17-5.24 provide the percentage of success in identifying the fault for symmetric
and asymmetric faults, with Noise level 1 and Noise level 10 for three selected lines at
1/4 and 1/2 of their lengths. What commented for the distribution network holds true
also for the transmission network. On the other hand, it has to be highlighted that, in
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Table 5.9 –Distribution: 2-ph fault: earthed
neutral, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L9,10
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L13,16
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.10 – Distribution: 2-ph fault: eart-
hed neutral, 100 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 92.48%
1/2 100% 92.91%
L9,10
1/4 100% 89.56%
1/2 100% 95.09%
L13,16
1/4 100% 68.43%
1/2 100% 91.73%
Table 5.11 – Distribution: 2-ph fault: une-
arthed neutral, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L9,10
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L13,16
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.12 – Distribution: 2-ph fault: une-
arthed neutral, 100 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 92.41%
1/2 100% 92.83%
L9,10
1/4 100% 89.38%
1/2 100% 95.20%
L13,16
1/4 100% 67.57%
1/2 100% 92.32%
Table 5.13 – Distribution: 1-ph-to-ground
fault: earthed neutral, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L9,10
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L13,16
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.14 – Distribution: 1-ph-to-ground
fault: earthed neutral, 100 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 83.78%
1/2 100% 99.99%
L9,10
1/4 100% 95.05%
1/2 100% 99.23%
L13,16
1/4 100% 96.06%
1/2 100% 99.36%
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Table 5.15 – Distribution: 1-ph-to ground
fault: unearthed neutral, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 69.84%
1/2 100% 87.28%
L9,10
1/4 100% 72.69%
1/2 100% 77.82%
L13,16
1/4 100% 72.08%
1/2 100% 79.33%
Table 5.16 – Distribution: 1-ph-to ground
fault: unearthed neutral,100 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L4,5
1/4 100% 70.95%
1/2 100% 99.66%
L9,10
1/4 100% 89.99%
1/2 100% 97.94%
L13,16
1/4 100% 87.56%
1/2 100% 95.74%
Table 5.17 – Transmission: 3-ph fault, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.18 – Transmission: 3-ph fault, 100Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 67.54%
1/2 100% 100%
general, the noise affects less the state estimation results in transmission networks due
to larger phasor displacements. This is reﬂected in an overall better performance of
the method especially in case of Noise level 10.
As a conclusion, we can state that the proposed algorithm is able to correctly detect
the fault and locate the faulted line irrespectively of the type of network, the neutral
connection, fault type, fault impedance and fault position. The method is robust
against realistic noise levels since, during the experimental validation, it never failed
when using noises directly inferred from real-ﬁeld data. The fault location accuracy
decreases, but not signiﬁcantly, only when we apply a noise level 10 times larger.
However, this noise level is considerably larger than the real one and the success
percentage of proposed method remains above 66% for both the networks under test.
In order to further test the proposed fault location method in distribution networks
we have carried out another simulation with a higher fault impedance of 1 kΩ. This is
commonly considered one of the highest possible fault impedances since it refers to
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Table 5.19 – Transmission: 2-ph-to ground
fault, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.20 – Transmission: 2-ph-to ground
fault, 100 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 59.59%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.21 – Transmission: 2-ph fault, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.22 – Transmission: 2-ph fault, 100Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 96.75%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.23 – Transmission: 1-ph-to ground
fault, 1 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 100%
1/2 100% 100%
Table 5.24 – Transmission: 1-ph-to ground
fault, 100 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1 10
L1,3
1/4 100% 99.99%
1/2 100% 100%
L3,4
1/4 100% 99.86%
1/2 100% 100%
L1,5
1/4 100% 87.19%
1/2 100% 100%
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Table 5.25 – Distribution: 1-ph-to ground fault: unearthed neutral, 1000 Ω
Fault Position
Noise Level
1
L4,5
1/4 80.94%
1/2 99.99%
L9,10
1/4 95.92%
1/2 99.30%
L13,16
1/4 95.93%
1/2 99.32%
the typical electrical resistance of a biological body. The performance of the proposed
method has been assessed considering a 1 kΩ 1-ph-to-ground fault in an unearthed
neutral network. The reason motivating this choice is that, for this case, the fault
current is limited in amplitude by the high network zero-sequence impedance, so
that its value becomes comparable to the currents absorbed by the loads. Indeed, the
simulation results show that fault location is more difﬁcult in unearthed networks. We
consider the case of Noise level 1 in order to match the realistic noise measured in the
real network. The results are provided in Table 5.25. It can be seen that, also for this
extreme scenario, the proposed methodology is capable to identify the faulted line and
type of fault in the large majority of the cases.
Faulted buses
The fault on a bus has not been discussed so far because we assume to have a PMU
installed in every substation. Hence, the faulted bus and the fault type are easily
detected by using the measurements of the PMU installed in the faulted bus. For
example, in case of 1-ph fault in a bus of an unearthed neutral network: (i) the voltage
zero-sequence component has a non-null value; (ii) the current magnitude in the
faulted phase has a sudden jump of tens of Amperes.
Distributed generation
The performance of the method has been also assessed when dealing with faults in
distribution networks characterized by a large penetration of DG. The loads in bus
#4, #10 and #17 have been coupled with variable pitch wind turbine models driving
160 kW squirrel cage asynchronous generators running at nominal speed. The power
requested by the loads has been varied in order to create three different scenarios.
Case 1: a passive network where the loads absorb approximately 1/4 of the rated power
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Table 5.26 – Distribution: presence of DG, unearthed neutral: Fault at 1/4 of L13,16,
100 Ω
Scenario Fault Type
Noise Level
1 10
Case 1
3-ph 100% 82.73%
2-ph 100% 66.66%
1-ph 100% 80.74%
Case 2
3-ph 100% 83.08%
2-ph 100% 67.43%
1-ph 100% 82.34%
Case 3
3-ph 100% 84.62%
2-ph 100% 69.71%
1-ph 100% 83.40%
of the real secondary substation transformers and the DG does not cover the load
demand. Case 2: an intermediate scenario where the loads absorb 50 % of the power
of Case 1, but the network is still passive. Case 3: the loads absorb 10 % of the power of
Case 1 so that the DG production is abundantly larger than the load demand making
the feeder exporting power towards the upstream grid. For these tests, we have used
the case characterized by the worst accuracy performance, that is a high impedance
fault (100 Ω) on line L13,16 in an unearthed neutral network. Table 5.26 shows the
fault location accuracy for different fault types and noise levels. As expected, these
results are close to the ones referring to the same fault conditions shown in Tables 5.8,
5.12 and 5.16. Indeed, the presence of DG does not change the performance of the
proposed method since state estimation is inherently not affected by the nature of the
loads/generators.
Computation time and latency
The assessment of the speed of the algorithm in identifying the faulted line is ametric of
interest when comparing the proposed method to existing fault location algorithms. In
what follows we focus on two time latencies: (i) the computation time of the proposed
method and (ii) the overall latency of the system to identify the faulted line.
The former is basically the time needed to compute the parallel SEs and then to go
through the ﬂowchart shown in Fig. 3.5. The computation time is function of the size of
the network, the number of measurements, and the type of state estimation technique
employed. Comparing the two networks under test, the distribution one presents a
larger number of measurements and unknown states and thus a larger computation
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time. The latency assessment that follows refers to the distribution network. The
proposed method has been implemented in an Apple MacBook Pro with a 2.6 GHz
CPU, 8 GB RAM, and MATLAB® 2014b. The SEs are implemented in series and the
computation time to run all the b-SEs is 11.0 ms with a std of 0.8 ms.
The overall latency represents the time between the occurrence of the fault and its
identiﬁcation. It is worth noting that, in order to obtain a reliable and correct post-
fault synchrophasor estimate, the PMUs have to process a dataset of raw-sampled
waveforms that does not contain the instant in which the fault occurred. To clarify
this aspect, Fig. 5.18 shows that whenever a fault occurs (e.g., in the grey area), three
acquisition windows (W1,W2,W3) are always corrupted. We remind that the adopted
synchrophasor estimation algorithm uses a window containing three periods of the
fundamental frequency. Then, W4 contains the post-fault waveform without any step
and the associated synchrophasor is correctly estimated. The total latency is therefore
the sum of four contributions:
1. T1 that is the time between the fault event and the ﬁrst sample of window W4.
Depending on when the fault occurs in the grey area of Fig. 5.18, T1 can vary
between 0 and 20 ms;
2. T2 that corresponds to half of the acquisition window length used by the syn-
chrophasor estimation algorithm. For the synchrophasor estimation algorithm
used, T2 is equal to 30 ms at 50 Hz;
3. T3 is the time between the center of the acquisition window and the moment the
set of measurements is pushed to the fault detection and location application.
In Section 5.3.1 it was shown that for wired communication networks (SiL and
EPFL), this value was approximately 47 ms. In case of wireless links T3 may
become more important.
4. T4 is the computation time needed to run the b-SEs. For the case considered in
this paper, where the b-SEs are implemented in series, T4 is equal to 11 ms with a
std of 0.8 ms.
Therefore, the overall latency can vary between 88 and 108 ms, depending on the
instant the fault occurred. This value of latency matches with the requirements of
protective relaying, so one can ideally envision its adoption in the context of protection.
5.4.3 Conclusions
A novel PMU-based fault detection and location method for power systems based on
real-time state estimation has been proposed. It consists of parallel SEs characterized
by different and augmented network topologies in order to include a ﬂoating fault
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Figure 5.18 – Overall latency of the proposed method in identifying faults.
bus. By comparing the weighted measurement residuals of all the SEs, we are able to
detect the presence of a fault and identify the faulted line with a latency ranging from
88 to 108 ms. The validation has been carried out on a distribution and transmission
networks equipped with PMUs at every bus. The electrical networks and the PMUs are
simulated in the time-domain by using a RTS. We have also implemented the PMU
synchrophasor estimation algorithm in order to reproduce the real PMU behavior.
The measurement noises have been inferred from real-ﬁeld PMU data. The proposed
method correctly identiﬁes the faulted line irrespectively of network type, neutral
connection, fault type, fault impedance and fault position along the line. It has also
been proven to be signiﬁcantly robust against noise. Additionally, the fault location
accuracy is not inﬂuenced by the presence of DG since the method is based on state
estimation, which does not inherently depend on the nature of the loads/generators.
Although the results here presented show an accuracy and latency that match the
requirements of protection schemes, a massive deployment of the presented fault
detection and faulted-line identiﬁcation method needs to be preceded by additional
studies. In particular, researchers need to investigate on the sensitivity of the method,
especially with respect to errors in the line parameters and its robustness against
communication issues.
5.5 HIL validation of GECN for voltage control
In this section, we present the experimental validation of the GECN mechanism when
applied to the case of thermostatically controlled loads to provide voltage control. The
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Figure 5.19 – The proposed HIL setup for the validation of GECN.
GECN is described in [118] and its basic concepts are recalled in Chapter 3.2.2 of this
manuscript. What follows is based on [123].
5.5.1 HIL Setup and Experiment Design
The HIL setup that has been designed and implemented for the experimental vali-
dation of the GECN control scheme is shown in Fig. 5.19. It consists of a RTS that
communicates via the local Ethernet network with a workstation. In the RTS, we have
developed speciﬁc models to represent the electrical network, the PMUs, the TCLs and
the GECN load controllers. In addition to the controllable resources, non-dispatchable
production coming from distributed solar panel units and non-controllable demand
are also included in the RTS.
It is worth noting that the developed set-up corresponds to the Alliander distribu-
tion network presented in Section 5.2.3 and the PMUs’ location corresponds to the
real installation of these devices in the electrical network. The PMUs estimate the
synchrophasors of nodal voltages and injected/absorbed currents, encapsulate them
according to the IEEE Std. C37.118.2-2011 and stream via Ethernet to the workstation.
In the workstation, a speciﬁc LabVIEW interface comprises a PDC, a RTSE, as well as
the GECN network controller. PDC and DKF-based RTSE have been already explained
in this manuscript. We rely on a PMU-based RTSE that surely matches the timing
requirements for the control of ADNs. However, the control approach here described
can be extended to the case of RTU-based SE (i.e., relying on measurements coming
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Table 5.27 – Parameters of the elastic appliances and the load controller
Parameter Value
Temperature deadband,Θ(oC) [1,6]
Ambient temperature, θ0(oC) 19
Thermal conductivity, A(kW/oC) 10.563
Coefﬁcient of performance, η 3
Rated power, Pr(W) 150
Time-step, τ (s) 1
Time constant, Tc = mc/A(h) ∼ U (1.326,2.778)
Controller time counter, T0(s) 480
Internal state parameter, ξ 0.4
Appliance power factor, cosϕ 0.85
from smart meters).
Once the estimated state is available, it is received by the GECN network controller
block that uses this information to compute the broadcast control signals. To this end,
ﬁrst the voltage sensitivity coefﬁcients are computed as in [120] and next, the optimal
control problem presented in Section 3.2.2, equation (3.37) is solved. Finally, the GECN
broadcast control signal is computed. The operation of the GECN network controller
is triggered every 16 sec as in [113]. In order to close the control loop, the GECN signal
is sent via Ethernet to a micro-controller where it is transformed to an analog voltage
signal and transmitted via dedicated analog outputs back to the network buses in the
RTS. There, each signal is received by all the GECN load controllers that are connected
to a single network bus. The local controllers change the state of the TCLs according to
the received signal and, consequently, the state of the network.
At each of the buses equipped with PMUs, apart from bus #1, we consider a population
of 400 controllable refrigerators. The characteristics of the elastic appliances, as well as
the TCL controller parameters are shown in Table 5.27. In addition to the controllable
resources, real measurements of 24 h curves of consumption and production coming
from distributed PV units are considered in each network bus. The aggregate active
and reactive power injections proﬁles of all the network buses are shown in Fig. 5.204.
In what follows, we ﬁrst verify that the RT implementation of GECN is the same as
the off-line event-driven simulation in MATLAB by performing a regression testing.
Then, we evaluate the performance of GECN in terms of voltage optimality and we
characterize its time requirements.
4These aggregate data come from measurements taken at a different feeder.
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Figure 5.20 – Aggregated non-controllable active and reactive power injections of all
network buses.
5.5.2 Regression Testing
In this section we want to verify that the implementation of the GECN control mecha-
nism in real-time is identical to the off-line version in MATLAB used for the simulations
in [113]. For this purpose, the goal is to run the same test-case in MATLAB off-line and
in real-time and obtain identical resulting voltage proﬁles, as well as aggregated power
of the TCLs. However, there are several factors that render such a comparison difﬁcult:
• The probabilistic nature of the GECN local controllers and the noise introdu-
ced by the analog signals do not allow to obtain a deterministic output of the
controllable loads between different simulations;
• The ﬁnite integration time-step of the RTS involves truncation errors caused by
the RTS solver that are different from the event-driven simulator developed in
MATLAB that, instead, uses the power ﬂow calculus.
For these reasons, we choose to test and compare separately the operations of the
GECN network controller and the load controllers as described next.
For the validation of the GECN network controller, we perform the following test. We
ﬁrst run a 24 h off-lineMATLAB simulation andwe store every second the network state,
i.e., the nodal voltage phasors, the nodal power injections, as well as the computed
GECN signals for each network bus. Then, we use the nodal voltage phasors and power
injections as input to the LabVIEW implementation of the GECN network controller
block shown in Fig. 5.19. In this way, we can compare the 24 h GECN signals computed
in MATLAB with the ones obtained from the GECN network controller that is used
in the experimental set-up. The results of this test are shown in Fig. 5.21-5.22. In
these ﬁgures we plot the difference between the 24 h GECN signal computed off-line
in MATLAB and the one computed by the RT implementation in LabVIEW. For the
sake of brevity we show only the signals sent to bus #3, which is the controllable bus
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Figure 5.21 – Difference between the 24 h GECN signals sent to bus #3 computed
by the MATLAB off-line and the LabVIEW RT implementation of the GECN network
controller.
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Figure 5.22 – Difference between the 24 h GECN signals sent to bus #12 computed
by the MATLAB off-line and the LabVIEW RT implementation of the GECN network
controller.
closest to the slack bus and bus #12 which is the furthest one. As it can be observed,
the difference between the GECN signals is negligible, in the order of 10−11, which
indicates that the implemented GECN network controller is behaving in RT as the
event-driven one developed in MATLAB.
For the validation of the local controllers of the TCLs we adopt a similar procedure. We
run a 24 h off-line simulation in MATLAB and we store the GECN signals sent to the
MV network buses, as well as the aggregate power of the controllable resources. Then
we use the control signals as input to the RT TCL controller which is implemented in
Simulink and we observe the aggregate TCL power at each MV bus. In both the RT and
the off-line simulations we make sure to set the seed of the random number generator
so that the same sequence of random numbers is produced in the two simulations.
By doing so we are able to compare the two different implementations of the local
resources controller in the two different software platforms. Fig. 5.23 and 5.24 show
the aggregate TCL power of bus #3 and #12 respectively computed in the off-line
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Figure 5.23 – Aggregate power consumption of TCLs connected to bus #3 in MATLAB
off-line (black squares) and in RT simulation (red line).
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Figure 5.24 – Aggregate power consumption of TCLs connected to bus #12 in MATLAB
off-line (black squares) and in RT simulation (red line).
simulations (black squares) and in real-time (red line)5. As it can be observed in these
ﬁgures the aggregate powers of the TCLs are exactly superposed, indicating that the
TCL controller, as well as the TCL model are behaving in RT exactly as the ones in
MATLAB.
5.5.3 Demonstration Example and Performance Assessment
In this section we evaluate the performances of GECN as a RT primary voltage control-
ler in ADNs. To this end we use the Alliander distribution feeder and the HIL set-up
described in detail in Section 5.5.1.
First, we run a 24 h RT simulation without enabling the GECN network controller in
order to obtain the base-case voltage proﬁle, as well as the uncontrolled aggregate
consumption of the TCLs. The results of this simulation for the voltage are shown in
5Note that in this case we do not show the differences between the aggregate powers computed in the
two implementations as they are exactly zero for the whole 24 h period.
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the dashed black lines in Fig. 5.25a-5.26a.
For the sake of brevity, we show the network voltage proﬁles that exhibit the minimum
and maximum voltage variations, namely the one of bus #3 and bus #12 that are the
closest and the furthest away from the slack bus respectively. It is worth observing that
for bus #12, the absence of a suitable control produces voltages below the allowed limit
of 0.95 p.u. in correspondence of the peak consumption periods, i.e., hours 7-8 and
17-18. Moreover, over-voltages above 1.05 p.u. occur in the middle of the day during
the peak production of the PV units, i.e. hours 12-13. In Fig. 5.25c-5.26c the aggregate
power of the refrigerators in buses 3 and 12 respectively are shown for the base-case in
red.
Next, we run a 24 h RT simulation where GECN control is enabled. The improvement
in the voltage proﬁle of buses 3 and 12 due to the application of GECN is shown in
Fig. 5.25a-5.26a (black curves). It is worth noting that the GECN is able to control in
real-time the network voltage guaranteeing that the resulting proﬁles remain for the
whole 24 h period within the allowed±5% limits shown in the dashed red lines. The
GECN signals that correspond to this improvement in the voltage proﬁles are shown in
Fig. 5.25b-5.26b for bus #3 and #12 respectively. As expected, the signal sent to bus #12
exhibits larger magnitudes caused by the larger voltage variations in this bus, whilst
GECN signals are close to zero for bus #3. In fact, the three peaks of the signal observed
in Fig. 5.26b correspond to the time periods when under-voltages and over-voltages
occur in Fig. 5.26a, i.e., hours 7-8, 12-13 and 17-18. The GECN signals cause variations
of the aggregate TCL power of the controllable buses that can be observed in Fig. 5.25c-
5.26c in black. Compared to the base-case consumption (red curves) the TCLs consume
less during hours 7-8 and 17-18, responding correctly to the positive GECN signal that
dictates there is a peak in consumption that causes under-voltages. On the contrary,
the TCLs consume more during hours 12-13 in order to locally compensate the peak
in the PV power production and decrease the corresponding over-voltages. Overall,
these results indicate that the GECN control mechanism is able to selectively control
the aggregated demand per bus and successfully provide real-time primary voltage
control in active distribution networks.
In addition to the performance evaluation of GECN in terms of voltage optimality, it is
interesting to assess the time latencies of the control process. In Fig. 5.27 we show the
time required by the GECN network controller to solve the centralized optimization
problem throughout the 24 h period. It is worth noting that even during the time-
periods when voltage control is required in the network, the solution time of the
optimization problem is in the order of few ms. Furthermore, Fig. 5.28 shows the CDFs
of the time required to solve the centralized optimization problem off-line, using the
solver fmincon of MATLAB and in RT, using the gradient descent method. It is worth
noting the signiﬁcant improvement of the adopted solution method in RT which is
in the order of 10 times faster. In particular, the median value of the solution time is
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(a) 24 h voltage proﬁle of bus #3 before (black dashed line) and after (black continu-
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(b) 24 h GECN signal sent to bus #3.
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(c) 24 h aggregate power consumption of the TCLs connected to bus #3 before (red
curve) and after (black curve) the GECN control.
Figure 5.25 – Voltage proﬁle, GECN signal and aggregate TCL power of bus #3.
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(b) 24 h GECN signal sent to bus #12.
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curve) and after (black curve) the GECN control.
Figure 5.26 – Voltage proﬁle, GECN signal and aggregate TCL power of bus #12.
162
5.5. HIL validation of GECN for voltage control
Time (h)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Ti
m
e 
fo
r t
he
 R
T
op
tim
iz
at
io
n 
so
lu
tio
n 
(m
s)
0
2
4
6
8
10
Figure 5.27 – Time required for the solution of the optimization problem.
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Figure 5.28 – CDF of the time required to solve the optimal control problem, compari-
son between off-line and RT implementations.
1.12 ms in RT with a corresponding 95-th percentile of 2.70 ms, where as off-line these
values are 17.37 ms and 32.82 ms respectively. The latency from the moment the data
enters the PDC until the state is available from the RTSE is assessed in [165] to be in
the order of 20 ms for the Alliander distribution feeder. Therefore, taking into account
the time latencies shown in Fig 5.27, within roughly 35 ms from the moment the data
is available to the PDC we are able to solve the centralized optimization problem and
compute the GECN signals. Overall, the timing performance shown here conﬁrms the
adequateness of GECN as a primary controller.
5.5.4 Conclusions
In this sectionwehave experimentally validated the operation of GECN, a soft real-time,
primary voltage control mechanism. This application represents a second example
on how, a timely and accurate knowledge of the system state can support network
operators in manage their electrical grids. We have designed a speciﬁc HIL setup to
evaluate voltage optimality and time latency of the control process. The real-time
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validation on a real medium voltage feeder has shown that GECN can successfully
maintain the network voltage proﬁle within the acceptable limits for safe operation
(typically±5% of the network rated value). Furthermore, we have computed the time
required for the centralized GECN network controller to solve the optimal control
problem and we have shown that it is in the order of few ms. Such time requirements
indicate the adequateness of GECN as a primary voltage control scheme. Finally, the
RT implementation of the GECN network controller, as well as TCL controllers into
dedicated equipment can, in principle, facilitate the actual deployment of the control
process in the real ﬁeld.
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This thesis focused on the design and validation of resilient synchrophasor networks for
the real-time monitoring, protection and control of power grids. Since synchrophasor
networks are identiﬁed as enablers of transmission and distribution systems of the
future, the thesis provided an overview on the state-of-the-art and insights on the
status of the current research and operational practices, always keeping the focus
on the challenges that have still to be addressed. Additionally, we produced major
efforts to design and validate synchronized measurement technology in distribution
networks.
A modern synchrophasor networks is a complex and multi-function infrastructure. For
this reason, we presented its architectural layers together with their key-components.
As the time synchronization of PMUs is identiﬁed as one of the major challenges for
the reliable operation of synchrophasor networks, particular focus is given to this topic.
Time dissemination techniques suitable for synchrophasor networks are introduced,
together with advantages and drawbacks when adopted in power systems. Always
in the context of reliable operation of synchrophasor networks, we deﬁned a novel
algorithm for the pre-estimation ﬁltering of bad data in PMU-based power system
linear state estimators, able to deal with intentional or unintentional tampering of
synchrophasor measurements. The algorithm is proven to be computationally efﬁcient
and robust against multiple bad data of different nature and magnitudes. Additionally,
it is able to distinguish between actual bad data and unexpected operating conditions
and thus it is suitable for being adopted in real PMU-based state estimators.
Again, in the context of reliable operation of synchrophasor network, we focused on
cyber-attacks on the time-reference of synchrophasor networks. We showed that it
is possible to forge delay attacks undetectable by state-of-the-art bad-data detection
algorithms used in conjunction with state estimation processes. We gave a closed form
for an undetectable attack that imposes two phase offset to two or more PMUs. We
also proposed different methods for combining two-delays attacks to produce a larger
impact. We proved that the attacks are successful and can lead to physical grid damage.
Among the countermeasures proposed, we validated the novel pre-estimation ﬁltering
of bad data as an effective way of neutralizing the attack.
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In the context of real-time monitoring of an electrical network by means of synchrop-
hasor technology, we designed a phasor data concentrator that, in addition to the
data-pushing logics suggested by the reference standard, implements a logic to mini-
mize the latency introduced in the concentration point without increasing the data
incompleteness. The performance of the data-pushing logics has been assessed in
terms of reliability, determinism and reduction of the overall latency in three real syn-
chrophasor networks adopting different telecom infrastructures (i.e., 4G-LTE, optical
ﬁber links and twisted pairs). The experimental results showed that the proposed
data-pushing logic is indeed characterized by the lowest latency contribution.
The same IEEE C37.118 Class-P Std compliant synchrophasor extraction algorithm
adopted in the real-ﬁelds is implemented and validated in a GPS-synchronized real-
time simulator. The simulated PMUs are used to validate two applications for the
real-time protection and control of electrical networks by means of synchrophasor
technology. The ﬁrst one is a protection mechanism for fault detection and faulted
line identiﬁcation that relies on PMU-based real-time state estimation processes. The
aim was to make the validation as realistic as possible, and thus we modeled in the
real-time simulator a real distribution network, we adopted a real synchrophasor
extraction algorithm and we inferred the measurement noise from real measurements.
We showed that, in terms of latency and accuracy, the proposed process is suitable for
both transmission or distribution networks (active or passive), with solid-earthed and
unearthed neutral, for low- and high-impedance faults of any kind (symmetric and
asymmetric) occurring at different locations. As a second example of synchrophasor
network application able to enhance the distribution network operations, we chose to
validate in a real-time HIL setup the GECN voltage control mechanisms. We modeled a
distribution network, the measurement devices, the data concentration, the real-time
state-estimation and the control mechanism. We showed that by leveraging on the
accurate and frequent knowledge of the system state, GECN is able to control the state
of the system in time-scales of seconds, in order to maintain its voltage level within
predeﬁned limits.
In the coming years, the advancement of PMU and telecommunication technologies
are likely to facilitate the real deployment and ﬁeld testing of the functionalities and ap-
plications proposed in this thesis. However, several aspects are left for future research.
For instance:
• An optimal delay attack could be formulated to take into account (i) the maxi-
mum step and derivative of the reference time to avoid alarms in the clock-servo
and (ii) the actual response of the clock-servo to a variation of its reference time
input. In this case, research has to propose effective countermeasures.
• The adoption of the proposed protection scheme in real installations, might be
preceded by the deployment of a robust and possibly redundant communication
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layer. An evaluation of the impact of line-parameter errors on the fault-location
accuracy is needed. Another important aspect may be the development of a
method that relaxes the assumption of having a PMU at every bus.
Although further research is still needed , this thesis has shown that, by leveraging on
the proposed synchrophasor networks, system operators might already acknowledge
the beneﬁts delivered by PMUs and therefore adopt such technology for themonitoring,
protection and control of their assets.
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Table 28 – SiL ﬁeld trial, line parameters: length L in km, resistanceR in Ω/km, reac-
tanceX in Ω/km, and susceptanceB in S/km. The subscripts 0 and 1 stand for zero
and positive sequence, respectively.
L R0 X0 B0 R1 X1 B1
Line 1 4.682 0.217 0.756 14.3e-6 0.112 0.372 15.1e-6
Line 2 1.625 0.168 0.093 63.2e-6 0.051 0.205 63.2e-6
Line 3 1.916 0.168 0.093 63.2e-6 0.051 0.205 63.2e-6
Line 4 1.849 0.185 0.102 60.4e-6 0.051 0.210 60.4e-6
Line 5 4.249 0.177 0.498 57.2e-6 0.061 0.201 57.2e-6
Line 6 4.291 0.168 0.093 63.2e-6 0.051 0.205 63.2e-6
Line 7 2.841 0.226 0.611 57.4e-6 0.064 0.210 57.4e-6
Line 8 3.800 0.420 1.272 1.8e-6 0.159 0.410 2.8e-6
Line 9 4.682 0.217 0.756 14.3e-6 0.112 0.372 15.1e-6
Line 10 3.800 0.420 1.272 1.8e-6 0.159 0.410 2.8e-6
Table 29 – SiL ﬁeld trial, accuracy classes of PTs and CTs.
PT sending CT sending PT receiving CT receiving
Line 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Line 2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5
Line 3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5
Line 4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Line 5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
Line 6 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Line 7 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
Line 8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Line 9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Line 10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
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Table 30 – EPFL ﬁeld trial, line parameters: length L in km, resistance R in Ω/km,
reactance X in Ω/km, and susceptance B in S/km. The subscripts 0 and 1 stand for
zero and positive sequence, respectively.
L R0 X0 B0 R1 X1 B1
Line 1 0.46032 0.159 0.113 130e-6 0.159 0.113 130e-6
Line 2 0.0728 0.159 0.113 130e-6 0.159 0.113 130e-6
Line 3 0.07168 0.159 0.113 130e-6 0.159 0.113 130e-6
Line 4 0.03472 0.159 0.113 130e-6 0.159 0.113 130e-6
Table 31 – BML ﬁeld trial, line parameters: length L in km, resistance R in Ω/km,
reactance X in Ω/km, and susceptance B in S/km. The subscripts 0 and 1 stand for
zero and positive sequence, respectively.
L R0 X0 B0 R1 X1 B1
Line1,2 0.74464 1.0571 0.9104 7.3390e-5 0.1393 0.0752 1.4794e-4
Line2,3 0.92883 1.0568 0.9095 7.6043e-5 0.1393 0.0752 1.4718e-4
Line3,4 1.43843 0.8439 0.1967 1.1959e-5 0.1593 0.0874 1.4495e-4
Line4,5 1.81345 1.0405 0.8551 7.1209e-5 0.1408 0.0761 1.4942e-4
Line5,6 0.7059 0.8150 0.1000 1.4137e-5 0.1620 0.0890 1.4137e-4
Line6,7 0.31992 0.8150 0.1000 1.4137e-5 0.1620 0.0890 1.4137e-4
Line7,8 0.4312 0.8150 0.1000 1.4137e-5 0.1620 0.0890 1.4137e-4
Line8,9 0.5916 0.8150 0.1000 1.4137e-5 0.1620 0.0890 1.4137e-4
Line9,10 0.56363 0.8150 0.1000 1.4137e-5 0.1620 0.0890 1.4137e-4
Line10,11 0.45427 0.8150 0.1000 1.4137e-5 0.1620 0.0890 1.4137e-4
Line11,12 0.42235 1.2369 1.3535 5.5964e-5 0.3571 0.0824 1.0621e-4
Line5,13 0.51052 1.0600 0.9200 7.3828e-5 0.1390 0.0750 1.4765e-4
Line13,14 0.457 1.0600 0.9200 7.3828e-5 0.1390 0.0750 1.4765e-4
Line14,15 0.47166 1.0600 0.9200 7.3828e-5 0.1390 0.0750 1.4765e-4
Line13,16 0.22738 1.2400 1.3800 5.3407e-5 0.3560 0.0820 1.0681e-4
Line16,17 0.21808 1.2400 1.3800 5.3407e-5 0.3560 0.0820 1.0681e-4
Line17,18 0.41697 1.1922 0.9745 8.7439e-5 0.3734 0.0883 1.0003e-4
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Table 32 – BML ﬁeld trial, power of the transformers.
Rated Power (kVA)
Bus 2 160
Bus 3 250
Bus 4 400
Bus 5 200
Bus 6 250
Bus 7 1000
Bus 8 400
Bus 9 400
Bus 10 400
Bus 11 400
Bus 12 400
Bus 13 400
Bus 14 250
Bus 15 250
Bus 16 250
Bus 17 250
Bus 18 400
Table 33 – BML ﬁeld trial, accuracy of the combination of measurement sensors and
PMUs, adopted for the validation of the fault detection and faulted line-identiﬁcation
method.
Noise level 1
σVmag = 1.6 · 10−3 % σVph = 5.1 · 10−5 [rad]
σImag = 4.0 · 10−1 % σIph = 5.8 · 10−3 [rad]
Noise level 10
σVmag = 1.6 · 10−2 % σVph = 5.1 · 10−4 [rad]
σImag = 4.0% σIph = 5.8 · 10−2 [rad]
Table 34 – BML ﬁeld trial, accuracy of the combination of current protection sensors
and PMUs, adopted for the validation of the fault detection and faulted-line identiﬁca-
tion method.
Noise level 1 σImag = 4.0% σIph = 5.8 · 10−2 [rad]
Noise level 10 σImag = 12.0% σIph = 1.7 · 10−1 [rad]
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List of acronyms
ADN Active Distribution Network
AOA Angle Of Arrival
BD Bad Data
BDD Bad Data Detection
cRIO Compact Reconﬁgurable I/O (compactRIO)
CT Current Transformer
DER Distributed Energy Resource
DFT Discrete Fourier Transform
DG Distributed Generation
DKF Discrete Kalman Filter
DMS Distribution Management System
DN Distribution Network
DNO Distribution Network Operator
DOS Denial Of Service
DSO Distribution System Operator
DSSE Distribution System State Estimation
e-IpMSDFT Enhanced Interpolated Modulated Sliding DFT
EMS Energy Management System
FDI False Data Injection
FFT Fast Fourier Transform
FIFO First In First Out
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
GECN Grid Explicit Congestion Notiﬁcation
GLONASS GLObal NAvigation Satellite System
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS Global Positioning System
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IpDFT Interpolated Discrete Fourier Transform
IRIG Inter-Range Instrumentation Group
IT Information Technology
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List of acronyms
KF Kalman Filter
LAV Least Absolute Value
MITM Man In The Middle
MV Medium Voltage
NASPI North American Synchrophasor Initiative
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
PBTSP Packet-Based Time-Synchronization Protocol
PDC Phasor Data Concentrator
PE Phase Error
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PPS Pulse Per Second
PTP Precision Time Protocol
RAM Random Access Memory
RER Renewable Energy Resource
RFE Rate of change of Frequency Error
RFI Radio Frequency Interference
RMS Root Mean Square
ROCOF Rate Of Change Of Frequency
RTOS Real-time Operating System
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SDFT Sliding Discrete Fourier Transform
SE State Estimation
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio
TAI International Atomic Time
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TCL Thermostatically Controlled Load
TNO Transmission Network Operator
TSO Transmission System Operator
TVE Total Vector Error
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UTC Coordinated Universal Time
VT Voltage Transformer
WAMS Wide Area Monitoring System
WAMPAC Wide Area Monitoring Protection and Control
WLS Weighted Least Square
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